State v. Jimenez-Jaramill
Citation | 134 Conn.App. 346,38 A.3d 239 |
Decision Date | 20 March 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 33302.,33302. |
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Luis JIMENEZ–JARAMILL. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James A. Killen, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Devant Joiner, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Paul A. Garlinghouse, New Haven, for the appellee (defendant).
BEAR, ESPINOSA and PELLEGRINO, Js.
The state of Connecticut appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the charge of creating a public disturbance in violation of General Statutes § 53a–181a brought against the defendant, Luis Jimenez–Jaramill.1 On appeal, the state contends that the court erred when it (1) summarily dismissed the charge against the defendant sua sponte in the midst of the defendant's testimony on direct examination and (2) denied the state the opportunity to cross-examine the defendant or present rebuttal testimony prior to rendering the judgment of dismissal. We agree with the state and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
In light of the highly unusual procedural posture of this case, we set forth the following undisputed facts gleaned from the record before us. On the evening of May 14, 2010, Officer Martin Feliciano of the New Haven police department patrolled the Fair Haven district of New Haven. At approximately 6:26 p.m., Feliciano was outside his vehicle on James Street when he observed the defendant operating a Mazda Protégé while using a hand-held cell phone.2 When Feliciano ordered the defendant to put the phone away, the defendant smiled at Feliciano and parked his vehicle on the right side of the road. A physical altercation thereafter ensued, at the conclusion of which the defendant was arrested and charged with various offenses. Those charges later were dismissed and replaced by an information charging the defendant with one count of creating a public disturbance in violation of § 53a–181a.
The defendant elected to plead not guilty to that infraction and a court trial commenced on January 25, 2011,3 at which the state's case-in-chief consisted solely of the testimony of Feliciano. Feliciano testified that he first observed the defendant 4 Feliciano testified that when he instructed the defendant to put the cell phone away, the defendant “continued to drive towards me while talking on the cell phone as he smiled.” Feliciano testified that he then pointed at the defendant and ordered him to pull the vehicle over. As he drove past Feliciano, the defendant Feliciano testified that the defendant then parked the vehicle in a nearby parking spot on James Street. Feliciano detailed the physical altercation that followed in a colloquy with the state's attorney:
Following the testimony of Feliciano, the state rested while reserving the right to call Feliciano in rebuttal. Significantly, the defendant did not move for a judgment of acquittal at that time. Rather, he commenced his defense with the testimony of two witnesses to the events in question, Javier Darwin–Chuquilla and Segundo Sarango, neither of whom clearly observed the physical altercation between Feliciano and the defendant.5 Due to the late time of day, the matter was continued until February 22, 2011.
At the outset of the February 22, 2011 proceeding, defense counsel informed the court that he had “two other witnesses besides my client.” The court then stated: With that, the trial resumed with the testimony of the defendant.
The defendant testified that, on the evening of May 14, 2010, he was driving to a soccer game at Criscuolo Park. He admitted that he was talking on a hand-held cell phone as he drove his vehicle to the park. The defendant testified that he saw a police officer on the street as he approached the park, whom he later identified as Feliciano. He testified that Feliciano yelled at him to put down the cell phone and that he immediately complied. The defendant explained that “because of my good nature, what I did was to smile and then park right in front of him.” He further testified that his vehicle had a standard transmission, which required him to use both hands to park. The defendant testified that when he exited his vehicle and reached for a folder, Feliciano At that point in the defendant's testimony, the court inquired as to how many questions defense counsel had for the witness, to which counsel responded, The court then conducted a sidebar conference with another attorney about two unrelated matters.
When that sidebar conference concluded, the court stated, at which point defense counsel conceded he could not recall his last question. The following colloquy ensued:
“[Assistant State's Attorney]: That's correct, Your Honor.
“[Assistant State's Attorney]: Right.
“[Defense Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor.
“[Assistant State's Attorney]: Your Honor—
“The Court: Yes.
The judgment file in the present case likewise reflects that From that judgment, the state now appeals.
The state's principal contention is that the court erred when it summarily dismissed the charge against the defendant midway through the defendant's testimony on direct examination. The state claims that there is no authority for a trial court in a criminal matter to sua sponte render a judgment of dismissal in such circumstances. The state further submits that the court's ruling both ran afoul of binding precedent of our Supreme Court and infringed on the constitutional...
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In re Shane M.
...310 Conn. at 507–508, 78 A.3d 797 (specific steps provide guidance to facilitate reunification). Furthermore, State v. Jimenez–Jaramill, 134 Conn.App. 346, 367–69, 38 A.3d 239, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 913, 45 A.3d 100 (2012), cited by the respondent in support of his argument, relates to th......
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State v. Jamison
...no dispute that jeopardy first attached prior to the acquittal, as the jury had been empaneled and sworn. See State v. Jimenez–Jaramill, 134 Conn.App. 346, 375 n. 18, 38 A.3d 239 (“[i]n jury trials, jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn”), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 913, 45 A.3d......
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State v. Jamison
...no dispute that jeopardy first attached prior to the acquittal, as the jury had been empaneled and sworn. See State v. Jimenez-Jaramill, 134 Conn. App. 346, 375 n.18, 38 A.3d 239 ("[i]n jury trials, jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn"), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 913, 45 A.3d......
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State v. Baker
...constitutes criminal punishment. Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. at 99–100, 118 S.Ct. 488; see State v. Jimenez–Jaramill, 134 Conn.App. 346, 368–73, 38 A.3d 239, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 913, 45 A.3d 100 (2012)(applying Hudson 's two-pronged test in determining that infraction for p......
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2012 Connecticut Appellate Review
...[137] Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-112©(3)(B). [138] 134 Conn.App. 288, 37 A.3d 834, cert, granted, 305 Conn. 909, 45 A.3d 97 (2012). [139] 134 Conn.App. 346, 38 A.3d 239, cert, denied, 305 Conn. 913, 45 A.3d 1000 (2012). [140] 136 Conn.App. 36, 43 A.3d 772, cert, granted, 307 Conn. 911, 53 A.3d ......