State v. Jewell

Citation285 A.2d 847
PartiesSTATE of Maine v. Randy JEWELL.
Decision Date10 January 1972
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

Peter W. Culley, Chadbourn H. Smith, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Eaton, Glass, Marsano & Hammond by Thomas W. Hammond, III, Belfast, for defendant.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WEATHERBEE, POMEROY and WERNICK, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Chief Justice.

At the October term of the Superior Court in Waldo County the defendant, Randy Jewell, was convicted by jury of the crime of breaking, entering and larceny in the nighttime as charged in the second count of an indictment found by the grand jury on October 8, 1970. The burglarized premises were those of Joshua Treat, also known as Howard's Shell Station, and the stolen property was a tool box containing assorted tools of one Henry Malo. Sentenced to imprisonment in the Maine State Prison for not less than two years and not more than six years, Jewell seasonably filed notice of appeal from the judgment and asserts several reasons why he claims his conviction should be set aside and a new trial granted. The appeal is denied.

INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING ALIBI EVIDENCE

The defendant first complains about the following portion of the charge to the jury:

'Now the alibi testimony must prove to be affective (sic) the absence of the Defendant from the scene of the crime so that it would be impossible for him to commit the crime, and that's the purpose of alibi testimony. An alibi, if believed by a Jury, if the facts of the alibi justify, it is an absolute defense. Otherwise, it is no defense. And so you will have to ask yourselves, what did these 3 witnesses for the Defendant say? Did they offer you testimony from which you are satisfied that Mr. Jewell was not at the Howard filling station at whenever time it was after midnight on the morning of July 16th? Does their testimony place him elsewhere? Does it create in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt? It is for you to say. You will remember who these alibi witnesses were, the nature of their testimony and the times that they gave to answer these questions.'

Defendant contends that these instructions erroneously conveyed to the jury that where the accused claimed an alibi the burden of proving the same was on him. We do agree that if the instructions of the Court suggested that the accused had to carry the burden of persuasion on his alibi defense to any degree there would be error.

The defendant was charged with breaking and entering Howard's Shell Station and stealing the property of Henry Malo which was kept therein. He was accused of committing this crime on or about July 16, 1970 in the City of Belfast, in the County of Waldo and State of Maine. Thus, as part of the accusation against Jewell, the State assumed the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crime charged, including the presence of the defendant, actual or constructive, at the time and place it was committed and his participation therein. See, State v. Saba and Korbett, 1942, 139 Me. 153, 27 A.2d 813.

It is a fundamental rule in this country that an accused is presumed to be innocent of the offense with which he is charged and that this presumption of innocence stays with him throughout his trial, the burden resting at all times upon the prosecution to overcome the presumption by such weight of evidence as will satisfy the minds of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. The State's burden to prove the commission of crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and conversely the accused's right to have any reasonable doubt resolved in his favor, applies to the whole evidence including that of alibi. Glover v. United States, 1906, 8 Cir., 147 F. 426; Thomas v. United States, 1954, 9 Cir., 213 F.2d 30.

Indeed, alibi evidence is merely rebuttal evidence directed to that part of the evidence which tends to identify the defendant as the person who committed or participated in the alleged crime. When resorting to an alibi defense, a defendant merely attempts to show a state of facts inconsistent with his presence, actual or constructive, at the time and place of the commission of the crime alleged against him, but recourse to such defense does not relieve the State of its standing burden, which never shifts, of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the perpetrator of the offense, participating therein at the time and place of its commission. When tendering an alibi defense, an accused does not assume any burden of proof respecting it. A defendant is entitled to an acquittal if the evidence taken as a whole, including the alibi evidence adduced by the prosecution or the defendant, is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his presence, actual or constructive at the scene of the crime or as to his guilt generally. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 923 b, p. 660; State v. Ing Kee, 1930, 106 N.J.L. 336, 338, 150 A. 358; People v. Elmore, 1938, 277 N.Y. 397, 14 N.E.2d 451; Floyd v. State, 1954, 205 Md. 573, 109 A.2d 729; State v. Brown, 1956, 102 Ohio App. 113, 141 N.E.2d 686; State v. Mayfield, 1959, 235 S.C. 11, 109 S.E.2d 716, cert. denied 363 U.S. 846, 80 S.Ct. 1616, 4 L.Ed.2d 1728; State v. Simon, 1964, Mo., 375 S.W.2d 102; Watson v. State, 1967, Fla.App., 200 So.2d 270.

