State v. Johnson

Citation28 Conn.App. 708,613 A.2d 1344
Decision Date30 October 1992
Docket NumberNo. 10015,10015
CourtAppellate Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Edward F. JOHNSON.

Mario Paul Mikolitch, New London, for appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John T. Redway, State's Atty., and Russell P. Zenter, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before LANDAU, FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN and CRETELLA, JJ.

LANDAU, Judge.

The defendant, Edward F. Johnson, was convicted, after a trial by jury, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a(a)(1) and of evading responsibility in violation of General Statutes § 14-224(b). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to dismiss, which claimed that a peace officer does not have probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed out of that officer's presence, (2) failed to permit him to testify regarding his personal history and background, (3) precluded the defendant from introducing evidence of events that allegedly occurred at the police station subsequent to his arrest and failed to conclude that the state's failure to furnish this evidence violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), (4) charged the jury that it could consider the defendant's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test in determining his guilt or innocence and that it was not necessary that the defendant know that the automobile collision he was involved in had caused damage to property, and (5) denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. 1 He also claims that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because the trial court was biased against him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On April 23, 1990, Catherine Mangels was driving her car on Route 1 in Westbrook when it was struck by a car driven by the defendant. As a result of the collision, the cars became hooked together. Robert Pandora, who had been driving behind Mangels and had witnessed the collision, helped unhook the two cars. Pandora then drove Mangels' car into the parking lot of a nearby restaurant.

The defendant drove his car to the back of the restaurant lot. Pandora got out of Mangels' car, went to where the defendant had driven, and told him that a bystander had called the police. The defendant responded that he would not wait for the police, and then tried to leave the restaurant lot. The defendant was having trouble getting his car into gear, so Pandora reached into the defendant's car, turned off the ignition and removed the keys. Pandora went into the restaurant with the keys, and the defendant followed him in an unsuccessful attempt to retrieve his keys. When the police arrived, Pandora was walking out of the front door of the restaurant with the defendant behind him. The defendant, upon seeing the police, retreated into the restaurant bathroom and locked himself in a bathroom stall.

Pandora led Trooper Michael Polansky of the state police to the bathroom the defendant had just entered. Polansky identified himself and asked the defendant to come out of the stall. After refusing several times, the defendant finally staggered out. The defendant smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes and was slurring his speech. Pandora identified the defendant as the operator of the one of the cars involved in the collision. Polansky asked the defendant if he had been involved in the collision and the defendant replied that he had not. Polansky then asked the defendant to take a number of field sobriety tests. After the defendant refused to take the requested tests, Polansky arrested him without a warrant.

On the way out of the restaurant, the defendant acknowledged that he was the owner of one of the cars that had been involved in the collision. At the police station, Polansky asked the defendant to take a breathalyzer test. He refused. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, and of evading responsibility.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss. In his motion, the defendant claimed that a peace officer does not have probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed outside the presence of that officer. The defendant argues that General Statutes § 54-1f(a), 2 which governs warrantless misdemeanor arrests and provides in pertinent part that peace officers "shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person for any offense in their jurisdiction, when the person is taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others," expands the common law rule for misdemeanor arrests, which stated that a person could not be arrested for a misdemeanor committed outside the officer's presence. This expansion, the defendant claims, violates the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution.

The state argues that the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976), which held that the fourth amendment imposes no warrant requirement for felony arrests occurring outside the home, also applies to warrantless misdemeanor arrests outside the home. 3

The defendant correctly notes that the common law rule was that a person could not be arrested for a misdemeanor unless it was a breach of the peace committed in the presence of the arresting officer. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(b), pp. 396-97. Connecticut enlarged this rule by statute to permit warrantless arrests "for any offense ... on the speedy information of others." Sims v. Smith, supra, 115 Conn. at 282, 161 A. 239. The defendant suggests that such "enlargement may raise constitutional issues."

Although the defendant asserts this claim on both federal and state constitutional grounds, he does not provide any analysis of either the federal or state constitutional claims. Therefore, we consider his constitutional claims to be abandoned and therefore need not address them. State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 510 n. 17, 594 A.2d 906 (1991).

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly failed to permit the defendant to testify regarding his mother's name and where he lived for the first eighteen years of his life. We disagree. At trial, the state objected to the introduction of this evidence on the basis of relevance. In an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury, the defendant argued that this information was relevant to his character. The trial court sustained the state's objection and the defendant properly excepted.

The rule regarding the admission of character evidence by a defendant is well established. The defendant may introduce only "such specific traits of his character as are involved in the crime or crimes as charged" and not evidence of his "general good character." State v. Blake, 157 Conn. 99, 103-104, 249 A.2d 232 (1968). The evidence the defendant attempted to introduce bore no relation to the crimes charged. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly precluded the defendant from introducing this evidence.

III

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly precluded him from introducing evidence concerning events that allegedly occurred subsequent to his arrest, and that the state's failure to provide the defendant with this evidence violated the rule of Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. at 83, 83 S.Ct. at 1194. The defendant attempted to introduce photographs depicting injuries that he allegedly suffered during his postarrest detention at the hands of state troopers and testimony concerning a discussion he had with Polansky, five weeks after the arrest, about a videotape allegedly made of this incident. In an offer of proof, the defendant argued that he had a "minor breakdown" and was unable to remember the accident due to these injuries and that the injuries were relevant because they bore on whether he knew of his involvement in the accident, which is an element of the crime of evading responsibility. 4 The trial court ruled that this purported injury lacked relevance because it occurred after the accident and could not have been the cause of his breakdown. We agree with the trial court's ruling.

"A trial court has wide discretion in its rulings on relevancy." State v. Williams, 27 Conn.App. 654, 664, 610 A.2d 672 (1992); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 646, 431 A.2d 501, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 320, 66 L.Ed.2d 148 (1980). "One fact is relevant to another fact whenever according to the common course of events, the existence of the one, taken alone or in connection with other facts, renders the existence of the other either certain or more probable." State v. Williams, supra, 27 Conn.App. at 664-65, 610 A.2d at 679; State v. McClendon, 199 Conn. 5, 8-9, 505 A.2d 685 (1986). "All that is required is that the evidence tend to support a relevant fact." State v. Williams, supra, 27 Conn.App. at 665, 610 A.2d at 679; State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 482, 522 A.2d 249 (1987).

Our review of the record indicates that this evidence does not render any other relevant fact either certain or more probable, and has no relationship to the crime of evading responsibility. We also note that the defendant attempted to leave the scene of the accident when Pandora told him that a bystander had called the police, indicating that the defendant was aware of his involvement in the accident. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly precluded the defendant from introducing this evidence.

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