State v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 02 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 8780,8780
• Citation: 24 Conn.App. 330,588 A.2d 648
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Keith JENKINS.

Page 648

588 A.2d 648

24 Conn.App. 330

STATE of Connecticut v. Keith JENKINS.

No. 8780.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 8, 1990.

Decided April 2, 1991.

Brian M. O'Connell, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John M. Bailey, State's Atty., and Christopher Morano, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, LANDAU and CRETELLA, JJ.

EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, Judge.

The defendant appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, of interference with a search in violation of General Statutes § 54-33d, risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21, and reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of § 53a-63(a). ¹ The defendant argues that the court improperly admitted drug paraphernalia and a .38 caliber gun into evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On July 26, 1988, twelve police officers converged on an apartment on Hampton Street in Hartford to execute a search warrant for narcotics, drug paraphernalia and weapons. When the police arrived, the apartment was occupied by a female tenant, her two year old child, a twelve year old child, and by, another woman, the defendant, and six other males. The officers' initial attempts to gain entry without force failed when the defendant threatened to shoot the officers if they set foot inside the unit. Because of the defendant' threat, a two hour standoff ensued during which the police called in an emergency response team, notified a hostage negotiator, and evacuated a family from a nearby apartment. The episode caused a crowd, estimated at between 300 and 400 people, to gather outside the building. The police called for backup units to bring sledgehammers to break down the door.

A refrigerator blocked the first door that the police tried to open. Following their successful forced entry at a second door, Sergeant Frank Campbell and Detective Peter Getz encountered the defendant brandishing a gun and holding the two year old. The officers also observed several other people in the unit. The defendant's threats to shoot the officers compelled them to back out of the apartment. From their position in the stairway, the police shouted for the defendant to release the women and children. The door then opened and the two women and the twelve year old child emerged. The two year old appeared in the doorway, but the defendant quickly pulled the child back and slammed the door.

Meanwhile, Officer Paul Kutcher, who was positioned outside the building, observed several people in the apartment throwing things into the sink. Kutcher also saw the defendant hold the now crying two year old out the window, shielding himself with the child while shouting threats to the police and attempting to incite the crowd. The police in the stairway heard male voices yelling from inside the apartment that they wanted to surrender. The police told them to crawl out on their stomachs one at a time. Several males exited the apartment in this fashion, leaving only the defendant, the child and another male in the unit.

The police were subsequently approached by the defendant's attorney, who had apparently been contacted by the defendant during the standoff. The attorney talked with the defendant from outside the apartment door. As a result of this conversation, the defendant released the child and surrendered to the police. The subsequent search of the apartment yielded the following evidence: a handgun and bullets, a gram scale with cocaine residue, vial containers and caps, .38 caliber bullets and a police radio scanner. All of these items were introduced at trial as indicative of a drug outlet operation.

Although he initially framed his claim in state and federal constitutional terms, at oral argument in this court the defendant conceded that he was entitled to review on only the evidentiary issues of relevancy and prejudice. This concession was appropriate because rulings on relevancy and motive are not issues of constitutional dimension but rather are evidentiary matters within the trial court's discretion. State v. Kim, 17 Conn.App. 156, 158, 550 A.2d 896 (1988). This appeal has been argued by the parties as a question of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence. We will analyze the issue on the same basis on which it was argued by the parties. See Crozier v. Zaboori, 14 Conn.App. 457, 463, 541 A.2d 531 (1988).

Several police officers testified that all of the items in question were found in the raided apartment. The defendant objected to their admission into evidence on grounds of materiality and bias, emphasizing that no nexus had been established between the defendant and the apartment where the evidence was discovered. The only connection between the defendant and the exhibits is that he was present in the apartment at the time of the raid. The defendant argues that because no nexus exists between him and the drug paraphernalia, the court improperly allowed the state to introduce evidence of drug possession by the other people in the apartment against him. His reliance on this argument is misplaced because "[t]he state is not obliged to present evidence of a [crime] in a vacuum; a description of the area where it occurred, the persons present and the activity in progress at the time of a [crime] are not irrelevant to the matter in issue." State v. Moye, 177 Conn. 487, 502, 418 A.2d 870, vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 893, 100 S.Ct. 199, 62 L.Ed.2d 129 (1979), on remand, 179 Conn. 761, 409 A.2d 149 (1979).

The trial court noted that the apartment was not proven to be the defendant's residence but admitted the questioned evidence for the purpose of establishing the defendant's motive. Immediately following the testimony of each officer, through whom the exhibits were introduced, the court gave the jury a very strict instruction limiting its consideration of the exhibits to determining the defendant's motive and expressly prohibiting the evidence's use for any other purpose. ² In its final instructions to the jury, the court again strongly and explicitly charged that the evidence could be used solely to determine the defendant's motive. ³

Although evidence of other misconduct is not ordinarily admissible to prove the bad character or criminal tendencies of the accused, it may be allowed for numerous other purposes. State v. Shindell, 195 Conn. 128, 133, 486 A.2d 637 (1985). Proof of motive is a widely recognized exception to the prohibition against the admission of such evidence. State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 578, 560 A.2d 426 (1989). Before evidence can be admitted under the motive exception, it must satisfy a two-pronged test: (1) it must be relevant and material, and (2) its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect. State v. Marra, 215 Conn. 716, 738, 579 A.2d 9 (1990).

In the present case, the court reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had knowledge of the incriminating articles and interfered with the search in order to prevent the police from finding those items. "[W]here the motive for the crime charged was the concealment of some other crime ... the evidence of such motive is admissible, although it tends to show the commission of an extraneous crime." 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 325; see also 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Evidence (14th Ed.) § 185. The defendant went to extreme and potentially violent lengths to keep the police from entering the apartment. The defendant's motive for such frantic conduct...