State v. Janis

• Decision Date: 10 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 13237,13237
• Citation: 317 N.W.2d 133
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Marvin Wayne JANIS, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 133

317 N.W.2d 133

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Marvin Wayne JANIS, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 13237.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued April 24, 1981.

Decided March 10, 1982.

Dennis R. Holmes and Mark Smith, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellant; Mark V. Meierhenry, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.

Jerry Matthews, Pine Ridge, for defendant and appellee.

Tom D. Tobin of Tobin Law Offices, Winner, for amici curiae Corson and Ziebach Counties, South Dakota, and Sioux County, North Dakota; William W. Shakely of Tobin Law Offices, Washington, D.C., on brief.

Joseph G. Troisi, Eagle Butte, W. Richard West, Jr. of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, Washington, D.C., for amici curiae Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe; Reid Peyton Chambers, Washington, D.C., on brief.

Charles J. Mickel, Rapid City, for amicus curiae Public Safety Commission Oglala Sioux Tribe.

MORGAN, Justice.

This appeal relates to jurisdiction in areas of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation opened to settlement by the Surplus Lands Act of May 29, 1908, 35 Stat. 460. It arises from a manslaughter prosecution of Marvin Janis (Janis), an enrolled member of the Pine Ridge Sioux Tribe, who allegedly caused a double-fatality automobile accident on U.S. Highway 212 in Dewey County, South Dakota, within the original boundaries of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation. It is also alleged that Janis was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor when the accident occurred. The trial court dismissed for lack of state jurisdiction. The State appealed. We reverse and remand.

The jurisdictional facts, pertinent to the decision below, were stipulated and, in essence, are as follows: (1) Janis is an enrolled tribal member; (2) he was charged with manslaughter in the second degree; (3) the accident occurred on U.S. Highway 212 in the SW 1/4 of Section 10, Township 12 North, Range 23 E.B.H.M., Dewey County, South Dakota; (4) that said site was patented in fee in 1919 and since then has been nontrust property presently owned by a non-Indian; and (5) that said site is within the original confines of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation and inside that portion of the reservation opened to settlement by the Surplus Lands Act of May 29, 1908, 35 Stat. 460.

Janis moved for dismissal on the grounds that; (1) he is an Indian as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. 1151; (2) the site of the alleged crime is in "Indian country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151; (3) the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of manslaughter offenses allegedly committed in "Indian country" by Indians; and (4) the State is without jurisdiction to prosecute him. The trial court granted the motion.

This court last considered the issue of Indian jurisdiction in opened lands of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation in Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117 (S.D.1977). In an elaborate discussion of the development of the history of the case law on the subject, this court, in an opinion authored by then Chief Justice Dunn, specifically held that the Surplus Lands Act of May 29, 1908 diminished the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation and, concommitantly, that the courts of South Dakota possess subject matter jurisdiction over the diminished area. ¹ In arriving at that decision we relied on our previous opinions in State v. Barnes, 81 S.D. 511, 137 N.W.2d 683 (1965) and Lafferty v. State for Jameson, 80 S.D. 411, 125 N.W.2d 171 (1963).

We have found no case law that overrules Stankey or that persuades us that we should do so now. Stankey teaches us that although the decision results in checkerboard jurisdiction on the reservation and some confusion attends criminal jurisdiction in the area.

[I]t cannot compare with the confusion in determining criminal jurisdiction that has existed since Seymour [v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962)] with Indian defendants charged with a crime within the original boundaries of a reservation claiming federal jurisdiction if convicted in state courts and claiming state jurisdiction if convicted in federal courts. The finality of where jurisdiction belongs far outweighs any problems of determining whether a crime was committed on Indian allotments or on deeded land.

Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d at 127.

Janis argues that the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Dupris, 612 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1979) are authority to reverse Stankey. We disagree and endorse our previous opinions since they, the opinion of Judge Bogue in United States v. Juvenile, 453 F.Supp. 1171 (D.S.D.1978), and Judge McMillian's dissent in United States v. Dupris, 612 F.2d at 323, more closely follow pertinent United States Supreme Court decisions than the majority opinions in Dupris and Condon.

