State v. Jeffries

Decision Date22 April 2020
Docket NumberNo. 2018-0338,2018-0338
CourtOhio Supreme Court
Parties The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. JEFFRIES, Appellant.

Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary M. Frey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Donnelly, J. {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal we are asked to determine whether Ohio's rape-shield law prohibits the admission of evidence of an accuser's prior nonconsensual sexual activity. Appellant, Cedric Jeffries, asserts that the rape-shield law applies only to an accuser's prior consensual sexual activity and that he was wrongfully prohibited from introducing evidence at his jury trial for rape and kidnapping that the accuser, D.S., had previously been sexually assaulted by another person.

{¶ 2} We hold that Ohio's rape-shield law unambiguously applies to both consensual and nonconsensual sexual activity. The trial court and the Eighth District Court of Appeals correctly applied Ohio's rape-shield law and determined that evidence of D.S.'s prior sexual assault was inadmissible. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Eighth District upholding Jeffries's convictions.

BACKGROUND

{¶ 3} D.S.'s mother lost custody of D.S. and two of D.S.'s half-siblings during the early years of the children's lives. The children then went into foster care. D.S. lived in three different foster homes before she was six years old. In 2006, when D.S. was six years old, H.G., Jeffries's mother, obtained custody of D.S. and her two half-siblings. Jeffries lived in the home with H.G. and the children. Jeffries is the biological father of one of D.S.'s half-siblings. Although D.S. was not Jeffries's biological child, he was a father figure to her. D.S. lived with H.G. and Jeffries until March 2016, when D.S. reported that Jeffries had repeatedly sexually abused her over the course of approximately nine years.

{¶ 4} The state decided to pursue four criminal charges against Jeffries related to two specific instances of sexual abuse. Pursuant to a grand-jury indictment, Jeffries was charged with kidnapping and raping D.S. when she was 12 years old and kidnapping and raping D.S. when she was 16 years old.

{¶ 5} During the discovery process, counsel for the defense and the state were permitted to review D.S.'s child-abuse-investigation records maintained by the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services. Those records revealed that when D.S. was four or five years old, she reported to the children-services agency that a foster brother had sexually assaulted her.

{¶ 6} On the first day of Jeffries's jury trial, prior to voir dire, defense counsel indicated that she did not plan on questioning D.S. about her prior allegation of sexual abuse and therefore would not need the court to conduct an in camera hearing pursuant to State v. Boggs , 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 588 N.E.2d 813 (1992), to determine whether such questions would be prohibited by the rape-shield law. Counsel apparently reconsidered soon after, and on the next day, after voir dire had begun, the trial court took a break from voir dire and conducted a Boggs hearing. At the hearing, D.S. testified that when she was four or five years old and living in a foster home, a foster brother living with her had touched her inappropriately and compelled her to engage in vaginal intercourse. She testified that she had been truthful when reporting the incident to the children-services agency. The trial court concluded that the incident involved sexual activity and therefore it appeared it should be barred from admission into evidence by Ohio's rape-shield law.

{¶ 7} Defense counsel argued that although D.S.'s prior sexual assault involved sexual activity, the rape-shield law and Boggs did not prevent the admission of evidence about that assault, because the sexual activity was nonconsensual. The defense argued that the purpose of the rape-shield law is limited to protecting victims from being harassed about their consensual sexual history and therefore prior sexual assaults are outside the scope of protection. Defense counsel asserted that the evidence was necessary for the purpose of establishing D.S.'s "knowledge of the system" and for potentially rebutting any inference the jury might make that D.S.'s behavioral issues around age nine or ten were the result of sexual abuse by Jeffries.

{¶ 8} The trial court rejected the defense's argument and held that Ohio's rape-shield law and Boggs address all sexual activity, not only consensual sexual activity. Because the judge did not want to continue to make the prospective jurors wait to finish voir dire, she told counsel that she would explain her analysis in more detail later.

{¶ 9} The following day, after several witnesses had testified and the jury had been released for the day, the judge explained in more detail her rape-shield ruling. She stated that the plain language of the rape-shield law prevented the admission of the evidence, that she was satisfied from the evidence presented that D.S.'s allegation of abuse by her foster brother was true, and that the caselaw submitted by the defense was not controlling or persuasive.

