State v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 15 September 1981
• Citation: 434 A.2d 532
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Ronald JOHNSON.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 532

434 A.2d 532

STATE of Maine v. Ronald JOHNSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued May 14, 1981.

Decided Sept. 15, 1981.

Charles K. Leadbetter, Pat Perrino, William R. Stokes, Wayne S. Moss (orally), Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Burton G. Shiro, Waterville (orally), for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK ^*, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, and CARTER, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

The defendant, Ronald Johnson, appeals from his conviction for murder, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A), following a jury trial in Superior Court, Lincoln County. ¹ On this appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of the murder of his mother, Verna Johnson, and also argues that numerous errors occurred in the course of the trial. We affirm the conviction.

From the evidence at trial, the jury could have found the following facts in connection with the death of Verna Johnson on March 27, 1979: On March 19, 1979, a police officer was called to the Johnson residence in Waterville. Mrs. Johnson was very upset and said she wanted her son, the defendant, out of the house. On March 25, 1979, the defendant told an acquaintance with whom he was drinking that he hated his mother and wanted her killed. On March 26, 1979, the defendant told the dispatcher of the taxi company he worked for that he was having problems with his mother and "she ought to be put away."

About 6:45 on the evening of March 27, 1979, the defendant and a friend, Steve Gillcash, took a taxicab to Mrs. Johnson's home. During the ride, the cab driver heard the defendant repeatedly say to Gillcash: "Something's going to happen tonight." At about 7:00 and again at 7:45 that evening, a friend of Mrs. Johnson telephoned the Johnson residence and asked for Mrs. Johnson. On both occasions, the defendant answered the phone and said that his mother was taking a bath. Between 8:00 and 9:00 that evening, the defendant and Gillcash went to a bar and a grocery store where the defendant cashed checks bearing his mother's signature.

At about 1:30 on the morning of March 28, the defendant and Gillcash were stopped by the Saco police while travelling southbound on Route 1. They were riding in a car registered to Mrs. Johnson, and the police saw a television set in the back seat. The defendant was arrested for operating under the influence, was released on personal recognizance, and left the police station about 5:30 a.m.

At about 6:00 on the morning of March 28, the taxi driver who regularly drove the defendant to work discovered that no one was home and that Mrs. Johnson's car was missing. The Waterville police were called and they found Mrs. Johnson's body sprawled on a chair in her living room. The medical examiner found three independent causes of death: a chest wound that could have been inflicted with a knife, a scalp wound consistent with being struck by a ceramic object, and strangulation.

Two knives were found in the kitchen, one stained with the victim's blood. Broken pieces of a ceramic ashtray were found near the body, and similar fragments were found in Mrs. Johnson's hair. Stephen Gillcash's fingerprints were found on one fragment. The defendant's fingerprint was found on another fragment, located in an area where it could have been left only after the ashtray was broken. Gillcash's fingerprints were also found on a cigarette pack near the garage door.

On April 5, 1979, the defendant and Gillcash were arrested near Scarborough while travelling northbound on Route 1. They were still in Mrs. Johnson's car, but they had replaced the Maine license plate with a stolen New Brunswick plate. The defendant had in his possession his mother's checkbook and credit cards and receipts for gasoline purchases made on her credit cards.

The defendant and Gillcash both made statements to the state police on April 5. The defendant told police that when he and Gillcash arrived at his mother's house on March 27, they found her already dead, became scared, took his mother's checks and credit cards and television set, and left in his mother's car. Gillcash initially told the police the same story about finding Mrs. Johnson dead. Later, on the same day, he told a police officer that he and the defendant had planned to murder Mrs. Johnson and described the details of their joint participation in the killing.

On April 3, 1979, the defendant and Steve Gillcash were jointly indicted for the murder of Verna Johnson. ² On August 14, 1979, Gillcash entered a plea of guilty and was convicted of murder. At the hearing on his guilty plea, Gillcash again stated that he and Ronald Johnson had jointly planned and participated in the killing.