We hold that the Surplus Lands Act of 1908, on its face, from surrounding circumstances and legislative history disestablished tribal and federal jurisdiction over unallotted lands on the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation. Thus, the legislative intent sufficiently expresses a policy of disestablishment to override the rule of construction that ambiguities and doubtful expressions are resolved favorably to the Indians. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586-7, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 1362-1363, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 1092, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975), rehearing denied, 421 U.S. 939, 95 S.Ct. 1667, 44 L.Ed.2d 95 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 37 L.Ed.2d 92 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962). In this respect, the instant case is more analogous to DeCoteau and Rosebud than it is to Mattz and Seymour.

The most recent diminishment decision, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. at 586, 97 S.Ct. at 1362, considered the effect of three Surplus Lands Acts. There, the Court found a controlling legislative intent to disestablish the reservation. The pivotal expositor of this intent was a pre-statute agreement which unequivocally divested jurisdiction. The agreement, as ratified, stated that the Indian bands "cede, surrender, grant and convey" their unallotted interests. The subsequent divesting Acts merely changed the method of payment to the Indians for the purchase of the opened lands.

Two years before Rosebud the Court held in DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. at 425, 95 S.Ct. at 1082, that an 1891 Surplus Lands Act diminished the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation. As in Rosebud, the Court relied on a previously negotiated agreement. The ratifying act provided that "the Indians cede, sell, relinquish and convey" unallotted lands in exchange for a negotiated amount. Id., at 437, 95 S.Ct., at 1089. This language was precisely suited to diminishment. The Court held that the face of the Act, the legislative history and the surrounding circumstances, clearly indicated an intent to terminate federal and tribal jurisdiction over these lands. Id., at 444, 95 S.Ct., at 1092.

DeCoteau cited Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. at 481, 93 S.Ct. at 2245, as establishing the rule that a clear intent evidenced by the Act itself, its legislative history or the surrounding circumstances could rebut the presumption of tribal or federal jurisdiction over lands within reservation boundaries. ² In Mattz, an 1892 Surplus Lands Act was held not to terminate tribal or federal jurisdiction over unallotted lands within reservation boundaries because the language of the Act was consistent with a continued reservation status. Moreover, unlike Rosebud and DeCoteau, this 1892 Act was not preceded by an agreement expressing Indian consent to diminishment. The Court reached its decision after an extensive analysis of both reservation and congressional history.

The seminal opinion in diminishment cases is Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. at 351, 82 S.Ct. at 424, where the Court held that the 1906 Surplus Lands Act for the Colville Indian Reservation opened the reservation for settlement without dissolving reservation boundaries. Primary significance was given to the Act's language which lacked an express reference to termination or, adversely, restoration to the public domain. Moreover, the Act referred specifically to the "Colville Indian Reservation" which would not exist if the Act terminated the boundaries.

As in Rosebud and DeCoteau, James McLaughlin, special agent for the federal government, negotiated an agreement with the Cheyenne River Indian bands. The Cheyenne River Indians agreed "to sell and dispose of" their unallotted interests. Although the instant agreement lacked the word "cede," its presence or absence is not the sine qua non of disestablishment. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87, 90 (8th Cir. 1975) aff'd, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977). Admittedly, "sell" and "dispose" were used in the surplus lands act considered in Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354-5, 82 S.Ct. at 426. Yet, that case did not involve a reference to a "diminished" reservation which is evident, here, in section 2 of the 1908 Surplus Lands Act. In United States v. Wounded Knee, 596 F.2d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1979), the omission of "diminished" from federal legislation became a salient factor in holding that Crow Creek Sioux Indian Reservation was not diminished. Its presence here has an equal but opposite impact.

The instant case differs from Mattz and Seymour. Both cases considered the effect of unilateral congressional acts not preceded by a negotiated agreement. Unlike those acts, the 1908 Surplus Lands Act began as a previously negotiated agreement entered into by the Cheyenne River Indians. This agreement, and its negotiation and effect closely resembles the situations in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 425, 95 S.Ct. at 1082, and Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 584, 97 S.Ct. at 1361, where ...