State v. Jenks

• Decision Date: 31 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-910,90-910
• Citation: 574 N.E.2d 492,61 Ohio St.3d 259
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. JENKS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 259

61 Ohio St.3d 259

574 N.E.2d 492

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. JENKS et al., Appellees.

No. 90-910.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 5, 1991.

Decided July 31, 1991.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value and therefore should be subjected to the same standard of proof. When the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of the offense charged, there is no need for such evidence to be irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction. Therefore, where the jury is properly and adequately instructed as to the standards for reasonable doubt a special instruction as to circumstantial evidence is not required. (Holland v. United States [1954], 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150, followed; State v. Kulig [1974], 37 Ohio St.2d 157, 66 O.O.2d 351, 309 N.E.2d 897, overruled.)

2. An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia [1979], 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, followed.)

On June 29, 1987, Robert Risberg was electrocuted when he stepped on a metal plate next to a passenger shelter of the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority ("RTA"). The metal plate, set flush in the sidewalk, was energized by current from an electrical transformer that provided electricity to the lights in a passenger shelter a few feet away. These lights were used to illuminate advertising panels in the bus shelters. Apparently, Risberg had just left a Cleveland Indians baseball game and was proceeding home for the evening.

Risberg's death received a large amount of media coverage. It became apparent from such media stories that both a civil action and an official investigation would be pursued. Three days after Risberg's death RTA received a letter from the attorneys representing Ruth Duale, Risberg's daughter and the administratrix of his estate, informing RTA that their firm had been retained. The RTA Board of Trustees had a meeting on June 30, 1987, at which time there was discussion of Risberg's death. One week later, on July 7, 1987, the Board of Trustees initiated a formal investigation into Risberg's death.

Appellees Mary Jenks and Dale Madison were employees of RTA, both working in the Planning Department; Jenks was head of the department while Madison was a transportation planner and Jenks' subordinate. On October 28, 1987, appellees were each indicted on two counts of tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12. The indictments alleged that both Jenks and Madison destroyed or removed documents for the purpose of impairing the value or availability of said documents, with the knowledge that an official investigation was in progress. The pertinent dates of the alleged destruction of documents were July 7, 16 and 17, 1987.

The state's theory in the case against Jenks and Madison was that both of them destroyed specific documents that would have shown that RTA had prior knowledge of the electrical problems associated with electricity connected to the shelters which ultimately led to Risberg's death. Specifically, the state sought to prove that the destruction of said documents was an attempt by appellees to either limit or conceal RTA's potential civil and criminal liability. The defense theory offered by Jenks and Madison was that while they admitted destroying documents, and perhaps knew an investigation was imminent, they lacked the criminal intent to commit the offense. Jenks and Madison contended that their purpose in destroying the documents was totally administrative, and unrelated to any investigation into Risberg's death.

At trial the state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the criminal intent necessary to obtain a conviction. As such, the trial court instructed the jury, in regard to the use of circumstantial evidence, as follows: "In the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, by itself, will justify a finding of guilty if the circumstances are entirely consistent with the defendants' guilt and are wholly inconsistent or irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of the defendants' innocence and are so convincing as to exclude a reasonable doubt of the defendants' guilt." This is the standard instruction on the use of circumstantial evidence found in 4 Ohio Jury Instructions (1988) 42, Section 405.03(2).

After a lengthy trial involving numerous witnesses and hundreds of documents admitted as evidence, and given the above instruction, the jury found both Jenks and Madison guilty on all counts. Appellees were sentenced to consecutive terms of two years of imprisonment on each count. However, the trial court suspended the sentences, placed each appellee on probation for two years, and ordered them to serve ninety days in the county jail and to perform two hundred hours of community service. Appellee Jenks was fined $3,000 and Madison was fined $1,000. Both Jenks and Madison filed timely appeals.

At the appellate level, Jenks argued that the trial court erred in denying her Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. Moreover, both Jenks and Madison asserted that the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the state's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law on the essential element of intent. The court of appeals sua sponte ordered the two cases consolidated. After an analysis of the evidence and testimony at trial, the court of appeals reversed appellees' convictions primarily on two grounds. The appellate court first noted that the evidence concerning the requisite mental state, i.e., intent, was solely circumstantial. Relying on the rule of law expressed in State v. Kulig (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 157, 66 O.O.2d 351, 309 N.E.2d 897, and its progeny, the court went on to hold that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction since it failed to preclude appellees' reasonable theory of innocence. In so holding, the appellate court stated that " * * * [e]ven though the evidence was such that an inference of guilt might reasonably have been drawn therefrom, the evidence was not sufficient to foreclose the drawing of * * * [appellees'] equally plausible hypothesis of innocence * * *."

Second, the appellate court determined there was prosecutorial misconduct involving certain comments by the prosecutor during the opening statement referring to RTA "corruption." The court of appeals held that " * * * [w]hile evidence was in fact introduced relevant to the prosecutor's comments, such evidence was irrelevant, incompetent and improperly admitted as the prosecutor should have known. * * * " The appellate court also concluded that other irrelevant evidence introduced by the prosecution during trial amounted to reversible error.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Pros. Atty., George J. Sadd, Cleveland, and Laurence R. Snyder, Rocky River, for appellant.

Gold, Rotatori, Schwartz & Gibbons Co., L.P.A., and John S. Pyle, Cleveland, for appellee Mary Jenks.

Greene & Hennenberg and Michael C. Hennenberg, Cleveland, for appellee Dale Madison.

Randall M. Dana, Public Defender, Gregory L. Ayers and Kurt Gatterdam, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender Comm'n.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, Justice.

We are confronted with two issues for our determination. First, the state asks this court to repudiate the rule regarding circumstantial evidence as set forth in State v. Kulig, supra. As a corollary, the state urges that we adopt the standard followed by the federal courts when reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case. The second issue presented in this case is whether the trial court committed reversible error in admitting certain evidence. A related question is whether the comments of the prosecutor during opening statement were likewise reversible error. We will consider these issues and the parties' arguments in that order.

I

The doctrine relied upon by the court of appeals is found in Kulig, supra, wherein the syllabus provides: "Circumstantial evidence relied upon to prove an essential element of a crime must be irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of an accused's innocence in order to support a finding of guilt." Since Kulig, Ohio courts have treated this tenet of law as an appellate standard of review. This rule of law is also embodied in the standard instruction on the use of circumstantial evidence. See 4 Ohio Jury Instructions (1988) 42, Section 405.03(2). As such, the state challenges not only the standard of appellate review from a criminal conviction based on circumstantial evidence, but also the circumstantial evidence instruction. In support, the state cites cases from the United States Supreme Court, the federal circuit courts, and various state supreme courts. Because the issue is squarely presented to this court, we shall conduct an analysis as to the appropriate standard of appellate review of a criminal conviction and the propriety of the circumstantial evidence instruction.

A Prior Ohio Case Law

It is a basic principle of law that the prosecution has the burden of proving a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a defendant in a criminal case against a conviction " * * * except upon proof beyond a...