State v. Joas
Citation | 34 N.J. 179,168 A.2d 27 |
Decision Date | 06 February 1961 |
Docket Number | No. A--55,A--55 |
Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Anthony JOAS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
Ralph J. Pocaro, Summit, for defendant-appellant.
Myles J. Gilsenan, Sp. Asst. Counsel, Elizabeth, for plaintiff-respondent (H. Douglas Stine, Union County Pros., Plainfield, attorney).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Defendant appeals from a conviction by the Union County Court of having violated N.J.S.A. 39:4--82 ( ) upon an appeal from a conviction by the Municipal Court of Berkeley Heights of having violated N.J.S.A. 39:4--97 (careless driving). The court certified the appeal upon its own motion before argument in the Appellate Division.
On January 17, 1960 defendant, while operating a motor vehicle in the Township of Berkeley Heights, was stopped and given a summons and complaint in the form of a uniform traffic ticket; Local Criminal Court Form No. 12 (deleted September 30, 1960). A cross was marked in ink on the face of the ticket by the arresting officer after the printed words 'careless driving' and the words 'crossing white line' inserted in a blank space reserved for a more specific designation of the offense.
After hearing, defendant was convicted in the municipal court of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4--97, which provides:
'A person who drives a vehicle on a highway carelessly, or without due caution and circumspection, in a manner so as to endanger, or be likely to endanger, a person or property, shall be guilty of careless driving.'
Defendant thereupon appealed to the County Court.
Prior to the commencement of the trial De novo in the County Court the prosecutor and the deputy attorney general moved for an amendment of the original complaint, to charge the defendant with a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4--82. The amendment was allowed and defendant was tried and convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4--82, which reads:
Defendant argues that the judgment of conviction should be reversed since N.J.S.A. 39:4--97 does not contain a sufficient standard of conduct and hence violates both Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 1 of the N.J. Constitution. Alternatively, he argues that in the event N.J.S.A. 39:4--97 is declared to be constitutional, the said conviction of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4--82 should be reversed and the matter remanded for a trial by the County Court on the original complaint of having violated N.J.S.A. 39:4--97 for the reasons that (1) the County Court erred on the trial De novo in considering the synopsis of testimony contained in the return of the magistrate who heard the case on the original charge, and (2) the conviction on the amended complaint placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
As noted above, prior to the hearing before the County Court the complaint was amended so that the charge of having violated N.J.S.A. 39:4--97 (careless driving) was eliminated and the charge of having violated N.J.S.A. 39:4--82 ( ) was substituted therefor. It is admitted that both charges arose out of the same factual setting.
R.R. 3:10--10(b) furnishes the authority for the substitution of the new charge. It provides:
'(b) The appeal shall operate as a waiver of all defects in the record, including any defect in, or the absence of any process or charge laid in the complaint, and as a consent that the court may, during or before the hearing of the appeal, amend the complaint by making the charge more specific, definite or certain, or in any other manner, including the substitution of any charge growing out of the act or acts complained of or the surrounding circumstances, of which the tribunal from whose judgment or sentence the appeal is taken had jurisdiction.'
In State v. Henry, 56 N.J.Super. 1 at pages 13, 14, 151 A.2d 412, 418 (App.Div.1959), the court said:
And, at page 17 of 56 N.J.Super., at page 420, 151 A.2d:
It has been frequently held in this State that when a defendant appeals from a judgment of a County Court on an appeal from a municipal court, the appellate court will consider only the action of the County Court and not that of the municipal court. State v. Henry, supra; State v. Hulsizer, 42 N.J.Super. 348, 125 A.2d 728 (App.Div.1956); State v. Baumgartner, 21 N.J.Super. 348, 91 A.2d 222 (App.Div.1952).
It is apparent, therefore, that the constitutionality of the careless driving statute is not involved. In view of its importance, however, and of the fact that the question raised by the defendant is one of novel impression in this State, we conceive it of sufficient public importance to pass upon defendant's argument.
Defendant argues that the words of the statute are so indefinite of characterization and evanescent of description that they do not sufficiently inform an accused of the standard of conduct proscribed.
Decisions in states other than New Jersey are not especially helpful in reaching a solution of the problem with which we are confronted, for the reason that the exact language of the enactments is not identical with that of our statute. Nor is there any uniformity as to the language employed by those states. Cases sustaining the validity and determining the invalidity of such similar legislation elsewhere may be found in State of West Virginia v. Hamilton, 133 W.Va. 394, 56 S.E.2d 544, 12 A.L.R.2d 580 (Sup.Ct.App.1950); 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 609, p. 699 (1949); 5A Am.Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 1179, p. 984 (1956).
At the outset it must be recognized that a penal statute must specify the elements of the offense which it proscribes with such a reasonable degree of certainty as to apprise those to whom it is addressed of the standard of conduct proscribed, so that men of common intelligence need not necessarily guess at its meaning or differ as to its application. State v. Frankel, 42 N.J.Super. 7, 125 A.2d 728 (App.Div.1956); State v. New York Central Railroad Co., 37 N.J.Super. 42, 116 A.2d 800 (App.Div.1955); Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1938).
In judging the sufficiency of the language employed in a penal statute it is necessary to give consideration to the latitude of the field encompassed and the consequent impracticability of rigid legislative criteria. As stated in State v. Frankel, supra, 42 N.J.Super. at page 11, 125 A.2d at page 730:
'* * * It is, however, common to find regulatory penal statutes or ordinances which are necessarily couched in terms of fairly broad scope because of the peculiar nature of the subject matter in question.'
In Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 72 S.Ct. 329, 330, 96 L.Ed. 367, 371 (1951), the court said:
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