State v. Jiles

• Decision Date: 27 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-0153-CR.,02-0153-CR.
• Citation: 2003 WI 66,262 Wis.2d 457,663 N.W.2d 798
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph F. JILES, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

262 Wis.2d 457

2003 WI 66

663 N.W.2d 798

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.Joseph F. JILES, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 02-0153-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral argument April 29, 2003.

Decided June 27, 2003.

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Mark S. Rosen and Rosen and Holzman, Ltd., Waukesha, and oral argument by Mark S. Rosen.

For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager,attorney general.

¶ 1.DAVID T. PROSSER, J.

This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals¹ that affirmed both the defendant's conviction following a guilty plea to one count of first-degree reckless injury by use of a dangerous weapon, and one count of armed robbery, both as party to a crime, and the circuit court's order denying the defendant's motion for postconviction relief.

¶ 2.On May 15, 2000, Joseph F. Jiles(Jiles) was arrested at 11:30 p.m. shortly after an armed robbery and shooting at a Milwaukee gas station.He was taken into police custody and transported to the Milwaukee Police Department.At 4:03 a.m. Jiles was awakened by a Milwaukee police detective and questioned about the robbery.Over the next 80 minutes he allegedly made a number of incriminating admissions about his involvement in the robbery, which the detective reduced to writing in a report that Jiles signed.

¶ 3.In due course, Jiles moved to suppress his statements.He claimed that: (1)he was not informed of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436(1966), prior to being interrogated; (2)he was unable to make a voluntary statement to police because he was intoxicated due to marijuana use prior to his arrest; and (3) any statements he made were not voluntary because they were the result of overbearing conduct by the interrogating officer.

¶ 4.The issue presented is whether Jiles received a full and fair evidentiary hearing on this motion to suppress his statements.

¶ 5.We conclude in this fact-specific matter that Jiles did not receive a full and fair hearing because the State did not meet its burden of proof.We are disturbed by the disregard of established procedure that we see in the record.We reverse the decision of the court of appeals, vacate Jiles' judgment of conviction, and allow Jiles to withdraw his guilty plea.We remand this matter to the circuit court for a new Miranda-Goodchild hearing if Jiles renews his motion to suppress his statement.

FACTS

¶ 6.This case is about the proper administration of justice.We do not focus on the crime, which was a violent robbery; or on the defendant; or on the innocent victim who was badly injured and blinded in one eye when she was shot in the head.We focus solely on the proceedings, especially the Miranda-Goodchild hearing, because proceedings of this nature may impact thousands of criminal cases.

¶ 7.Joseph Jiles was taken into custody on May 15, 2000.He waived his preliminary examination, and a jury trial was calendared for September 12, 2000.At a hearing on September 5, the trial date was vacated when Jiles' defense counsel, Daryl A. Kastenson, raised questions about the defendant's competency.Milwaukee County Circuit JudgeRobert Crawford suspended the proceedings and ordered a competency examination.At this hearing, Kastenson and Assistant District AttorneyMichael Mahoney also signed a "Felony Pretrial Scheduling Order" setting an October 9 final motion date, an October 20 final pretrial date, and an October 24 jury trial date.The order contained a handwritten note: "(1) Any Miranda Goodchild motions to be filed so motion can be heard on 10/9/00-1:30 P.M."

¶ 8.On September 20, Kastenson signed the Jiles motion to suppress evidence.It was filed with the court on September 22.

¶ 9.On October 12, the court convened a hearing to receive and consider a psychiatrist's report about Jiles' competency.Present in court with Judge Crawford were Assistant District AttorneyDouglas Simpson, defense counsel Kastenson, and defendant Jiles.The psychiatrist had concluded in his report that Jiles was malingering.The defense did not challenge the psychiatrist's conclusion, and the court determined that Jiles was competent.Then the following exchange took place:

MR. KASTENSON: Yes, Your Honor.Currently this matter is set for a final pretrial next Friday at 8:30 and jury trial on the 24th of October at 8:30.

I have filed some motions in this case as well, and I don't know if the Court wishes to take them up today or next Friday.One dealing with severance of the trials of this defendant and the codefendant, Lyron Wilson.That motion I would like to withdraw at this time because it's my understanding that Mr. Wilson entered a guilty plea before this Court this past Tuesday and will not be having a jury trial.

