State v. Jenkins
| Decision Date | 20 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 70958,70958 |
| Citation | 257 Kan. 1074,898 P.2d 1121 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Walter L. JENKINS, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A trial judge has an independent duty to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a trial that is fair and does not contravene the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
2. The assistance of counsel is among those constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their denial can never be treated as harmless error.
3. Where the trial court is advised of the possibility of a conflict of interest involving defense counsel by either the defendant or the State, the court is required to initiate an inquiry to insure that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated. If the court fails to make such inquiry and it is later established that an actual conflict of interest involving defense counsel and his or her client existed, reversal of the defendant's conviction on a claim of ineffective representation under the Sixth Amendment is required.
4. The determination of whether a criminal defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment because his or her lawyer had a conflict of interest arising from a multiple representation of defendants, or from any other conflict of interest involving his or her client, a trial court, unless it knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, is not required to initiate an inquiry into the propriety of multiple representation or other potential conflict if no party lodges an objection, even though trial courts are required to investigate timely objections to multiple representation or other conflicts. Absent special circumstances, trial courts may assume either that multiple representation or other possible conflicts entail no conflict or that the lawyer and his or her clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist.
5. In order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation arising from multiple representation or any other alleged conflict of interest by an attorney, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Until a defendant shows that his or her counsel actively represented conflicting interests, the defendant has not established the constitutional predicate for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Such unconstitutional multiple representation or other unconstitutional conflicts of interest are never harmless error and, accordingly, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his or her representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.
6. In this case, where the trial court was on notice that defense counsel represented the defendant and the key prosecution witness against the defendant, and was on notice that the defendant had not waived this conflict of interest, the trial court had an independent duty to inquire about the conflict. Failure of the trial court to inquire under these circumstances requires reversal of the defendant's convictions. Under these circumstances, prejudice to the defendant is presumed.
Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Max Rowinsky, Asst. Appellate Defender, was with her on the brief, for appellant.
No appearance by appellee.
Charles D. Dedmon, Topeka, was on the brief, for amicus curiae the Kansas Ass'n of Crim. Defense Lawyers.
This case comes before us on defendant's petition for review of his conviction for sale of cocaine. He argued before the Court of Appeals that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because of his trial counsel's conflict of interest. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that a conflict of interest existed and that there had been no waiver of the conflict of interest by the defendant. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant had failed to establish that the conflict adversely affected his attorney's performance and affirmed. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because of his trial counsel's conflict of interest.
Walter L. Jenkins was charged with one count of sale of cocaine in connection with an incident which occurred on July 19, 1992. Tracy Mouser, to whom Jenkins allegedly sold cocaine, was working as an informant for the Liberal Police Department, making controlled buys of illegal substances. In exchange for making these controlled buys, the Liberal Police Department promised not to bring a previous charge of sale of cocaine against Mouser.
On the night in question, Mouser contacted Detective John Schnoor and told him that he would attempt to buy cocaine from the defendant. Prior to the buy, Schnoor strip-searched Mouser, placed a recording device on him, and gave him $40 to buy a rock of cocaine. Schnoor also searched Mouser's vehicle to determine that there was no cocaine present. Schnoor then followed Mouser to the defendant's house.
Schnoor saw Mouser walk up to the front door. Schnoor then drove down the block, made a U-turn, and parked just south of the house. When Mouser emerged from the house, he followed Mouser from the house back to the police training center, where Mouser gave him a rock later identified to be cocaine and a tape recording of the transaction.
Linda Trigg was appointed to represent the defendant. At the preliminary hearing, Trigg became concerned about the appearance of a possible conflict of interest because she had previously represented Mouser on unrelated charges based on events that had occurred during the time he was working as a confidential informant. Trigg asked to voir dire Mouser, and the following exchange took place:
Trigg then addressed the court, saying, After Jenkins stated that he was aware of that fact, Trigg asked, "And are you willing to go forward with me as your attorney in this case?" to which Jenkins answered, "Yes."
Trigg represented Mouser on a burglary case which had occurred during the time Mouser was working as a confidential informant. She represented him at his plea hearing on October 2, 1992, wherein he pled guilty to two counts of burglary. She also represented him at sentencing on December 16, 1992. Trigg was appointed to represent the defendant on February 26, 1993. She represented the defendant at his preliminary hearing at which Mouser testified on March 31, 1993. She then represented Mouser on his motion to modify sentence, which motion was heard by the court on April 27, 1993. Trigg continued her representation of the defendant during his trial on September 29, 1993.
On the day of trial, the defendant requested a continuance because one of his alibi witnesses, his cousin Houston White, was unavailable to testify. According to Trigg, White lives in Little Rock, Arkansas, and she was unable to contact him until that morning. However, White was in Kansas City on business that day and could not testify. Trigg stated that White had told her he could make himself available to testify if she could obtain a continuance. Trigg also offered an affidavit in accordance with K.S.A. 60-240(c) which stated that, because of White's employment as a circuit minister and salesman, she had been unable to contact him. The affidavit proffered that if allowed to testify, White would testify that defendant was in Arkansas on July 19 and could not have sold cocaine to Mouser.
The district court denied the request for continuance. The court further found insufficient evidence to show the unavailability of White and efforts to compel his attendance and, therefore, denied the admission of the affidavit under K.S.A. 60-240(c).
At trial, Mouser testified that he was a cocaine addict with a prior record for burglary and driving while his license was suspended, as well as a charge of burglary which had occurred during the time he was working as a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Carter
...S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). We have adopted Wood's holding. Taylor, 266 Kan. at 979, 975 P.2d 1196; see State v. Jenkins, 257 Kan. 1074, 1084, 898 P.2d 1121 (1995) ("where the trial court is advised of the possibility of a conflict by either the defendant or the State, the court is ......
-
Cooke v. State
...facts in closing argument] caused a breakdown in our adversarial system of justice")). 85. Id. at 1148 (quoting State v. Jenkins, 257 Kan. 1074, 898 P.2d 1121, 1127-28 (1995)). 86. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666, 104 S.Ct. 2039; Carter, 14 P.3d at 1145 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666, 104 S.Ct. 20......
-
State v. Cheatham
...facts as outlined above requires us to remand the case for review under the appropriate standard. We faced a similar problem in Gleason and Jenkins when the ineffective assistance allegations were based upon a claimed conflict of interest that was not considered by the trial court. We found......
-
State v. Griffin
...State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, 785, 47 P.3d 783 (2002); State v. Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 433, 14 P.3d 1138 (2000); State v. Jenkins, 257 Kan. 1074, 1079-80, 898 P.2d 1121 (1995). (a) Griffin contends that his trial counsel should have introduced Griffin's testimony and the prosecutor's closing......
-
Appellate Decisions
...On appeal from probation revocation, Galaviz argued for first time that he was entitled to automatic reversal under State v. Jenkins, 257 Kan. 1074 (1995), because his attorney mentioned being guardian ad litem to a victim in one of Galaviz's crimes, and district court failed to investigate......