State v. Jefferies

• Decision Date: 20 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 24111,24111
• Citation: 316 S.C. 13,446 S.E.2d 427
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Petitioner, v. Jeffrey Charles JEFFERIES, Respondent. . Heard

Page 427

446 S.E.2d 427

316 S.C. 13

The STATE, Petitioner, v. Jeffrey Charles JEFFERIES, Respondent.

No. 24111.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Oct. 20, 1993.

Decided July 5, 1994.

Rehearing Denied July 28, 1994.

T. Travis Medlock, Atty. Gen., Donald J. Zelenka, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman Mark Rapoport, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia, and Donald V. Myers, Sol., Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Lexington, for petitioner.

Franklin W. Draper, Asst. Public Defender, and South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for respondent.

TOAL, Justice.

The State of South Carolina ("State") appeals the judgment of the Court of Appeals in State v. Jefferies, 308 S.C. 414, 418 S.E.2d 339 (Ct.App.1992), which summarily remanded the case for a new trial. We reverse.

FACTS

On the evening of November 25, 1988, the defendant ("Jefferies") escaped from John G. Richards Youth Detention Center located in the St. Andrews area of Richland County. After his escape, Jefferies looked for an automobile to steal so he could go home to Gaffney, South Carolina.

Shortly after Jefferies' escape, Ronald Caldwell ("Father") and his four-month-old son, Matthew, drove into a convenience store parking lot at Ashland and St. Andrews Roads to use the telephone. Matthew was attached to a heart monitor. He was strapped in an infant car seat. The evidence is conflicting as to whether Matthew was in the front seat or the back seat of the automobile.

The Father decided to leave Matthew in the automobile with the motor running while he used the pay telephone. Realizing that he did not have enough change, the Father started to go into the store. The Father glanced back at his automobile and saw Jefferies opening the door and getting in.

Jefferies got into the automobile and began to drive away. The Father immediately ran to the automobile and grabbed onto the partially open driver's window. Jefferies continued to drive on to Ashland Road then right on to St. Andrews Road heading towards Interstate 26. ¹ As the Father hung onto the window and car door, he pleaded with Jefferies to release the baby.

Jefferies admits that while the Father was hanging onto the moving vehicle, pleading for the release of his child, Jefferies looked around in the automobile and saw Matthew. Nevertheless, Jefferies continued towards the interstate. On the entrance ramp to Interstate 26, Jefferies increased speed and the Father fell off. The Father was picked up by onlookers and they gave chase. Shortly thereafter, they lost Jefferies. The Father then called the police.

Jefferies was picked up by the Gaffney police between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m. on November 26, 1988 in Cherokee County, South Carolina. He told police that he left the baby at a service station in Newberry, South Carolina, more than twenty miles from where the automobile was stolen. Matthew was found, in his car seat still attached to the heart monitor, beside the garbage dumpster of a service station in Newberry, South Carolina shortly after 3:45 a.m. that same morning. Matthew was taken to the Newberry Hospital, treated and released.

At trial, Jefferies, through his attorneys, admitted stealing the automobile. Jefferies' attorneys claimed, however, that because Jefferies did not know Matthew was in the automobile at the time he stole the automobile, Jefferies could not have intended to kidnap Matthew. The trial judge refused the charge on "intent" submitted by Jefferies. Instead, the trial judge read the statute on kidnapping and charged as an additional element "positive act."

After the jury began deliberation, the foreman asked the trial judge to re-charge the law of kidnapping. The jury was brought in and the judge charged the jury with language identical to that of the first charge. The trial judge then asked the jury to return to the jury room and resume deliberation. The foreman again sent a note asking for the judge to define the term "positive act." The trial judge refused to define the term and directed the jury to continue their deliberations. Finally, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of kidnapping. ²

On direct appeal, Jefferies claimed the trial judge erred in not defining the term "positive act." Jefferies also claimed the trial judge erred in not charging "intent" as an element of kidnapping. The Court of Appeals held the trial judge's failure to define "positive act" was error. The Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of whether "intent" must be charged, rather they summarily held that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jefferies, 304 S.C. 141, 403 S.E.2d 169 (Ct.App.1991). This Court denied certiorari and Jefferies appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to review in light of Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991). Jefferies v. South Carolina, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1464, 117 L.Ed.2d 611 (1992). The Court of Appeals granted Jefferies a new trial in a summary opinion. State v. Jefferies, 308 S.C. 414, 418 S.E.2d 339 (Ct.App.1992). The State appeals.

