State v. James
Citation | 977 P.2d 489,361 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 |
Decision Date | 28 January 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 971544-CA,971544-CA |
Parties | 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 1999 UT App 17 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Douglas B. JAMES, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Utah |
D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Tony C. Baird, Logan, for Appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ.
¶1 Douglas B. James appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and his consequent conviction for drunk driving under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1998). We reverse.
¶2 When reviewing a trial court's order on a motion to suppress evidence, we recount the facts in a light most advantageous to the trial court's decision. See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Utah 1996).
¶3 While parked on the shoulder of State Road 101 at a traffic stop, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Kendrick was approached by a citizen who reported he had just seen a pickup truck either strike or almost strike three other vehicles. The citizen gave the trooper the truck's license number, make, color, and direction of travel. Trooper Kendrick ran the license number through dispatch, got the registered address, and drove there. As he neared the address, he saw the truck described by the citizen pull into the driveway. He stopped behind the truck, left his car, and approached the truck's driver's side door. He looked in the window and ensured his safety was not threatened by the truck's occupants, a male driver and female passenger. He then may or may not have knocked on the window, but, without necessarily waiting for a response, opened the door. 1
¶4 Upon opening the door, Trooper Kendrick asked the driver, James, to exit the truck. He saw containers of beer in the truck, one of which was open, and smelled alcohol. The two walked to the front of the truck, where Trooper Kendrick asked for James's driver's license. During their interaction, Trooper Kendrick smelled alcohol and observed James's slurred speech, flaccid face, and droopy, bloodshot eyes. The trooper then told James that he was there to investigate the citizen's report, and together they scanned the truck for signs of damage, finding none. At that point, James and the female passenger became difficult. Fearing for his safety, Trooper Kendrick asked James to stay put and went to his car to call for backup. James disobeyed the trooper's request and went inside his home.
¶5 When the backup trooper arrived, he and Trooper Kendrick entered the attached garage through the open garage door. The troopers knocked on the door leading from the garage into the house and told James that, if he did not come out, they would come in to get him. James came out and performed one field sobriety test, which he failed, then refused any further tests. The troopers arrested him for drunk driving and having an open container of alcohol in his truck.
¶6 Before and during trial, James moved to suppress all evidence obtained by the troopers. He argued that the troopers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights in three ways: (1) Trooper Kendrick lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his truck based on the citizen's report; (2) Trooper Kendrick illegally "searched" his truck by opening the door without probable cause; and (3) the troopers lacked the probable cause and exigent circumstances necessary to enter his garage without a warrant and arrest him. The trial court denied his motions. The jury went on to convict James of drunk driving, but acquitted him of the open container violation.
¶7 James appeals, reviving each of his Fourth Amendment arguments. Because we reverse the trial court's ruling regarding his second argument, we need not reach his first and third arguments. 2
¶8 James contends that Trooper Kendrick violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his truck without a warrant and without an exception to the warrant requirement. 3 Specifically, James argues that the trooper needed probable cause to open the door to his truck because opening the door constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. James thus asserts that any evidence obtained after the trooper opened the door should be suppressed and his conviction reversed.
¶9 With the burden of showing that the trooper's action was lawful, see State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990), the State rejoins that Trooper Kendrick was entitled to open the truck door as part of a legitimate investigative detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Alternatively, should we hold that opening the door constituted a search, the State effectively concedes the trooper lacked probable cause to search by simply urging us to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to affirm the trial court's ruling.
¶10 The trial court entered no findings of fact; however, the pertinent facts derived from the record are undisputed. We thus treat this appeal as involving only questions of law and review the trial court's ruling for correctness. See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct.App.1990).
¶11 "Although a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-15, 106 S.Ct. 960, 966, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (). Upon stopping a driver to investigate a possible traffic violation, an officer may temporarily detain the driver, passengers, and vehicle to examine the vehicle registration and driver's license. See Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135. For protection, the officer may also direct the driver to exit the vehicle. See id. If no arrest ensues, the officer may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle only when (1) probable cause supports it or (2) the officer is able to articulate reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be dangerous. See id.
¶12 It is well settled that a police officer's opening of a vehicle's door constitutes a search. See Class, 475 U.S. at 115, 106 S.Ct. at 966 ( ); Larocco, 794 P.2d at 466 ( ); Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1137 ( ); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1152-53, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) ( ); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 404, 487 N.E.2d 238, 239-40 (1986) ( ). We must thus initially reject out of hand the State's rather cursory contention that Trooper Kendrick's action was not a search, but part of his valid investigative detention of James.
¶13 Further, we need not dwell on grounds that would legitimate this search--i.e., officer safety or probable cause. See Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135. By not arguing them, the State effectively--and correctly, we add--concedes that these grounds do not exist here. We thus conclude that Trooper Kendrick conducted an unlawful search of James's truck when he opened the door.
¶14 This Fourth Amendment violation triggers the exclusionary rule which requires that the trial court suppress "the fruits of th[e] violation." State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah Ct.App.1995). The tainted evidence of James's intoxication was not excluded in this case and resulted in James's conviction. We therefore must overturn his conviction and order a new trial unless: (1) an exception to the exclusionary rule applies to redeem the State's evidence or (2) admission of the evidence was harmless error. See id.
¶15 To save its evidence and this conviction, the State pins its hopes on just one exception to the exclusionary rule: the inevitable discovery doctrine. 4 The State begins its argument by asserting that Trooper Kendrick had reasonable suspicion to detain James for investigation. 5 Thus, the State contends, aside from the trooper's illegal opening of James's door, it was inevitable that James would eventually exit the truck to enter the house and that Trooper Kendrick would then be able to observe the same evidence as he did when he opened the door. The State notes that "Trooper Kendrick would have made personal contact with the Defendant and detected the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his person and observed the other signs of alcohol consumption on the Defendant." 6
¶16 The inevitable discovery doctrine may best be understood in the context of the policies underlying the exclusionary rule. In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), the leading case on inevitable discovery, the Supreme Court stated that the "core rationale" behind the exclusionary rule is "that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections." Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 2508. The Court held, however, that the deterrence rationale has no bite when "the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. at 444, 104 S.Ct. at 2509. The Court explained that allowing otherwise tainted evidence in under this, the inevitable discovery...
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Case Summaries
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