State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 04 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | SC S51591.,CC CR9800590.,CA A116313. |
| Citation | 339 Or. 69,116 P.3d 879 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. Martin Allen JOHNSON, Respondent on Review. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Janet A. Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and Paul L. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.
Susan F. Drake, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
This criminal case, arising out of defendant's conviction for third-degree rape, raises various issues relating to the proper interpretation and application of Oregon's statutory provisions respecting speedy trials, ORS 135.745 to 135.750. Pursuant to those statutes, and based on facts of this case, defendant moved to dismiss the charge in question. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty, but reserved his speedy trial challenge. See ORS 135.335(3) (). On defendant's appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the state had failed to bring defendant to trial within a "reasonable period of time," as one of the speedy trial statutes, ORS 135.747, requires. State v. Johnson, 193 Or.App. 250, 90 P.3d 4, adh'd to on recons., 194 Or.App. 28, 92 P.3d 766 (2004). On review, the state argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted and applied the speedy trial statutes. The state also argues that the Court of Appeals employed an erroneous standard of review. We conclude that the state's arguments about the meaning and application of the statutes are not well taken and, accordingly, affirm.
The relevant facts are as follows. In early 1998, defendant became aware of the fact that he was the target of a Washington County homicide investigation. He fled the state. Shortly thereafter, the police obtained evidence that defendant may have committed other crimes in a different venue, Clackamas County, in 1997. On the basis of that evidence, a Clackamas County grand jury indicted defendant on April 9, 1998, charging him with one count of third-degree rape and two counts of third-degree sexual abuse. Based on the Clackamas County indictment, a warrant for defendant's arrest issued four days later. In the meantime, the Washington County homicide investigation had continued, ultimately leading to an indictment against defendant in that county on a charge of aggravated murder.
Defendant eventually was apprehended in Florida. On March 4, 1999, the authorities returned defendant to Oregon to face trial on the Washington County aggravated murder charge. Clackamas County put a "hold" on defendant with respect to the rape and sexual abuse charges around that same time,1 but it did not serve defendant with the April 1998 arrest warrant or otherwise attempt to move the Clackamas County case forward.
According to defendant, he did not learn of the Clackamas County "hold" or the charges connected with it until November 2000 — 20 months after his return to Oregon.2 At that time, he still was in jail in Washington County awaiting trial on the aggravated murder charge. On November 24, 2000, defendant filed a "Notice of Request for Early Trial" in Clackamas County Circuit Court. Clackamas County responded to that notice by serving defendant with an arrest warrant on December 20, 2000, arraigning him in circuit court on December 21, 2000, and setting the case for trial on February 9, 2001.
Defendant subsequently requested and obtained several postponements of the Clackamas County trial. He also filed a number of motions relating to his stated desire to represent himself. However, when the trial court inquired about defendant's willingness to waive his speedy trial rights for purposes of those requests and motions, defendant indicated, albeit somewhat inarticulately, that he did not wish to waive his rights with respect to the 21-month period between his return to Oregon and his arraignment in Clackamas County.3 Eventually, defendant moved to dismiss the Clackamas County charges on both constitutional and statutory speedy trial grounds. The trial court denied the motion, finding that "the delay in service of the arrest warrant [was] attributable to the defendant's absence from the state" and that there were no significant delays after defendant demanded a speedy trial other than delays that occurred at defendant's request. The trial court did not specifically address and assess the 21-month delay between defendant's return to Oregon and his arraignment. As noted, defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the rape charge pursuant to a plea agreement that resulted in dismissal of the two sexual abuse charges and reserved defendant's right to challenge the trial court's speedy trial ruling on appeal.
On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his speedy trial motion on statutory grounds only. In the course of that appeal, defendant acknowledged that the court could not hold the state responsible for the period before the authorities arrested him in Florida and returned him to Oregon. He argued, however, that the state was responsible for the period after he was returned to Oregon and during which Clackamas County failed to move the case forward. Defendant further argued that that 21-month delay was unreasonable and constituted grounds for dismissal under ORS 135.747, which mandates dismissal of an accusatory instrument when the state fails to bring a defendant to trial within a "reasonable period of time." The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant that the 21-month prearraignment delay was unreasonable and that, consequently, ORS 135.747 required the charges to be dismissed. It therefore reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the charges against defendant without prejudice. Johnson, 193 Or.App. at 257, 90 P.3d 4. We allowed the state's petition for review.
Before turning to the state's arguments, we set out the statutory speedy trial provisions in their entirety. The first of those statutes is ORS 135.745, which is implicated only indirectly in the present case. That statute provides:
"When a person has been held to answer for a crime, if an indictment is not found against the person within 30 days or the district attorney does not file an information in circuit court within 30 days after the person is held to answer, the court shall order the prosecution to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary is shown."
ORS 135.747, the statute that defendant cited in his motion to dismiss, provides:
"If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial has not been postponed upon the application of the defendant or by the consent of the defendant, is not brought to trial within a reasonable period of time, the court shall order the accusatory instrument to be dismissed."
ORS 135.750 then provides:
Before this court, the state contends that the Court of Appeals decision to reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds arose out of an erroneous interpretation and application of ORS 135.747. We address each of the state's arguments below.
The state argues, first, that the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard of review under ORS 135.747 by treating the trial court's decision not to dismiss the case against defendant as a question of law when, by statute, that decision is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The state argues, in that regard, that ORS 135.747 must be read in tandem with ORS 135.750. The state then points to the discretionary wording of ORS 135.750 — "the court may order the action to be continued" — as evidence that the legislature intended to "grant a wide range of discretion as to a trial court's determination of both reasonableness and remedy for delay."
The state's argument presents an issue of statutory construction, to be considered under the paradigm set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). That paradigm requires us to look first at the text and context of the statute and to proceed to other interpretive sources only if the statute under examination remains ambiguous. Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. We turn, first, to the relevant text.
It is undebatable that ORS 135.747 and ORS 135.750 must be read together. The latter statute expressly refers to the former and appears on its face to confer some authority on the trial court to continue an action in spite of the requirement in ORS 135.747 that the court dismiss a charge when the state fails to bring the defendant to trial within a reasonable time. As noted, the state emphasizes the fact that ORS 135.750 contains wording that connotes discretion — "may order the action to be continued" (emphasis added) — and argues that that discretion extends to the "reasonableness" inquiry in ORS 135.747, as well as to...
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