State v. Jerry Bradley
| Decision Date | 01 February 1892 |
| Citation | 24 A. 1053,64 Vt. 466 |
| Parties | STATE v. JERRY BRADLEY |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
FEBRUARY TERM, 1892
Exceptions sustained, sentence, judgment and verdict set aside, a new trial granted, and cause remanded.
Sheldon & Cushman, for the respondent.
I. On trial, the witness Cole, after having testified that soon after the homicide, Bolger, who was present at the time of the homicide, would speak out and say that Bradley the respondent, killed the woman,--was asked, against the exception of the respondent, "what was his appearance then?" He answered first "It kinder seemed as though he didn't want it laid to him," and again "He seemed kinder worried that it should be laid to him and would turn it off in this way, that she died of heart disease; he said that she had it and he had rubbed her an hour at a time and fetched her out of it and so on." Witness was not an expert. It is contended that the question called upon the witness to give his opinion in regard to the appearance of the respondent. Whether the question called upon the witness to give his opinion, or to describe the appearance of Bolger it was admissible under our decisions. State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153; Bates v. Sharon, 45 Vt. 474; Crane v. Northfield, 33 Vt. 124; Stowe v. Bishop, 58 Vt. 498; Knight v. Smythe, 57 Vt. 529.
Nor do we think the answers objectionable if a departure from the question. It was that the respondent appeared kinder worried, and the witness gave his reason, that the respondent sought to avoid the charge by falsely claiming that the deceased came to her death from a disease of her heart rather than by a stab in the breast. The answer was more a statement of an admissible fact than of the opinion of the witness. It is always permissible to show that the accused when charged with the commission of a crime denied the charge, by asserting a falsehood.
II. The conditional threats of the respondent to take the life of the deceased, proof tending to show that the condition had transpired having been introduced,--was properly admitted. The fact that the threats were made six or eight months before the homicide went, not to the admissibility, but to the weight which the jury should give to such threats.
III. The respondent excepted to the charge as to what the jury must find relative to suicide and to the charge upon that subject. It is not now contended that the charge was erroneous so far as it was given, but it is contended there was error in the failure to charge that if the evidence of suicide was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt whether the crime of manslaughter or murder had been committed, the respondent was entitled to the benefit of that doubt. The exception taken, does not call the attention of the Court to any failure to charge, nor point out any such failure. It only drew the attention of the Court to the charge given on this subject. Hence the exception does not raise the error now insisted upon. If the attention of the Court had been called to the error now contended for, the Court, doubtless would have corrected the claimed omission, unless in other portions of the charge the Court had given the respondent the benefit of such...
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