State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 13 February 1940 |
| Parties | STATE v. JOHNSON. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Eau Claire County; James Wickham, Judge.
Affirmed.
On August 21, 1937, Carl Johnson was charged with having committed the crime of second degree murder. He was found guilty. From the judgment of conviction, defendant appeals.
The information charged the defendant with murder in the second degree in that on June 29, 1937, he “did feloniously and unlawfully kill and slay one Joyce Sorenson, without a premeditated design to effect the death of said Joyce Sorenson, said killing being perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, contrary to sec. 340.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Wisconsin.” The defendant pleaded not guilty because insane at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, and for that reason not responsible for his acts. In addition to this plea he framed and interposed two other pleas; one asserting that he was insane and feeble minded at the time, and another that he was feeble minded, and therefore not responsible for his acts.
The jury by its verdict found the defendant guilty as charged. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were denied by the court, and the defendant having been adjudged guilty, it was ordered that he be punished by imprisonment in the state prison at Waupun at hard labor, for an indeterminate term of not less than fourteen nor more than fifteen years.Stafford & Stafford, of Chippewa Falls, and Riley & Riley, of Eau Claire, for appellant.
John E. Martin, Atty. Gen., William A. Platz, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Connor Hansen, Dist. Atty., of Eau Claire, for respondent.
The child's death was the result of one of several shots fired by the defendant. Of this there is no doubt. Such questions as are presented arise from the issues raised by the pleas interposed by the defendant, and which in substance are that he is not guilty because he was insane or feeble minded at the time of the shooting, and consequently his mental condition was so impaired that he ought not to be held responsible for his acts.
[1][2]It is the contention of counsel for defendant that knowledge of right and wrong as a test of responsibility was done away with by Chapter 620, Laws of 1917, and that some new rule under which we are to determine the existence or non-existence of “sanity or mental responsibility” of those who commit criminal acts was brought into being. By that chapter there was added to the section governing pleas of insanity the words “or feeble minded.” See sec. 357.11, Stats. Although the term “insanity” had been considered as broad enough to include all species of mental aberration or sickness of the mind, the distinction between insanity, idiocy, and feeble mindedness existed and had been frequently referred to in expert testimony when occasion required the examinationinto the condition of mind of a defendant. This suggested the advisability of definitely including within the scope of the criminal law relating to mental responsibility the condition more exactly described by the psychiatrists as “feeble mindedness.” It does not follow, however, that one of less mental caliber than another but still knowing the nature of his act and whether it is right or wrong is to be excused from responsibility therefor. The legislature by enacting that amendment did not lower the guard that is to protect society. It extended, if it was not already so extended, the benevolent protection that the public must grant to the mentally sick. The purpose was to make surer the hospitalization of those who because of a lack of mental responsibility are dangerous to have at large. The learned trial judge in charging the jury in this case stated the law correctly in the following words: “In order that the plea of feeble mindedness shall prevail, the evidence must be sufficient to justify you in finding that at the time he fired the fatal shot which resulted in the death of the deceased, that he did not have sufficient mental capacity to know the difference between right and wrong or the nature of the act which he was then doing.”
[3]The suggestion that the amendment was to bring the legal definition of insanity in keeping with modern thought may be a valid challenge to develop principles of certainty that will make improvement possible; but we must deal with things as they are, including the state of knowledge upon particular subjects. The gradual breaking down of the mind leading to the abnormal is not easily detected. The defendant in this case was released from the Mendota hospital in February, 1937. The crime with which he was charged was committed the following June. Had the wisdom of man been sufficient to foresee the train of events, some steps might have been taken to prevent the catastrophe. Success in crime prevention is dependent upon knowledge derived from experience; but even with all our modern enlightenment, it is not always possible to catch the hand before the blow is struck, nor is it possible to determine exactly the precise state of mind at the instant the striking occurs. The likelihood of error in diagnosing mental responsibility with a jury and detecting the true extent of the growth of mental disease or the development of mental incapacity is considerable, and it has resulted in rules designed to restrain the vicious which have been accepted by the courts of this state in the effort to deal justly with individuals and at the same time protect society. There must be some reasonably definite and sensible line to indicate the division between that state of mind where responsibility must be present and the condition of insanity or feeble mindedness where there is no responsibility. Whether the actor is vicious because he is willing to...
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... ... Such a plea, first recognized in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and later in Wisconsin in State v. Johnson, 105 Wis.2d 657, 314 N.W.2d 897 (Ct.App.1981), allows a guilty (or no contest) plea to be entered by a defendant "even when accompanied by protestations of innocence." Id. at 661, 314 N.W.2d at 899. In ... Page 598 ... that event, the plea is said to constitute only a waiver of trial and ... ...
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