At Johnson's trial on July 14-18, 1980, Gillcash was called as a witness by the defense. On cross-examination, he testified that he and Johnson were both very drunk on March 27, 1979, that they were together all day, that they went together to the home of Verna Johnson, and that they later left the state together. He claimed to have no other memory of the events of March 27, but he acknowledged that his statements to the police on April 5 and at the hearing on his guilty plea were true "as far as I can remember."

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The defendant preserved this issue by a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. State v. Wentworth, Me., 366 A.2d 178, 178 (1976). He contends that there was not sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he "intentionally or knowingly" caused his mother's death. In particular, he contends that there is no evidence from which the jury could have found that he performed any of the actions that caused the death.

The jury was not required to find that the defendant's own actions caused Mrs. Johnson's death. The jury was properly instructed that it could find the defendant guilty either as the perpetrator of a murder or as an accomplice to the commission of murder, as defined in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 57(3)(A). ³ There is ample evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant and Gillcash were present at Mrs. Johnson's home while she was being killed, and that they both participated in knowingly or intentionally causing her death. Even if the jury found that the actual attack was perpetrated solely by Gillcash, they could conclude that the defendant was present for the purpose of assisting his friend and was therefore guilty as an accomplice to murder. See State v. Gervais, Me., 394 A.2d 1183, 1185-86 (1978). The jury could have rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson was guilty of murder. State v. Allison, Me., 427 A.2d 471 (1981).

Evidentiary Rulings

A.

At trial, the defendant objected to a police officer's testimony that red spots near the victim's body "appeared to be blood" and to the medical examiner's testimony that pottery fragments found in the victim's hair had the "same appearance" as fragments found on the floor. He contends that these statements were inadmissible because they represented lay opinions not based on personal knowledge. M.R.Evid. 701 permits a lay witness to testify in terms of opinion or inferences that are "rationally based on the perception of the witness" and "helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony." A witness's observation that stains appear to be blood is sufficiently within the scope of common familiarity to be admissible under this rule. See State v. Wilbur, Me., 278 A.2d 139, 143 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). Similarly, the medical examiner's comparison of the pottery fragments was rationally based on his own observations as a lay witness and did not purport to be expert testimony. His testimony was properly admitted as a "shorthand rendering of the facts." State v. Lagasse, Me., 410 A.2d 537, 543-44 (1980); State v. Buzynski, Me., 330 A.2d 422, 426-27 (1974).

B.

The defendant objected, on grounds of hearsay, to testimony from Robert Taylor, a fellow inmate of Steve Gillcash. On direct examination by defense counsel, Taylor testified, without objection from the state, that he had had a conversation with Gillcash about the murder of Verna Johnson in which Gillcash "admitted doing it himself" and "said he killed the lady; that Johnson was innocent." On cross-examination, the state's attorney asked Taylor, over the defendant's objection, whether it was the "general consensus" and "general feeling" in the prison that Gillcash was "trying to cover for Johnson." After first responding that Gillcash and Johnson were "good friends" but that he did not know if Gillcash was trying to cover for Johnson, Taylor finally responded affirmatively. On redirect examination, Taylor repeated that he did not know.

We agree that it was error to admit Taylor's testimony as a matter of his view of the "general consensus." Taylor's testimony was hearsay in that it amounted to recitation of other inmates' assertions that Gillcash was trying to cover for Johnson. The testimony was being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in order to discredit the statement that Taylor had attributed to Gillcash. Even if Gillcash's out-of-court statement was also hearsay, M.R.Evid. 806 permits impeachment of hearsay declarants only with "evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness." ⁴

Although Gillcash's credibility was a critical issue, the jury already knew that Gillcash and Johnson were friends, and they had heard Gillcash testify. Taylor's testimony that Gillcash and Johnson were "good friends" was properly admitted for purposes of discrediting the statement Gillcash made in prison. Although the other portion of Taylor's response to the prosecutor's question was erroneously admitted, we find that the error was harmless, because it did not affect substantial rights of the defendant, M.R.Crim.P. 52(a).

The jury's determination...