State v. Jefferson

Decision Date17 July 2017
Docket NumberNo. 76011-4-I.,76011-4-I.
Citation199 Wash.App. 772,401 P.3d 805
Parties STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Tyree William JEFFERSON, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

Lise Ellner, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 2711, Vashon, WA, 98070-2711, for Appellant.

James S. Schacht, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, 930 Tacoma Ave. S, Rm. 946, Tacoma, WA, 98402-2102, for Respondent.

Mann, J.¶1 Tyree Jefferson appeals his conviction for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Jefferson raises ten issues on appeal, including: (1) the trial court erred in denying his Batson 1 challenge after the State used a peremptory challenge to strike the only African American venireperson, (2) the trial court violated the appearance of fairness doctrine, (3) the trial court erred in denying a mistrial for jury misconduct, (4) the trial court erred in admitting gang evidence, (5) the trial court erred in excluding evidence and testimony from one of Jefferson's witnesses, (6) prosecutorial misconduct, (7) that insufficient evidence supported the convictions, (8) the "to convict" instruction was inadequate, (9) ineffective counsel, and (10) cumulative error. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2 On February 14, 2013, Harmony Wortham and Lashonda Goodman went to Latitude 84, a Tacoma nightclub. At Latitude 84, Wortham and Goodman met an acquaintance Dimitri Powell and Powell's younger relative, Tyree Jefferson.

¶3 Over the course of the evening, a dispute arose between Goodman and Rosendo Robinson, another bar patron, over Goodman's sunglasses. Eventually, Goodman and Wortham were kicked out of Latitude 84, and the police arrived. The police interviewed Goodman and Wortham, but did not resolve the dispute over Goodman's sunglasses.

¶4 After the police left, Goodman and one of Robinson's female friends, Jessica Hunter, agreed to settle the dispute with a fight. Goodman, Wortham, and Robinson met at the Union 76 gas station across the street from Latitude 84 to fight. Powell and Jefferson also arrived at the gas station. The Union 76 surveillance cameras captured many of the events. The cameras showed Goodman and Wortham confronting and punching Robinson through his car's driver's side window. Robinson stepped out of his car to confront Goodman. And as he did so, Powell and Jefferson got out of a black Nissan Altima and approached. While Powell got into a physical altercation with Robinson, Jefferson walked back to the black car, opened the trunk, pulled out an object, and then ran toward Robinson with his arm outstretched holding a dark item. Surveillance camera 10 showed Jefferson chasing Robinson and Robinson fleeing from Jefferson into the street. After Robinson fled, Jefferson ran back to Powell's car. Moments later, the cars at the Union 76 station sped off.¶5 Robinson was struck by bullets at the gas station and as he fled on foot across the street. He sustained five gunshot wounds

to the torso. Robinson initially identified Powell as the shooter, but after watching the videos, he changed his mind and believed that Jefferson shot him. Wortham, Goodman, and Hunter identified Jefferson as the shooter.

¶6 On July 12, 2013, Jefferson was charged with one count of first degree assault by alternative means and one count of unlawful first degree possession of a firearm. The charges were subsequently amended to add one count of attempted first degree murder.

¶7 The trial began with jury selection on May 4, 2014. Jury deliberations began on May 20, 2015. The jury convicted Jefferson of (1) attempted first degree murder, (2) first degree assault, and (3) unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. Jefferson was sentenced to a low-end standard range sentence of 277.5 months in prison plus 60 months additional for the firearm sentence enhancement.

¶8 Jefferson appeals his conviction.

ANALYSIS

I

¶9 Jefferson argues first that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge after the State used a peremptory challenge to strike the only African American venireperson in his jury pool. Jefferson claims the peremptory strike was clearly racially motivated in violation of the equal protection guaranty described in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed. 2d 69 (1986). We disagree.

¶10 We review a Batson challenge for clear error, deferring to the trial court to the extent its rulings are factual. State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wash.2d 34, 41, 309 P.3d 326 (2013). "Clear error exists when the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Saintcalle, 178 Wash.2d at 41, 309 P.3d 326. "Deference to trial court findings is critically important in Batson cases because the trial court is much better positioned than an appellate court to examine the circumstances surrounding the challenge." Saintcalle, 178 Wash.2d at 56, 309 P.3d 326.

¶11 The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits racial discrimination during the jury selection process. "Those on the venire must be ‘indifferently chosen,’ to secure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment to ‘protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.’ " Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309, 25 L. Ed 664 (1879) ).

