State v. Jefferson
Decision Date | 11 December 2001 |
Docket Number | 20112 |
Citation | 786 A.2d 1189 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTHONY JEFFERSON THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT AC 20112 |
Counsel: Pamela S. Nagy, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, were G. Douglas Nash, public defender, and Diane C. Iglesias and Robert C. Koetsch, certified legal interns, for the appellant (defendant). Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and Joseph J. Harry, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
The defendant, Anthony Jefferson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b) 1 and possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public housing project in violation of General Statutes § 21a278a (b). 2 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction, (2) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the nature of his prior felony conviction for escape and (3) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that violated the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of July 17, 1998, officers Keith Grieco and Jeremy DePietro of the Bridgeport police department were patrolling the west side of Bridgeport in a marked patrol car when an unidentified man approached their vehicle and informed them that a heavy-set adult black man, with long dreadlocks, dressed in a red shirt and baggy jeans, sitting at a card table, was selling narcotics near building fifteen in the P.T. Barnum housing project. The officers immediately proceeded to the housing project to investigate the complaint, arriving at approximately 7:45 p.m. Upon arriving, they parked their patrol car near the administration building, exited the vehicle and walked to a location that provided a clear view of building fifteen.
From that location, the officers observed the defendant sitting at a card table near the stairwell of building fifteen. The defendant fit the description provided by the unidentified man. After a few minutes, the officers observed a ''white male or light skinned Hispanic male'' approach the defendant and engage him in a brief conversation. The defendant then stood up, walked to the stairwell, reached under the lip of the stairwell and pulled out a ''glassine fold,'' which Grieco testified was consistent with the packaging of narcotics. The defendant gave the man the glassine fold in exchange for paper currency. As soon as the transaction was complete, the man left the area and the defendant again reached under the lip of the stairwell, pulled out a plastic bag containing multiple glassine folds, looked inside it and then replaced it under the lip of the stairwell.
At that point, the officers walked to the stairwell where the defendant had replaced the plastic bag. DePietro reached under the lip and pulled out two plastic bags, each containing multiple glassine folds that were similar to the fold the defendant had handed to the buyer. The state toxicology laboratory subsequently tested the contents of the two bags. One bag was found to contain seventy-eight glassine folds of cocaine, weighing a total of 6.9 grams, and the other bag was found to contain sixty-six glassine folds of heroin, weighing a total of 3.4 grams.
After DePietro found the two bags, he handed them to Grieco. At the same time, the defendant started to walk hastily away. DePietro and Grieco, both in full uniform, instructed the defendant to stop. In response, the defendant looked back at them and began to run toward building eleven. The officers chased the defendant to the back of building eleven, where they observed him enter apartment 102. They knocked on the door, and Gerald Williams answered. The officers explained to Williams why they were there and asked him if the defendant was in the apartment. Williams replied that no one was there except his girlfriend and shut the door. The officers then decided to call dispatch to request backup units. Shortly thereafter, the officers' supervisor arrived on the scene with backup units.
The supervisor again explained to Williams why the police officers were there and asked him if the defendant was in the apartment. A few minutes later, the defendant walked out of the apartment. As he walked out, DePietro advised him to place his hands on the wall and that he was under arrest. The defendant became verbally abusive and resisted DePietro's efforts to arrest him. As a crowd of onlookers began to gather, DePietro forcibly handcuffed the defendant and took him into custody. No narcotics or money were found on the defendant. The man that the officers observed buying drugs from the defendant was not apprehended.
Thereafter, the defendant was convicted of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent and possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public housing project. After the jury returned the guilty verdict, the defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial. The court denied both motions and this appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction and, therefore, he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process. Specifically, the defendant argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he exercised constructive possession over the cocaine and heroin found under the lip of the stairwell, and that he had the intent to sell the narcotics. 3 We disagree.
Initially, we note that because the defendant did not raise those claims at trial, they are unpreserved. The defendant maintains, however, that they are reviewable pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 4 We agree with the defendant that his claims are reviewable.
''Unpreserved sufficiency claims are reviewable on appeal because such claims implicate a defendant's federal constitutional right not to be convicted of a crime upon insufficient proof.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. O'Neil, 65 Conn. App. 145, 151, 782 A.2d 209, cert. granted on other grounds, 258 Conn. 932, A.2d (2001). Our Supreme Court has stated that ''Jackson v. Virginia, [443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)], compels the conclusion that any defendant found guilty on the basis of insufficient evidence has been deprived of a constitutional right, and would therefore necessarily meet the four prongs of Golding.'' State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270, 275-76 n.3, 623 A.2d 42 (1993). Accordingly, we will review the defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claims.
'(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 175, 778 A.2d 955 (2001).
'(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Best, 56 Conn. App. 742, 752-53, 745 A.2d 223, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 902, 753 A.2d 937 (2000).
''The test for determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict is thus whether the [jury] could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn...
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