THE COURT: Mr. Wilson did plead guilty.I am prepared to address your motion to suppress the statements.Do you have the police reports, Mr. Simpson?

MR. SIMPSON: Regarding which part of the—I thought I attached them to mine.I did not, Judge?

THE COURT: I don't have a response from you, Mr. Simpson.

MR. SIMPSON: I filed one.

MR. KASTENSON: I received a response from Mr. Simpson, but it was the response to Mr. Wilson's motion to suppress the statement rather than specifically a response to my client's motion to suppress the statement.

MR. SIMPSON: Then I don't know if I ever received a motion from Mr. Jiles because I would have answered it.

MR. KASTENSON: I filed with the Court the original, of course, with the clerk's stamp and the district attorney's stamp dated September 22nd.I'm also showing Mr. Simpson a photocopy of a letter with the motions attached that I sent to him on September 22nd.

MR. SIMPSON: I do not recall receiving this.I note that attached to the defendant's motion are the reports.So if the Court has that, at least it gets the Court that far.If you'd like another copy, I can provide one.I don't have this motion nor have I responded to it.

THE COURT: The motion which Mr. Jiles filed on September 22nd, 2000 bears the district attorney's Bate stamp reflecting service on the District Attorney's Office.It is helpful for future reference, Mr. Kastenson, to file the motions here in Branch 9.The District Attorney's Office systems are inadequate, and documents that are actually filed in the District Attorney's Office seem to have a way of getting lost.

MR. KASTENSON: That's why I mailed a copy to Mr. Simpson, but apparently that was lost in his office as well but—

MR. SIMPSON: I certainly believe `cause I've had many, many cases with Mr. Kastenson that he did exactly what he says.And I, quite frankly, don't expect the Court to offer the State any leeway should it feel that my failure to respond deserves something in terms of oral chastisement.But I can only assure the Court that I answer these things whenever I see them.If I missed this one and I should have had it, I apologize.But I tried to answer it.

¶ 10.This exchange reveals that the court had not scheduled a hearing for October 12 on the suppression motion.The assistant district attorney had lost the motion, was surprised by the hearing, and unprepared to present evidence.The court expected the assistant district attorney to produce a police report, and so the prosecutor scrambled to point out that relevant police reports were attached to the defendant's withdrawn, unrelated motion to sever his case from his codefendant.

¶ 11.Undeterred by the State's lack of preparedness, Judge Crawford plunged forward.He addressed the public defender:

THE COURT: Do I understand that you raise two challenges?First, you challenge whether the police, in fact, informed Mr. Jiles of his Miranda rights.And your second challenge is that, due to his voluntary intoxication, based upon his marijuana use, that any statements that he did make to police were not knowing and voluntary?

¶ 12.After receiving an affirmative answer, the court launched into a lengthy discussion of the State's burden at a suppression hearing as well as the role of the court:

THE COURT: Under State against Armstrong, the district attorney bears the burden of proof on both these issues.The district attorney must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, in fact, a defendant who was subjected to custodial interrogation was given his Miranda warnings and that the defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of those warnings.

The question of whether a statement was taken involuntarily in violation of the due process clause requires the district attorney to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary.Statements can be involuntary if a defendant's use of narcotic drugs or alcohol so impairs a person's ability that their statements cannot be said to be the product of a free and voluntary choice.

So during the evidentiary hearing, I'll be focusing on a couple of things.I'll be focusing on whether the defendant was in custody, whether he was given Miranda warnings, whether he made a knowing and voluntary waiver of those warnings and whether he was then subjected to interrogation.

I'll also be focusing on the due process question, on any behavior which indicates that the defendant was fully possessed of his faculties.That means any behavior that shows that the defendant was asserting his will and making choices will be relevant to me in my decision on whether his consumption of marijuana or any other drug would have overcome his ability to make free and informed choices.

The State's burden of proof on the Miranda issue and the due process issue has two components.One is the burden of production; the other is the burden of persuasion.The judge is not bound by the rules of evidence when considering whether a defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and whether his statement was voluntary under the due

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