{¶ 10} Defense counsel then asserted that the evidence of the prior assault should be admitted to explain H.G's testimony describing D.S.'s acting-out behavior. The judge noted that she had prohibited the state from implying that D.S.'s behavioral issues were connected with molestation, absent expert testimony to establish that connection. Also, the judge indicated that the evidence of the prior sexual assault was not particularly relevant given that there had been no evidence that D.S. had behavioral issues around age four or five and very little evidence that D.S. later acted out in a way that was abnormal for a preteen who had lived in multiple foster homes.

{¶ 11} During Jeffries's trial, the state presented evidence indicating that Jeffries had molested D.S. over the course of approximately nine years and that he had compelled D.S. to engage in vaginal intercourse on multiple occasions, including two specific incidents—one when D.S. was 12 years old and another when she was 16 years old. The jury found Jeffries guilty of all four counts. After merging certain counts for purposes of sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 15 years to life and classified Jeffries as a Tier III sex offender.

{¶ 12} Among his arguments on appeal, Jeffries asserted that prior instances of nonconsensual sexual activity are outside the scope of the rape-shield law and are therefore admissible. And because the sexual assault by D.S.'s foster brother was admissible, Jeffries argued, the trial court's exclusion of the evidence violated Jeffries's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. The appellate court rejected Jeffries's argument on the authority of Boggs , 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 588 N.E.2d 813. It noted that Boggs referred to "sexual activity" as including both nonconsensual and consensual sex and that Boggs held that evidence of "either type of activity" is barred from admission by the rape-shield law, id. at 423, 588 N.E.2d 813. The appellate court therefore affirmed the trial court's ruling on the applicability of the rape-shield law.

{¶ 13} We accepted one proposition of law for review:

Ohio's rape shield law prohibition on the admission of "specific instances of the victim's sexual activity" applies only to consensual sex [and does not apply to] questions related to prior sexual abuse.

See 152 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2018-Ohio-1989, 98 N.E.3d 292.

ANALYSIS

{¶ 14} Ohio's rape-shield law protects both the accuser and the defendant from the admission of evidence of prior sexual activity. The law is contained in statutes defining the crimes of rape, R.C. 2907.02, and gross sexual imposition, R.C. 2907.05, both of which include the following:

Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the victim's past sexual activity with the offender, and only to the extent that the court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value.
Evidence of specific instances of the defendant's sexual activity, opinion evidence of the defendant's sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the defendant's sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, the defendant's past sexual activity with the victim, or is admissible against the defendant under section 2945.59 of the Revised Code, and only to the extent that the court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value.

R.C. 2907.02(D) ; R.C. 2907.05(E).

{¶ 15} Our resolution of this case turns on the meaning of the term "sexual activity" as it is used in R.C. 2907.02 and 2907.05. The meaning of statutory language is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Vanzandt , 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 2015-Ohio-236, 28 N.E.3d 1267, ¶ 6. A fundamental preliminary step in our analysis of any legislation is to review the plain language of the statute. Id. at ¶ 7. "When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory interpretation." Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth , 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000). When there is no ambiguity on the face of the statute, it must simply be applied as written. Lake Hosp....

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  • Westley v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 2, 2021
    ...own rape shield laws, which sometimes use different language, to apply to nonconsensual conduct. See, e.g. , State v. Jeffries , 160 Ohio St.3d 300, 156 N.E.3d 859, 861 (2020), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1085, 208 L.Ed.2d 539 (2021) ("We hold that Ohio's rape-shield law unambi......
  • State v. Curtiss
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • January 21, 2022
    ...been able to present evidence about a victim's prior nonconsensual sexual activity. State v. Jeffries, 160 Ohio St.3d 300, 2020-Ohio-1539, 156 N.E.3d 859. As the defense argued that the rape shield law should not have applied because it was intended to protect victims from being harassed fo......
  • Westley v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 2, 2021
    ...their own rape shield laws, which sometimes use different language, to apply to nonconsensual conduct. See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 156 N.E.3d 859, 861 (Ohio 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1085 (2021) ("We hold that Ohio's rape-shield law unambiguously applies to both consensual and nonco......
  • State v. Rodriguez, 109320
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • July 29, 2021
    ... ... not pertain to this case, evidence of specific instances of a ... defendant's sexual activity are inadmissible in ... prosecutions for rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02 and gross ... sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05. State v ... Jeffries, 160 Ohio St.3d 300, 2020- Ohio-1539, 156 ... N.E.3d 859, ¶ 14. However, a defendant waives this ... statutory prohibition after interjecting or "opening the ... door" to the issue of his own prior sexual activity ... State v. Howell, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-7, ... ...
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