State v. Jeffcoat, 21934
| Decision Date | 06 June 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 21934,21934 |
| Citation | 279 S.C. 167,303 S.E.2d 855 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Glen A. JEFFCOAT and William Hutchinson, Appellants. |
Kerry W. Koon and O. Grady Query, Charleston, and Frederick A. Gertz and Alice S. Moore, Columbia, and Deputy Appellate Defender David W. Carpenter, of S.C. Com'n of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellants.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Retired Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. William K. Moore and C. Richard Kelly, Columbia, for respondent.
Appellants Jeffcoat and Hutchinson were convicted of five counts of obtaining property or signatures by false pretenses and one count of conspiracy to obtain property or signatures by false pretenses. Jeffcoat was also convicted of three counts of breach of trust with fraudulent intent. Jeffcoat was fined and sentenced to a total of fifteen years; Hutchinson was fined and sentenced to three months actual confinement and five years probation. We affirm.
In April 1979, appellant Jeffcoat contracted to purchase certain land from Gibson-Wall Partnership for $2,030,000.00. The contract called for a $50,000.00 deposit, payment of 8.5% interest on the remaining $1,980,000.00 on September 15, 1979, with closing soon thereafter. Immediately after signing the sale contract, appellants began selling residential lots to individual purchasers.
Appellants failed to pay the interest due on September 15th, and Gibson-Wall declared the contract breached in late October. The contract being breached, appellants could not obtain title to convey to those who purchased from them. Nevertheless, appellants continued to accept installment payments from purchasers pursuant to the sales contracts.
Appellants first contend the trial judge erred in denying their motions for directed verdicts on the charges of obtaining property or signatures by false pretenses because (1) the State failed to prove the elements of the crime, and (2) the proof varied from the allegations contained in the indictments.
The indictments allege appellants falsely pretended the land was unencumbered, and that the land was suitable for installation of septic tanks. At trial, the State presented evidence the appellants held themselves out as owning the land, and did not disclose to purchasers that they did not have legal title. Additionally, the record establishes appellants, although aware the water table was too high and that the Department of Health and Environmental Control prohibited septic tanks on subdivisions of more than forty lots, told purchasers they could place septic tanks on the lots.
Other than complete lack of ownership, we know of no greater encumbrance to a land transfer than lack of legal title. We hold that a seller's failure to disclose his lack of legal title can constitute a false pretense. See State v. Johnson, 20 S.C. 387 (1883); State v. Stanley, 116 Kan. 449, 227 [279 S.C. 170] P. 263 (Kan.1924); 35 CJS, False Pretenses, § 8. We see no material variance warranting a directed verdict.
Appellant Jeffcoat contends the State failed to prove he made any misrepresentations, since his sales agent, appellant Hutchinson, handled the sales. However, the record reveals Jeffcoat furnished Hutchinson with restrictive covenants and contracts of sale which contained the misrepresentations, and obviously intended that these documents be given to the purchasers. Jeffcoat's bookkeeper and another salesman testified they were instructed by Jeffcoat to tell purchasers the lots were suitable for septic tanks. The evidence sufficiently establishes Jeffcoat's guilt as a principal. See State v. Thompkins, et al., 220 S.C. 523, 68 S.E.2d 465 (1951); State v. Blackwell, et al., 220 S.C. 342, 67 S.E.2d 684 (1951).
Appellants next assert the trial judge erred in denying their motions for directed verdict on the conspiracy charge as the State failed to prove a conspiracy.
S.C.Code Ann. § 16-17-410 (1976) defines a conspiracy as "... a combination between two or more persons for the purpose of accomplishing a criminal or unlawful object or an object neither criminal nor unlawful by criminal or unlawful means." Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. State v....
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...in ruling on questions concerning the relevancy of evidence. State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 401 S.E.2d 146 (1991); State v. Jeffcoat, 279 S.C. 167, 303 S.E.2d 855 (1983). Evidence is relevant if it tends to establish or make more or less probable some matter in issue upon which it direct......
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