LAW/ANALYSIS

The State first claims that the Court of Appeals was not required to order a new trial for Jefferies by virtue of the remand from the United States Supreme Court. We agree. See e.g., Arnold v. South Carolina, 484 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 743, 98 L.Ed.2d 757 (1988) (remanding for harmless error analysis), appeal after remand, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992) (affirming conviction), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1302, 122 L.Ed.2d 691 (1993). The United States Supreme Court used the following language in remanding the case to the Court of Appeals: "[t]he judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals of South Carolina for further consideration in light of Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991)." This is the identical language used by the United States Supreme Court in remanding Arnold v. South Carolina, 484 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 743, 98 L.Ed.2d 757 (1988), and Plath v. South Carolina, 484 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 743, 98 L.Ed.2d 757 (1988). ³ Consistent with our prior opinion in Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992), we do not read the language of the United States Supreme Court's remand as requiring an automatic new trial. Rather, we read the remand as a directive to the Court to determine whether the constitutional error was harmless.

Next, the State contends the trial judge's instructions on the mental element or required mens rea of kidnaping was sufficient. Further, the State contends that if the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the mens rea required, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.

I. Mens Rea

"Few areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 100 S.Ct. 624, 631, 62 L.Ed.2d 575, 586 (1980). "Criminal liability is normally based upon the concurrence of two factors, 'an evil meaning mind [and] an evil doing hand,' " Id. at 402, 100 S.Ct. at 631, 62 L.Ed.2d at 586; although this Court has recognized that the legislature may declare an act criminal regardless of the mental state of the actor. State v. Ferguson, 302 S.C. 269, 395 S.E.2d 182 (1990); State v. Manos, 179 S.C. 45, 183 S.E. 582 (1936). Thus, we must determine what, if any, mens rea is required for the crime of kidnapping.

The required mens rea for a particular crime can be classified into a hierarchy of culpable states of mind in descending order of culpability, as purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404, 100 S.Ct. at 631, 62 L.Ed.2d at 586-87. "At common law, crimes generally were classified as requiring either 'general intent' or 'specific intent.' This venerable distinction, however, has been the source of a good deal of confusion." Id. at 403, 100 S.Ct. at 631, 62 L.Ed.2d at 586. Thus, the commentators and Model Penal Code have rejected the traditional dichotomy in favor of the hierarchical approach. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 28 (1972).

The kidnapping statute does not expressly state whether a mens rea is required. ⁴ Thus, we look to common law and the development of the statute to determine whether the legislature intended the crime to require a mens rea. State v. Ferguson, 302 S.C. 269, 395 S.E.2d 182 (1990).

Originally, kidnapping required the lesser degree of mental culpability of "knowledge." ⁵ In 1937, the additional element of "holding for ransom" was required which indicated that the actor must have had a "purpose" or "desired result." Act No. 106, 1937 S.C.Acts 137. This element, however, was deleted in 1976, clearly indicating the legislature intended to lower the standard of culpability required to hold one liable for the crime of kidnapping. Act No. 684, 1976 S.C.Acts 1787. ⁶ While we find clear legislative intent to require a lesser mens rea than "purpose," ⁷ we find no evidence of legislative intent to make the crime of kidnapping a crime of strict liability. See State v. Ferguson, 302 S.C. 269, 395 S.E.2d 182 (1990). "In order to give effect to the purpose of the legislature, in construction of a statute a court may supply a word which is unintentionally omitted." Gaffney v. Mallory, 186 S.C. 337, 348, 195 S.E. 840, 845 (1938). We find that the mens rea of "knowledge" ⁸ is required under S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-910 (1985).

II. Jury Charge

Turning to the case at bar, Jefferies submitted four proposed jury charges to the trial judge on the element of mens rea. Each of the charges submitted by Jefferies contained either the element of "specific intent" or "purpose." ⁹ "Purpose" is the highest level of mens rea known in criminal law and it is not required under the South Carolina kidnapping statute. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404, 100 S.Ct. at 631, 62 L.Ed.2d at 587 ...