In offering evidence that he was elsewhere and not at the scene of the crime either actually or constructively, a defendant merely undertakes to substantiate and support his plea of not guilty of the offense charged against him; it is one method of negating the prosecution's case. Notwithstanding the defensive nature of his alibi evidence, the accused does not, by asserting such a defense, undertake to establish an affirmative issue, but only offers to show facts inconsistent with the State's proof that he was present at the time and place when and where the crime was committed and consistent with his innocence. Ragland v. State, 1939, 238 Ala. 587, 192 So. 498; People v. Pearson, 1960, 19 Ill.2d 609, 169 N.E.2d 252; State v. Searles, 1964, 82 N.J.Super. 210, 197 A.2d 384.

The burden of proof that the accused was present at the scene and participating in the commission of the crime rests at all times on the State. The Justice below instructed the jury respecting the intrinsic nature of the defense of alibi, explaining that alibi evidence, to be effective, deals with physical absence from the scene of the crime and involves the physical impossibility of guilt. He characterized an alibi, if believed and justified from the evidence, as an absolute defense to an accusation. He called upon the jury to assess the alibi evidence, whether it satisfied them respecting the defendant's absence from the scene of the crime at the time involved.

The correctness of a charge, however, is to be determined from the entire charge and not from isolated extracts from it. State v. Berube, 1962, 158 Me. 433, at p. 438, 185 A.2d 900. The adequacy of the charge is to be measured by the charge as a whole. State v. Poulin, 1970, Me., 268 A.2d 475, at p. 480.

Nowhere did the presiding Justice place the burden of proof respecting alibi on the defendant. As a matter of fact he instructed the jury specifically as follows:

'Now, of course, the State must prove that the Defendant was there. They must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was at the scene of the crime and active, present and participating therein. The Defendant does not have to prove he wasn't there. The State has to prove he was, and that beyond a reasonable doubt, * * *.'

Furthermore, the Justice's explanation of the intrinsic nature of alibi evidence was qualified by him in the same breath by the inquiry: 'Does it create in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt?', after which he added: 'It is for you to...

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18 cases
  • Jones v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • August 8, 2018
    ...3d 481 (La. 2017) & 237 So. 3d 1190 (La. 2018), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (May 22, 2018) (No. 17-9016); State v. Jewell, 285 A.2d 847, 851 (Me. 1972); People v. Young, 693 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Mich. 2005); Williams v. State, 32 So. 3d 486, 490 (Miss. 2010); State v. West, 295 A......
  • State v. Grady
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • October 7, 1975
    ...393 U.S. 1001, 89 S.Ct. 483, 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968); People v. Pearson, 19 Ill.2d 609, 169 N.E.2d 252, 255 (1960); State v. Jewell, 285 A.2d 847, 849-50 (Me. 1972); People v. Elmore, 277 N.Y. 397, 14 N.E.2d 451, 454-55 (1938); 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 23 (13th ed. 1972); 29 Am.Jur.2d ......
  • State v. Reardon
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • December 31, 1984
    ...907 (Me.1976). This rule applies, even if the criminal conviction rests on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. State v. Jewell, 285 A.2d 847, 851 (Me.1972). See also State v. Wentworth, 366 A.2d 178 (4) Lastly, Reardon questions Ritchie's testimony as too vague and so inconsistent......
  • State v. Lagasse
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • October 20, 2016
    ...1981) (affirming conviction for murder principally based on testimony of accomplice whose credibility was challenged); State v. Jewell , 285 A.2d 847, 851–852 (Me. 1972) (affirming conviction for breaking, entering, and larceny when the uncorroborated accomplice testimony formed the basis f......
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