State v. Jamison
Decision Date | 15 March 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 19409.,19409. |
Citation | 320 Conn. 589,134 A.3d 560 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Kenneth JAMISON. |
Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and Richard L. Palombo, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
John L. Cordani, Jr., assigned counsel, New Haven, for the appellee (defendant).
ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.
The state appeals, following our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed in part the judgment of the trial court convicting the defendant, Kenneth Jamison, following a jury trial, of, inter alia, illegal possession of an explosive in violation of General Statutes § 29–348, and manufacturing a bomb in violation of General Statutes § 53–80a.1 See State v. Jamison, 152 Conn.App. 753, 755, 780, 99 A.3d 1273 (2014). The state claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that, although the defendant did not request an accomplice credibility instruction, the trial court committed plain error by not providing one, sua sponte, to the jury. The defendant disputes the state's contention and also argues that, even if we agree with the state's claim, the Appellate Court's judgment can be affirmed on the alternative ground that the trial court had violated his rights under the Connecticut constitution by compelling him to provide a handwriting exemplar. We agree with the state that the trial court's failure to give an accomplice credibility instruction did not constitute plain error, and we also reject the defendant's alternative ground for affirmance. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. In 1995, "Maria Caban lived in a third floor apartment [at 400 Wood Avenue] in Bridgeport. The defendant, her boyfriend at the time, would stay with her on occasion. On October 12, 1995, at approximately 8:40 p.m., eight police officers executed a search warrant [for] the apartment, which had front and rear entrances. One group of officers entered the rear of the apartment using a battering ram while the second group entered through the front. The group entering from the front encountered the defendant, dressed only in boxer shorts, on the stairs leading up to the apartment. The defendant was brought up into the apartment and read his Miranda2 rights....
(Footnotes altered.) State v. Jamison, supra, 152 Conn.App. at 756–57, 99 A.3d 1273.
The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that, although the defense did not request an accomplice credibility instruction regarding Caban's testimony, it was plain error for the trial court not to have provided one, sua sponte, to the jury. Id., at 755, 760, 99 A.3d 1273. The Appellate Court agreed, concluding, first, that, because Caban had testified that she purchased the M–1000 and helped the defendant attach pennies to it, the trial court's failure to provide an accomplice credibility instruction was "a patent and readily discernible error"; id., at 762, 99 A.3d 1273 ; in light of decades of case law mandating that such an instruction be given when, as in the present case, a person who aided in the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged testifies against the accused at trial. Id., at 766 n. 5, 99 A.3d 1273.
The Appellate Court further concluded that the trial court's error was sufficiently harmful as to require reversal of the defendant's conviction of manufacturing a bomb and the illegal possession of an explosive. See id., at 765–66, 99 A.3d 1273. In reaching its determination, the Appellate Court considered the several factors first identified by this court in State v. Ruth, 181 Conn. 187, 199–200, 435 A.2d 3 (1980) —a case involving a preserved claim of instructional error—for determining whether the harm caused by the omission of an accomplice credibility instruction warranted a new trial. See State v. Jamison, supra, 152 Conn.App. at 763–64, 99 A.3d 1273. According to the Appellate Court, those considerations favored the defendant because Caban's testimony was the only evidence linking the defendant to the explosive device, Caban provided inconsistent testimony regarding the gun found in her apartment, and the trial court did not instruct the jury to consider Caban's potential bias in assessing her credibility. Id.
We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following question: "Did the Appellate Court properly reverse the defendant's convictions under the plain error doctrine where the trial court failed to give an accomplice credibility instruction?" State v. Jamison, 314 Conn. 943, 102 A.3d 1117 (2014). Because we answer the certified question in the negative, we must consider the defendant's alternative ground for affirmance, namely, that the trial court violated his rights under the Connecticut constitution when it required him to provide a handwriting exemplar. We need not address the merits of that claim, however, because we conclude that the use of the compelled handwriting exemplar at the defendant's trial was harmless.
We begin our analysis of the state's claim by setting forth the legal principles that govern our review of the claim. It is well established that the plain error doctrine, codified at Practice Book § 60–5, "is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpreserved [and nonconstitutional in nature], are of such monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our system of justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party.5 [T]he plain error doctrine ... is not ... a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that this court invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling that, although either not properly preserved or never raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal of the trial court's judgment ... for reasons of policy.... In addition, the plain error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.... Plain error is a doctrine that should be invoked sparingly.... Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion ... that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review....
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...error review, they are not, of themselves, sufficient for its application." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jamison , 320 Conn. 589, 596, 134 A.3d 560 (2016). "[T]he plain error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence of the error is so ......
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