State v. Jenkins, 52

• Decision Date: 15 July 1980
• Docket Number: No. 52,52
• Citation: 300 N.C. 578,268 S.E.2d 458
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Richard Levi JENKINS.

Page 458

268 S.E.2d 458

300 N.C. 578

STATE of North Carolina v. Richard Levi JENKINS.

No. 52.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 15, 1980.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by W. A. Raney, Jr., Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Floyd D. Brock, Asheville, for defendant-appellant.

BRANCH, Chief Justice.

Defendant first assigns as error the trial court's ruling that defendant had the mental capacity to stand trial.

The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing on defense counsel's motion questioning defendant's capacity to proceed to trial. At this hearing, Dr. John D. Patton, a psychiatrist, testified for the defense that he examined defendant for a total of three hours on several different occasions. He concluded that defendant was mildly mentally retarded with an I.Q. of less than 60 and a markedly impaired memory. The witness also testified that in his opinion defendant was able to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him. He concluded, however, that in his opinion defendant was unable to assist in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner. This opinion was based on defendant's ability to understand only simple words and on his limited memory.

The State presented on voir dire the testimony of Dr. James Groce, a psychiatrist, who stated that he had an opportunity to observe and examine defendant for about three weeks commencing on 17 November 1978 when defendant was admitted to Dorothea Dix Hospital. After conducting psychological tests and a series of interviews, Dr. Groce was of the opinion that while defendant suffered from mild mental retardation, he could nonetheless understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and could assist his attorney in his defense. Dr. Groce further testified that he found defendant to have a limited vocabulary and an I.Q. of 59. Defendant had had problems with alcoholism in the past.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law resolving the conflicting testimony. The court concluded that defendant was "able to assist in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner."

By this assignment defendant first contends that insufficient evidence was presented to support the court's conclusion of law that defendant could assist in his defense "in a rational and reasonable manner." Dr. Groce testified only that defendant "can assist his attorney in his defense," and defendant claims that this was insufficient to support the court's conclusion. We disagree. In our opinion, Dr. Groce's statement was tantamount to stating that defendant could assist in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner.

"When the court, as here, conducts the inquiry without a jury, the court's findings of fact, if supported by evidence, are conclusive on appeal." State v. Taylor, 290 N.C. 220, 228, 226 S.E.2d 23, 27 (1976). Here the evidence amply supports the judge's findings of fact.

Defendant also contends by this assignment that the trial court erred in failing to determine whether defendant was able to "cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed." For this requirement he relies on the following language of State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305 (1975):

The test of a defendant's mental capacity to stand trial is whether he has, at the time of trial, the mental capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. State v. Jones, 278 N.C. 259, 179 S.E.2d 433; State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 161 S.E.2d 560; State v. Sullivan, 229 N.C. 251, 49 S.E.2d 458; Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, § 29, 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 65.

Id. at 565-66, 213 S.E.2d at 316.

G.S. 15A-1001(a) was enacted in 1973 providing in pertinent part:

No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.

This statutory provision expresses a legislative intent to alter the existing case law governing the determination of whether a defendant is mentally incapable of proceeding to trial. In contrast to our former case law, the new statute clearly sets forth in the disjunctive three tests of mental incapacity to proceed, and the failure to meet any one would suffice to bar criminal proceedings against a defendant. The statute does not, however, require the trial judge to make a specific finding that defendant is able "to cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed," and the failure of Judge Mills to so find did not constitute error.

In his second assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant made a knowing, understanding and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and in admitting into evidence his statement to police.

Again the trial court conducted a lengthy voir dire hearing to determine whether defendant had been fully informed of his constitutional rights and had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before making the inculpatory statement to police. The testimony of Officer W. R. Anarino tended to show that when defendant was placed into custody at the Asheville Police Department, Officer Anarino read him his Miranda rights from a waiver form, going over it very slowly and carefully with defendant. While reading him his rights, Officer Anarino repeatedly asked defendant whether he understood them, and defendant replied that he understood and did not want a lawyer present while he talked with the officers. Defendant then placed his signature upon the document. He told the officers that he wanted to get this thing off his chest and be a Christian, because when he went to heaven he wanted to be able to see his mother and sister.

The State also offered the testimony of Dr. James Groce, who testified much as he had at the pretrial hearing concerning defendant's capacity to proceed. He also stated that in his opinion defendant could understand the Miranda waiver form used by the police, and that going over it slowly and asking defendant after each paragraph whether he understood it would increase his understanding.

On voir dire Dr. John Patton testified for defendant that he examined defendant on three occasions and found him to have an I.Q. of less than 60 and a grossly impaired memory capacity. Dr. Patton stated his opinion that a number of words in the Miranda warning would not have been in defendant's vocabulary. In his opinion, defendant could not have had a clear understanding of the consequences of his decision to sign the statement after the warning had been read to him. Nor could defendant have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

Upon this conflicting evidence, the trial judge found that defendant was taken into custody on 25 October 1978 and told the police detectives that he wanted to make a statement; that defendant was read his constitutional rights from a prepared form, and defendant said that he understood each right as it was explained to him; that he did in fact understand his rights; that his statement was freely and voluntarily made without coercion by the officers and that he understood the consequences thereof; that the typewritten statement was an accurate representation of defendant's conversation with the officers, and defendant indicated that the statement was correct; and that it was given after a full and understanding waiver of his constitutional rights. The trial court concluded that although defendant was mildly retarded, he was able to appreciate the consequences of giving such a statement and to understand his constitutional rights, which were fully and adequately explained to him by the police officers. The court thereupon ruled that defendant's statement was admissible into evidence.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that when a defendant challenges the admissibility of an in-custody confession, the trial judge must conduct a voir dire hearing to determine whether defendant has been informed of his constitutional rights and has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before making the challenged admissions. When the voir dire evidence is conflicting, as here, the trial judge must weigh the credibility of the witnesses, resolve the crucial conflicts and make appropriate findings of fact. When supported by competent evidence, his findings are conclusive on appeal. State v. Jenkins, 292 N.C. 179, 232 S.E.2d 648 (1977); State v. Biggs, 289 N.C. 522, 223 S.E.2d 371 (1976); State v. Smith, 278 N.C. 36, 178 S.E.2d 597, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934, 91 S.Ct. 2266, 29 L.Ed.2d 715 (1971).

In the instant case there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Although the voir dire evidence regarding defendant's mental capacity to make a knowing waiver was in conflict, the trial judge resolved the dispute and made the appropriate findings of fact. State v. Biggs, supra. A defendant's subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered, but such lack of intelligence, standing alone, does not render an in-custody statement incompetent if it is in all other respects voluntary and understandingly made. State v. Thompson, 287 N.C. 303, 214 S.E.2d 742 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 908, 96 S.Ct. 3215, 49 L.Ed.2d 1213 (1976). Consequently, we hold that the trial judge properly overruled the motion to suppress defendant's inculpatory statement.

By his third assignment of error, defendant contends that the court...