State v. Jennings

• Citation: 2002 WI 44,647 N.W.2d 142,252 Wis.2d 228
• Decision Date: 01 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-1680-CR.,00-1680-CR.
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward Terrell JENNINGS, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

252 Wis.2d 228

2002 WI 44

647 N.W.2d 142

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward Terrell JENNINGS, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 00-1680-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral argument October 3, 2001.

Decided May 1, 2002.

For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Gregory M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general.

For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral argument by Margaret A. Maroney, assistant state public defender.

¶ 1. DIANE S. SYKES, J.

This is an interlocutory appeal of a circuit court order suppressing the defendant's custodial statement in which he implicated himself in a homicide. The circuit court concluded that the defendant's statement was made after he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The court's order was based primarily on Wentela v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 283, 290 N.W.2d 313 (1980), a decision of this court that the State asserts has been effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).

¶ 2. The court of appeals certified the case to us on the question of "whether the court of appeals may, must, or must not follow a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court which is directly on point, but which appears to conflict with subsequent precedent from the United States Supreme Court."

¶ 3. We conclude that when confronted with a direct conflict between a decision of this court and a later decision of the United States Supreme Court on a matter of federal law, the court of appeals may, but is not required to, certify the case to us pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61. If it does not, or if this court declines to accept certification, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution compels adherence to United States Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal law, although it means deviating from a conflicting decision of this court.

¶ 4. The underlying substantive issue in the case concerns the sufficiency of the defendant's request for counsel during his custodial interrogation—more specifically, whether his statement, "I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer," unequivocally invoked his right to counsel such that any subsequent statements must be suppressed. In Wentela, 95 Wis. 2d at 292, we held that the statement, "`I think I need an attorney,' or `I think I should see an attorney,'" constituted a sufficient request for counsel. In State v. Walkowiak, 183 Wis. 2d 478, 486-87, 515 N.W.2d 863 (1994), we further held that when a suspect makes an equivocal reference to counsel—there, it was the question "Do you think I need an attorney?"—then "[t]he police must cease all interrogation, except they may attempt to clarify the suspect's desire for counsel."

¶ 5. The validity of both holdings—what constitutes a sufficient request for counsel and the obligations of the police when an ambiguous or equivocal request is made—was called into question by the Supreme Court's decision in Davis. There, the Supreme Court concluded that the statement "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" was equivocal and therefore not sufficient to invoke the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459-62. The Court further held that when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel, the police need neither cease questioning nor clarify the suspect's desire for counsel, although the Court did say that the latter "will often be good police practice." Id. at 461. ¶ 6. The Supreme Court's decision in Davis means that Wentela and Walkowiak are no longer valid as a matter of Fifth Amendment law, and we therefore overrule them. We also decline, in this instance, to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution's right against self-incrimination more broadly than the federal constitutional right. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's suppression order.

I

¶ 7. On June 25, 1999, defendant Edward Jennings was arrested in Loves Park, Illinois, in connection with a Rock County, Wisconsin, homicide investigation. After Jennings' arrest, two officers from the City of Beloit Police Department, Detectives Kreitzmann and Anderson, went to Loves Park to interview Jennings.

¶ 8. Detective Kreitzmann advised Jennings of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda and obtained a valid waiver of those rights. Detective Kreitzmann, interviewing Jennings alone, began questioning him about the Rock County homicide. Jennings, who is blind, initially denied any knowledge or involvement. After further questioning, Jennings admitted that he was present at the scene when the homicide occurred and that he had heard three gunshots.

¶ 9. When Detective Kreitzmann asked Jennings if he would put the statement in writing, Jennings replied, "I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer." Detective Kreitzmann immediately asked Jennings, "Are you telling me you want a lawyer?" Jennings responded with the same statement: "I think maybe I need to talk to a lawyer." Detective Kreitzmann testified that at that point, because he was unable to clarify whether Jennings was specifically asking for an attorney, and "to be on the safe side," he stopped questioning Jennings and left the interrogation room.

¶ 10. Approximately 15 minutes later, Detective Anderson entered the room and began to question Jennings. Detective Anderson first asked Jennings if he remembered his Miranda warnings. Jennings replied that he did. Detective Anderson also asked Jennings if he would be willing to speak with him. Jennings said that he would. During the questioning by Detective Anderson, Jennings again placed himself at the scene of the crime, and implicated himself in the homicide by describing a confrontation between himself, the victim, and several other people that immediately preceded the shooting. Jennings did not ask for a lawyer at any time during Detective Anderson's questioning.

¶ 11. Jennings was charged with being party to the crime of first-degree intentional homicide in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1) and 939.05 (1999-2000)¹ Jennings moved to suppress the statement he made to Detective Anderson, claiming that it was given after he had invoked his right to counsel. The Rock County Circuit Court, John W. Roethe, Judge, granted the motion, concluding that Jennings had unambiguously invoked his right to counsel, and citing Davis, Wentela, and State v. Long, 190 Wis. 2d 386, 526 N.W.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1994). The State appealed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.05(1)(d)2 and 3, and the court of appeals certified the case to us.

II

¶ 12. In its certification order, the court of appeals has essentially asked for guidance in resolving the problem of a direct conflict between a controlling decision of this court and a subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court. The State and the defendant suggest a procedural solution: a rule requiring the court of appeals to certify to this court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61, any case that presents a conflict between our precedent and a subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court.

¶ 13. We clearly have the power to impose such a rule. Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution expressly confers upon this court superintending and administrative authority over the lower state courts.² The constitutional grant of superintending and administrative authority "is a grant of power. It is unlimited in extent. It is indefinite in character." State ex rel. Fourth National Bank of Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 611, 79 N.W. 1081 (1899).

¶ 14. Article VII, Section 3 has been described as establishing "a duty of the supreme court to exercise . . . administrative authority to promote the efficient and effective operation of the state's court system." In re Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 783, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984). Accordingly, within this administrative power and duty, is "the inherent power to adopt those statewide measures which are absolutely essential to the due administration of justice in the state." In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 518, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).

[1]

¶ 15. Although unquestionably broad and flexible, our superintending authority will not be invoked lightly. In re Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 321, 274 N.W. 411 (1937); see also Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 226, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996)

; State v. Kendall, 94 Wis. 2d 63, 66, 287 N.W.2d 758 (1980); McEwen v. Pierce County, 90 Wis. 2d 256, 269-70, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979). Whether this court in a given situation will exercise its superintending authority is a matter of "judicial policy rather than one relating to the power of this court." Phelan, 225 Wis. at 320.

¶ 16. We decline to exercise our superintending authority to interpose a rule requiring certification of all cases that present a conflict between our precedent and subsequent United States Supreme Court precedent. Requiring certification would interfere with the discretion of the court of appeals in its power to decide cases before it, including the decision whether or not to certify a case to this court. See Phelan, 225 Wis. at 320 (superintending authority generally will not be exercised to interfere with the discretion of another court).

¶ 17. While we decline to establish a rule requiring it, certification will certainly be highly appropriate in a case such as this, in which a controlling decision of this court has arguably been overruled by a subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court. Only this court may "overrrule, modify or withdraw language from a previous [state] supreme court case." In re Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)

; see also State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1985).

¶ 18. But certification need not be mandatory, because the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution governs the outcome of any direct conflict between state and federal supreme court precedent on a matter of...