State v. Jeffrey, 13904
| Decision Date | 31 December 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 13904,13904 |
| Citation | 220 Conn. 698,601 A.2d 993 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Robert K. JEFFREY. |
Richard Emanuel, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was G. Douglas Nash, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Harry Weller, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Atty., and David Gold, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before SHEA, CALLAHAN, COVELLO, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.
After a jury trial the defendant, Robert K. Jeffrey, was convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a) 1 and kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92(a)(2)(A). 2 He was subsequently sentenced to an effective term of twelve years imprisonment, suspended after eight years followed by four years probation. He appeals from that judgment, claiming that the trial court improperly: (1) admitted into evidence a urine stained shirt worn by the complainant on the night of the incident; (2) admitted into evidence a "sex crimes report" prepared by the police; (3) admitted into evidence a certain prior consistent statement made by a witness for the state; (4) failed to instruct the jury on the defendant's reasonable belief that the complainant had consented; (5) defined a reasonable doubt as a doubt that a juror could explain to the other jurors; and (6) admitted evidence of the defendant's postarrest silence. We affirm the judgment.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On October 12, 1988, the defendant and the complainant, previously strangers to each other, met at a bar in Wallingford where the complainant was a regular patron. The defendant introduced himself as "Bob" and mentioned that he owned a nightclub in Old Saybrook. They spent several hours eating, drinking, playing pool and otherwise socializing with each other and others in the bar until approximately midnight, when a group of people, including the complainant and the defendant, decided to go to a nearby nightclub for "last call." The defendant offered the complainant a ride and she accepted. After they had entered the car, the defendant started toward the nightclub, but when the car reached a certain intersection, he drove straight ahead into a local park instead of turning down the street that would have brought them to the nightclub. He drove to the end of a parking lot in the park and proceeded onto a grassy area where he parked the car. When the complainant asked why they had come to the park, the defendant replied that it was better there and attempted to kiss her. When the complainant refused and tried to push him away, the defendant lifted her shirt and bit her breasts. Next, the defendant exposed his penis, asked the complainant to perform oral sex and, when she refused, forced her to do so. He then pulled the complainant's pants down and inserted his finger into her vagina. Shortly thereafter, they got out of the defendant's car, and the complainant attempted to run away. Once the defendant had caught up with her, he grabbed her breasts from behind, swore at her, forced her pants down again and slapped her on the buttocks, repeating his curse. 3 He proceeded to remove the complainant's pants and sneakers and then penetrated her anus with his finger. He then attempted anal intercourse with the complainant. Next, the defendant urinated on the complainant's stomach and lower abdomen, rubbing the urine around her vaginal area and then inserting his fingers into her mouth. He then forced her to have vaginal intercourse with him until he withdrew and ejaculated into her mouth. After another act of forced vaginal intercourse, during which the defendant repeatedly bit the complainant's breasts, he urinated on her once again and then got off of her and smoked a cigarette. After these events, the defendant drove the complainant back to the bar where they had met. He dropped her off, and the two returned to their respective homes.
Several days later, at the behest of a friend to whom she had confided the story, the complainant reported the incident to the police. The next day the police arrested the defendant after the complainant had positively identified him by choosing his picture from a photo array.
The jury heard contrary testimony from the defendant, who admitted having engaged in various sexual acts with the complainant, but claimed that he had done so with the complainant's consent. According to the defendant, sometime between 11 p.m. and midnight, after socializing with the complainant and others for most of the evening, he left the bar alone, but the complainant followed him outside. They kissed for a short while, and then he asked the complainant if she wanted to get into his car. She agreed, and they entered the car and began to kiss more passionately. The complainant stated that they should not persist right in front of the bar, prompting the defendant's suggestion that they go elsewhere. He then drove to the park and stopped the car in a certain secluded area, which the complainant said was all right. They left the car and engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. Afterwards, they drove back to the bar but, once there, decided to return to the park to resume their sexual activity. They again had intercourse and also engaged in oral sex. The defendant stated that, at a certain point, he did interrupt the sexual activity in order to urinate, but that, when he did so, he purposely turned away from the complainant, so as not to urinate on her or toward her. Presumably, the jury disbelieved the defendant's version of the facts because it convicted him of both sexual assault and kidnapping.
The defendant's first claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence the urine stained shirt worn by the complainant on the night the alleged sexual assault was committed. Our review of the record satisfies us that the admission of the urine stained shirt was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion.
Some background information is necessary. The shirt was initially marked for identification during the direct testimony of the complainant, who testified that it was the shirt she was wearing on the night of the incident and, that it had been clean before she put it on that night. The shirt had remained on her throughout the sexual assault, although it had been pushed up at times. According to the complainant, she arrived home after the sexual assault, took off her clothes, including the shirt, and put them on her bedroom floor. The next day she washed other clothing she had been wearing that night, but did not wash the shirt at any time before she handed it over to the police on October 17, 1988. On cross-examination, she stated that, during the time period involved, she owned three pets, one dog and two cats.
A hearing was then held, outside the presence of the jury, in which the court heard the testimony of Debra Messina, a criminologist at the state police forensic laboratory, who stated that she had tested a stain on the shirt and found only one substance, creatinine, a chemical found in human and animal urine. The defendant advanced several objections to the admission of the shirt into evidence, but the court overruled them, stating that any weaknesses in the evidence went to its weight and not to its admissibility. Thereafter, Messina repeated her testimony before the jury, adding that creatinine is contained in no other substance but urine. The shirt was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit over the defendant's objection.
The defendant contends that the shirt should have been excluded as irrelevant because the state had failed to establish an adequate link between the urine stain and the defendant. He also argues that the shirt should have been excluded because the state had failed to establish that the shirt had not been materially altered or tampered with in any way during the time it lay on the defendant's bedroom floor until the police seized it several days later. Finally, the defendant maintains that even if the shirt was relevant evidence, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted it into evidence because its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value it might have had. We address these claims seriatim.
In considering the defendant's first argument, we begin by noting that relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue. State v. McClendon, 199 Conn. 5, 8-9, 505 A.2d 685 (1986). Evidence is irrelevant if there is "such a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principal facts that, all things considered, the former is not worthy or safe to be admitted in proof of the latter." State v. Kelly, 77 Conn. 266, 269, 58 A. 705 (1904). In this case, the complainant testified that the defendant had urinated on her during the alleged sexual assault. Evidence of a urine stain on the shirt she was wearing would tend to support the conclusion that the defendant had done so. Messina testified that creatinine, a substance found only in the urine of human beings and animals, was detected on the complainant's shirt. Even though the defendant concedes that the stain contained urine, he argues that the shirt should have been excluded as irrelevant because Messina's testimony did not exclude the possibility that the source of the urine was one of the complainant's pets while the shirt lay on her bedroom floor rather than the defendant in the course of a sexual assault. He cites our decision in State v. Moody, 214 Conn. 616, 573 A.2d 716 (1990), in support of his argument.
In Moody, we reversed the defendant's murder conviction because we concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence the result of a ...
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