State v. John M.
| Citation | 87 Conn.App. 301,865 A.2d 450 |
| Decision Date | 08 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 24174.,24174. |
| Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. JOHN M. |
John W. Watson, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Anne F. Mahoney, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
DRANGINIS, McLACHLAN and STOUGHTON, Js.
The defendant, John M., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a trial to the court, of four counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(2), three counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a)(1) and two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(2).2 On appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the trial court made several improper evidentiary rulings that prohibited him from presenting a full defense and (2) that prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during the state's closing argument in rebuttal deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The nature of the defendant's claims does not require us to recount in detail the sexual abuse the victim suffered. It is sufficient for us to note that, beginning in 1992, the defendant engaged in a persistent course of sexual conduct toward his daughter that ended only after she disclosed the abuse in the end of 2000. During these years of abuse, the victim lived with the defendant, her stepmother, M, and her two brothers. Shortly before the victim disclosed the defendant's actions, first to M and then to others, the defendant moved out of the family home to live with another woman, whom he later married. The state's case consisted mainly of the victim's testimony regarding the defendant's conduct, as well as the testimony of a number of constancy of accusation witnesses and a nurse practitioner who evaluated the victim after she disclosed the abuse. M and the victim's younger brother also testified for the state, mainly highlighting family relationships and the home environment. The defendant extensively cross-examined these witnesses and also presented the testimony of a number of other witnesses. The defendant maintained his innocence throughout the trial, and several of his witnesses testified as to the lack of physical trauma to the victim or the lack of other physical evidence. To rebut the characterization of family relationships and home life presented by the state's witnesses, the defendant presented the testimony of his current wife and his mother and testified on his own behalf. In rendering its judgment, the court noted that its decision hinged largely on the credibility of witnesses and indicated that it found the victim quite credible while considering much of "the defendant's testimony ... merely self-serving in content." The court found the defendant guilty on all counts. Additional facts will be recounted as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the court deprived him of his right to present a defense when it prohibited him from presenting (1) evidence of M's alleged history as a victim of sexual abuse and (2) evidence of M's animus toward him.3 The defendant suggested that this evidence was vital to his theory of the case, which was that M persuaded the victim to make these allegations against him either (1) to punish him for leaving M, who has been diagnosed with a crippling disease, for another woman or (2) to ensure that the victim could reside with M after the divorce even though M is not her biological or adoptive parent. The defendant sought to testify that M had told him about having been abused sexually when she was younger and that the abuse she disclosed to him closely paralleled the victim's allegations against him. The defendant also sought to testify that, contrary to M's testimony, he had told M that he was leaving her and never returning, and yet she wanted him to come back and believed that he would return to her. The evidence at issue was proffered only through the defendant's testimony. During cross-examination of M, the defense failed to inquire into this subject matter. The court excluded both pieces of evidence as irrelevant and, even if relevant, as hearsay not within any exception to the rule against hearsay.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saunders, 267 Conn. 363, 382, 838 A.2d 186, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2113, 158 L.Ed.2d 722 (2004).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cerreta, 260 Conn. 251, 261-62, 796 A.2d 1176 2002). "[I]t is well settled that questions of relevance are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Barletta, 238 Conn. 313, 332, 680 A.2d 1284 (1996).
We first evaluate the defendant's claim that the court improperly excluded evidence of M's alleged history of sexual abuse. The defendant sought to testify that M had told him she had a history of sexual abuse. The defendant claims that the details of M's history closely paralleled the allegations against him and, therefore, this testimony would support the defendant's theory that M coached the victim in making these allegations against him. The defendant's testimony, however, was that M shared her history of sexual abuse with him, not with the victim. The defendant's argument, therefore, would have required the court, as fact finder, to make the inferential leap that because M shared this information with the defendant, she must have shared it with the victim and then coached the victim using this history. We are unable to say, therefore, that the court abused its discretion when it determined that this evidence, independent of any evidence that M shared her history with the victim, was irrelevant as to whether M had coached the victim in making her allegations against the defendant.4
The defendant also sought to testify that, when he told M that he was "splitting up with her," she indicated that she expected him to come back to her. This testimony could have been construed to contradict M's earlier testimony that she "wanted [the defendant] gone ... wanted him to move out." The defendant argued that the proffered testimony was relevant to the animus M felt toward him. The court, assuming M felt animus toward the defendant, concluded that any such animus was irrelevant as to the truth of the victim's allegations against the defendant. After further argument by defense counsel, the court indicated that, even if the proffered testimony were relevant, it consisted of hearsay that was not admissible under any exception to the rule against hearsay, as the proffered testimony did not satisfy the inconsistent statement exception to the rule.5
We reiterate that (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daniels, 83 Conn.App. 210, 214-15, 848 A.2d 1235, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 913, 853 A.2d 528 (2004).
The defendant argues that, pursuant to our rules of evidence, the court should have admitted his proffered testimony either as an inconsistent statement for purposes of impeaching M's credibility or as evidence of M's prejudice against him. Prior to discussing further the legal principles governing our review of the defendant's claim, we note that at no time during the defendant's cross-examination of M did he inquire whether she had expected or desired that he reunite with her, contrary to her testimony on direct examination. Because the defendant did not inquire into this area during cross-examination, the proffered testimony amounted to extrinsic evidence of either a prior inconsistent statement or M's animus toward the defendant, without any foundation having been laid previously. Granting the defendant the benefit of the assumption that M's alleged prior inconsistent statement or animus toward him bore some relevance as to the truth of the victim's allegations, we still cannot say that the court's...
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