¶12 Batson established a three-step analysis to determine whether a prosecutor's peremptory strike unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of race. First, the person challenging the peremptory must "make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Second, the " ‘burden shifts to the State to come forward with a [race-]neutral explanation’ for the challenge." Saintcalle, 178 Wash.2d at 42, 309 P.3d 326 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ) (alterations in original). Finally, " ‘the trial court then [has] the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.’ " Saintcalle, 178 Wash.2d at 42, 309 P.3d 326 (quoting Batson , 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ). Under this "purposeful discrimination" part of the Batson analysis, courts must examine whether the race-neutral explanation could apply just as well to a nonminority juror who was allowed to serve. Saintcalle, 178 Wash.2d at 43, 309 P.3d 326.

¶13 During voir dire, the State exercised a peremptorily challenge against juror 10—the last African American person from the venire. Jefferson, an African American, challenged this strike with a Batson motion. The trial court, walking through the three-step Batson analysis, concluded first that Jefferson had established a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. The trial court then shifted the burden to the State by asking the State to explain the reason why it struck juror 10. The State explained that three of juror 10's responses were concerning. First, juror 10 stated that he thought the voir dire questioning was a "waste of time." Second, juror 10 admitted that he previously brought extraneous evidence into the deliberations while serving as a juror in a criminal trial. And third, juror 10 enthusiastically described, in detail, the movie 12 Angry Men.

¶14 The trial court considered the State's explanation and concluded that the State had met its burden of producing a nondiscriminatory explanation for its challenge. The court then turned to the third step of the Batson analysis and concluded that that Jefferson had not established purposeful discrimination. Giving due deference to the trial court, its decision was not clearly erroneous.

¶15 At least two of juror 10's responses support the trial court's decision to deny Jefferson's Batson challenge. First, juror 10 stated voir dire was a "waste of time." Striking a juror who indicates that the voir dire and pretrial proceedings are a "waste of time" is a reasonable, race-neutral reason to strike a juror. Second, juror 10 admitted that while serving as a juror in a criminal trial he brought extraneous evidence into the deliberations. This is also a reasonable race-neutral reason to strike a juror.

¶16 Jefferson argues that the State's reasons for striking juror 10 were pretexts for a race based strike. First, he claims that juror 1 also believed that voir dire was a waste of time. To support his claim, Jefferson cites to his defense counsel's argument, not juror 1's alleged statement. Juror 1 never said that voir dire was a waste of time. Second, Jefferson claims that although other jurors discussed 12 Angry Men, the State only struck juror 10. This claim also fails, however, because juror 9 was also enthusiastic about the move and was challenged. Jefferson cannot establish that the trial court's decision to deny his Batson motion was clear error.

¶17 While we find no error, we are concerned with what appears to be the State's primary argument on appeal. The State repeatedly, in both its briefing before this court, and during oral argument, argued that we should affirm the trial court's denial of Jefferson's Batson motion because of "the circumstances evident to the trial court." Specifically, that "(1) the case was being tried before an African American judge, (2) the prosecutor was African American.... (3) the defendant was African American, and (4) the defense attorney was a Caucasian woman." The State argues:

[I]n essence, the defense attorney's objection amounted to this: the African American prosecutor chose this particular case to attempt to engage in purposeful race discrimination against an African American venire member. Even more implausibly he did so allegedly against a venire member who shared both his and the judge's racial background.[2 ]

¶18 In essence, the State invites us to accept the proposition that where the prosecutor is an African American or other minority, we should presume that there was no purposeful...

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8 cases
  • State v. Jefferson, 94853-4
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • November 1, 2018
    ...337.5 months of incarceration. CP at 409.¶ 8 Jefferson appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. State v. Jefferson, 199 Wash.App. 772, 784, 401 P.3d 805 (2017), review granted, 189 Wash.2d 1038, 409 P.3d 1052 (2018).¶ 9 Jefferson then petitioned for review on three issue......
  • State v. Cox
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • February 3, 2020
    ...Indeed, we have relied on DeRyke to reject the argument that Cox makes here. See, e.g., State v. Jefferson, 199 Wn.App. 772, 809-10, 401 P.3d 805 (2017). rev'd on other grounds, 192 Wn.2d 225, 429 P.3d 467 (2018); State v. Boswell, 185 Wn.App. 321, 336-37, 340 P.3d 971 (2014); cf. State v. ......
  • State v. Arndt, 48525-7-II
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • December 12, 2017
    ...to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. State v. Jefferson, 199 Wn. App. 772, 800, 401 P.3d 805 (2017). There also is a fundamental due process right to present a defense under the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Lizarraga, 191 Wn. App. 530......
  • State v. Arndt, 48525-7-II
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • December 12, 2017
    ...to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. State v. Jefferson, 199 Wn.App. 772, 800, 401 P.3d 805 (2017). There also is a fundamental due process right to present a defense under the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Lizarraga, 191 Wn.App. 530, ......
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