State v. Johnson

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: SUSSWEIN, J.A.D.
• Citation: 338 A.3d 932,482 N.J.Super. 67
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A-3221-23
• Decision Date: 03 June 2025
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Maurice E. JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

338 A.3d 932

482 N.J.Super. 67

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Maurice E. JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

DOCKET NO. A-3221-23

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued April 29, 2025

Decided June 3, 2025

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 23-12-0939.

John P. Morris argued the cause for appellant.

Kim Latonya Barfield, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent

(Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Kimberly P. Will, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Sumners, Susswein and Bergman.

₇₇The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUSSWEIN, J.A.D.

On leave granted by our Supreme Court, defendant Maurice E. Johnson appeals from a November 10, 2023 Law Division order denying his motion to suppress evidence and a May 30, 2024 order denying his motion for reconsideration. This case presents a novel constitutional question arising from the execution of a communications₇₈ data warrant (CDW) that authorized the surreptitious installation of a global positioning system (GPS) device on a vehicle to electronically monitor its movements. The State Police initially intended to install the device while the vehicle was on a public street or in a public parking lot. When that failed, the State Police decided to install the device while the vehicle was parked on defendant’s driveway. The CDW did not expressly authorize entry onto the driveway. Nor did the State Police seek prior judicial authorization to enter onto defendant’s residential property when they abandoned the plan to install the device on a public street or parking lot.

We are tasked in this appeal to decide whether the State Police violated defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and its state counterpart, Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, when they went on defendant’s driveway to perform the installation. To answer that ultimate question, we consider a series of interrelated sub-questions: Was the portion of the driveway where the subject vehicle was parked part of the “curtilage” of defendant’s home and thus protected under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7? If so, did the State Police have an “implied license” to step onto the private driveway and proceed to the subject vehicle to install the GPS device? If they did not have such license, did the CDW itself implicitly authorize their entry? Or were they required to obtain express judicial authorization to enter onto defendant’s residential property, either in the initial CDW application or by going back to the judge who issued the CDW when they abandoned their initial plan to install the device while the vehicle was parked on public property?

[1, 2] Because this case raises several discrete issues that must be resolved in sequence, we proceed step-by-step in our analysis to build the foundation for our ultimate conclusion. We first acknowledge what is not disputed in this appeal. Defendant does not challenge the issuance of the CDW, but rather its execution. The law is well-settled that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 can be violated by the manner in which a duly issued ₇₉search warrant ¹ is executed. See e.g., State v. Caronna, 469 N.J. Super. 462, 495, 499, 265 A.3d 1249 (App. Div. 2021) (diverging from United States Supreme Court precedent by invoking the exclusionary rule when police unreasonably and unjustifiably ignored the search warrant’s requirement that they knock and announce their presence before entering the dwelling). We must, therefore, address whether the State Police exceeded the scope of the CDW when they chose to install the GPS device while the subject vehicle was parked on defendant’s private property.

After reviewing the record in light of the parties’ arguments and the governing legal principles, we are constrained to reverse the denial of defendant’s suppression motion. The governing case law makes clear that the police entry onto the driveway in these circumstances constitutes a search regulated by the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. The top of the driveway where the subject vehicle was parked was part of the curtilage of defendant’s home and was thus constitutionally protected—a conclusion the State does not dispute.²

Furthermore, the State failed to establish that the State Police had “implied license” under the curtilage doctrine to approach the vehicle to install the GPS device. State and federal curtilage jurisprudence recognizes that visitors, such as delivery persons, may be privileged to enter onto private residential property and follow a path leading to the home’s front entrance. But here, the record shows that the State Police turned away from the pathway leading to the front door as they proceeded to the subject vehicle to attach the device. Furthermore, the implied license caveat to the curtilage doctrine would not, in any event, authorize police to ₈₀enter the driveway for the purpose of installing a GPS device, since that is not something visitors would be expected or permitted to do.

[3] Nor has the State established that the CDW itself authorized entry onto defendant’s residential premises. Under the plain language of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7, a search warrant must particularly, not impliedly, describe the place to be searched. Here, the CDW did not mention the driveway much less expressly designate it as a place to be entered/searched. We emphasize this is not a situation where police had a warrant to enter the house and the only question is whether the driveway falls within the geographic scope of the warrant’s search authorization. While the CDW expressly authorized a police incursion upon the subject vehicle, it did not authorize an incursion on defendant’s residential property. That distinction is critical to our analysis. It is well-settled that homes are afforded greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than automobiles. See State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 422, 126 A.3d 850 (2015).

We thus hold that the entry onto the top portion of defendant’s driveway in these circumstances not only constitutes a search, but a warrantless one. Applying the bedrock principle that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, we conclude that the State Police were obligated either to request judicial authorization to enter onto defendant’s residence as part of the initial CDW application, go back to the issuing judge to obtain express authorization once the initial installation plan failed, or establish that a recognized warrant exception applies.

We emphasize that it does not matter that the State Police did not appreciate the constitutional significance of entering onto defendant’s residential property. Nor does it matter that they were acting in good faith based on the assumption they were authorized to install the GPS device at any place of their choosing, including defendant’s private driveway. There is no good faith exception in this State. See State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 153, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).

₈₁I.

We discern the following pertinent facts from the record, focusing on the events leading to the issuance and execution of the CDW. On January 27, 2022, a Superior Court judge issued two CDWs authorizing police to install and monitor in real time GPS devices on a Jeep Grand Cherokee ³and a Chevrolet Tahoe. Both vehicles were registered to defendant’s mother but defendant primarily used them.

The CDW states in relevant part:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the signal monitoring and tracking device shall be installed on the subject automobile as soon as is practicable within ten (10) days from the issuance hereof in a [manner] to be determined by the executing officers so as to minimize the chances of detection of the device by the person whose vehicle is the subject of this warrant. Further, you are to make a report to me of the termination of monitoring within ten (10) days of the date that monitoring of the GPS device terminates hereunder or under any extension hereto[.]

The CDW additionally states that:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that authorization is granted to enter, access, or otherwise exercise control over the subject vehicle, with any and all necessary and proper assistance, for the purpose of maintaining, replacing, repairing, enhancing, moving, or removing the said devices and/or downloading data; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that authority is hereby granted to monitor the device in real time as an aid to physical surveillance until the authorized objectives are attained but in no eventshall the monitoring of the said device exceed thirty (30) days from the date of installation of the said unit unless the Court extends the termination date. The signal monitoring and tracking device may be operated and monitored twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, Sunday through Saturday, inclusive. Once installed, the signal monitoring and tracking device will ascertain and record the vehicle’s location into it’s memory.

….

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that authorization is granted to remove the signal monitoring and tracking device by employing the surreptitious means delineated herein within a reasonable time period after the end of the authorized period of use.

The judge issued a similar CDW on February 25, 2022 to track the Tahoe starting March 2, 2022 for no more than an additional thirty days.

₈₂The CDW noted the address of the registered vehicle owner but did not describe the residence. On March 23, 2022, a different judge issued a warrant to search defendant’s residence.⁴

In June 2022, defendant was charged by indictment with various drug and weapons offenses.⁵ In December 2023, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendant with first-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(l); second-degree possession of a weapon...