State v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 12 May 1944
• Docket Number: 8587
• Citation: 14 N.W.2d 420,70 S.D. 66
• Parties: STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Respondent, v. JOHN ARDEN JOHNSON, Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

70 SD 66, 14 NW2d 420 (1944)

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Respondent v JOHN ARDEN JOHNSON, Appellant South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Brown County, SD Hon. Van Buren Perry, Presiding Judge #8587—Affirmed Max Stokes, Aberdeen, SD Attorney for Appellant. George T. Mickelson, Attorney General Charles P. Warren, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, SD Elmer Thurow, State’s Attorney, Aberdeen, SD Attorneys for Respondent. Opinion Filed May 12, 1944

WARREN, Presiding Judge.

The defendant, John Arden Johnson, was charged with committing the crime of grand larceny of 22 hogs, the property of P. E. Peterson and A. D. Zimlicka, on the 8th day of June, 1941, in Brown County, South Dakota. He was tried in circuit court. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. After the various formalities in the lower court, defendant perfected an appeal to this court.

Appellant by his appeal contends: (1) That the court erred in not granting defendant’s motion for a new trial; (2) that the state failed to lay a proper foundation for the introduction of evidence of the casts of truck wheel marks; (3) that there was no identification of the hogs; and (4) the impossibility that a man could load in a truck 22 two-hundred-pound hogs in a four-acre feed lot at night.

Appellant contends that the court erred in permitting the state to endorse on the information the names of certain additional witnesses. Error is also charged in the court’s ruling on admission of evidence.

Appellant contends that the court erred in giving instruction No. 3 and No. 10. Appellant further urges that the court erred in not granting defendant’s motion for a new trial based upon new evidence discovered since the trial. It is also urged that the defendant’s counsel was not allowed sufficient time to prepare for trial in the circuit court.

We have examined the court’s instruction No. 3 given by the court with reference to evidence of possession of property which had recently been stolen as applied to the facts in this case. The instruction given by the court was clearly a correct statement of the law to cover the evidence as to the possession of the hogs, as it seems clear from the evidence that the hogs were stolen some time during the night of June 7th and that next morning about 9 o’clock the appellant attempted to sell a truckload of hogs to the witness Scott some seven miles east of Mobridge, SD. There seems to be clear identification of the appellant and the truck which contained these stolen hogs by Scott and Segerson some few hours after the hogs had been stolen at Aberdeen, SD. Two of the tires on appellant’s truck were identified by certain marks made in the ground where the truck had been loaded by casts made of the impressions of the tires, and which casts were offered and received in evidence. These facts furnish sufficient circumstantial evidence to go to the jury on the question of whether the hogs which were in the truck when the appellant drove into Scott’s yard were the same hogs which had been stolen a few hours before at Aberdeen. The instruction given by the court is quite similar to an instruction approved by this court in State v. Larson, 41 SD 553, 172 NW 114, 115.

Comparing the instruction given by this court with that given in State v. Larson, which reads:

“If from the evidence you should be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the property in question was stolen, and that the defendant soon after its theft was in possession of it, that is a circumstance to be taken into consideration by you in making up your verdict, and unless such possession is satisfactorily explained either by the defendant or by the facts and circumstances brought out upon the trial, it is sufficient upon which to base a conviction, provided upon the whole case you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt. If, upon the other hand, you believe that the possession of the defendant, under the circumstances shown by the evidence, is as consistent with his innocence as with his guilt, it is your duty to acquit him.”

We feel that the trial court did not err in the language employed. The rule of law stated in the instruction is applicable to the facts in evidence and is squarely in line with the instruction given in State v. Larson, supra.

Appellant contends that the court erred in giving instruction No. 10. We are setting forth at length said instruction and have set out in bold face type that portion of the instruction which the appellant excepted to at the time the trial court was settling the instructions. Instruction No. 10 reads:

“The Court further instructs the jury that one of the defenses set up by the defendant in this case is what is known in law as an alibi, that is that the defendant was at another place at the time of the commission of the offense alleged in the information, and the Court instructs the jury that you should carefully consider all of the evidence based upon this point. If because of such evidence you have any reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was at the place where the crime was committed at the time of the commission thereof, and that he committed the same, then you should give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and acquit him. If you believe from the evidence in this case that the plea, of alibi was not interposed in good faith, or that the evidence to sustain it is simulated, false and fraudulent, then that would be a discrediting circumstance to which you may look in connection with all the other evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. You will examine the evidence on the subject of alibi with care. If such evidence raises any reasonable doubt in the minds of any of you as to the guilt of the defendant, you should acquit him.

Appellant’s exception was specific and urged error only against the bold-face portion of the instruction, and was couched in the following language:

“... for the reason that the instruction would tend to disparage the defense of alibi; would tend to induce the jury to treat the defense lightly, and instructs the ,jury to give the testimony of such witnesses less credit than the testimony of other witnesses, and is prejudicial to the defendant.”

Much has been written upon cautionary instructions regarding an alibi as a defense. The authorities are not as harmonious as would be desirable. However, this instruction seems to particularly fit the facts shown by the evidence to which this instruction was applied. We do not believe the instruction, as a whole, is prejudicial. 14 RCL 817, § 76.

The language employed by the court in its charge to the jury wherein he stated: “... If because of such evidence you have any reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was at the place where the crime was committed at the time of the commission thereof, and that he committed the same, then you should give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and acquit him. ...” gave the defendant favorable consideration. This part of the court’s charge then ended: “... If such evidence raises any reasonable doubt in the minds of any of you as to the guilt of the defendant, you should acquit him.” This last part of the instruction was salutary and very fair to the accused. We are inclined to believe that this instruction was suitable and apt in stating the...