State v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 19 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2003-K-2993.,2003-K-2993.
• Citation: 884 So.2d 568
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Michael A. JOHNSON.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

884 So.2d 568

STATE of Louisiana v. Michael A. JOHNSON.

No. 2003-K-2993.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

October 19, 2004.

Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Doug Moreau, District Attorney, R. Christopher Nevlis, Assistant District Attorney, Mark A. Dumaine, Assistant District Attorney, Dylan Alge, Assistant District Attorney; Counsel for Applicant.

Louisiana Appellate Project, Prentice L. White, Counsel for Respondent.

WEIMER, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to consider the continuing validity of our decision in State ex rel. Mims v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649, 650 (La.1992) (on reh'g), which held that in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent, Act 688 of 1982, amending Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, did not eliminate a sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders.

The correctness of our holding in Mims was first called into question, albeit in dicta, by our decision in State v. Everett, 00-2998 (La.5/14/02), 816 So.2d 1272, wherein we revealed that, in the course of examining a different aspect of the Habitual Offender Law, legislative material unavailable at the time of the Mims decision had been uncovered. We suggested that the newly discovered legislative material "calls into question the underpinnings of the Mims decision," but declined to expound further on the question because it was not squarely presented by the case before the court. Everett, 00-2998 at 18, 816 So.2d at 1283.

This case brings the issue of the continuing validity of Mims squarely before the court. Defendant, who was sentenced by the district court as a fourth felony offender, argued on appeal that he was improperly adjudicated a fourth felony offender because two of the predicate convictions relied on to enhance his sentence were entered on the same date. Relying on our decision in Mims, the court of appeal held that the two convictions entered on the same date lack the proper sequencing to constitute more than one offense for purposes of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 and vacated the defendant's habitual offender adjudication and sentence. The State applied to this court for writs, asking that we re-examine our decision in Mims in light of our comments in Everett. We granted the State's application.

After consideration of the additional legislative materials now available, and further study of the issue, we find that our original interpretation of the effect of Act 688 of 1982, amending LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, was incorrect. We hold that the 1982 amendment removed the statute's sequential requirement for enhanced penalties in the sentencing of multiple offenders and legislatively repudiated the rule of law pronounced in State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 283 So.2d 210 (La.1973).

Based on our interpretation of Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law, we conclude that the district court properly adjudged defendant to be a fourth felony offender because at the time of the commission of the armed robbery for which he now stands convicted, he had earlier been convicted three times (for armed robbery, felony theft, and simple robbery). Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeal insofar as it vacates the defendant's habitual offender adjudication and sentence, and remand this case to the court of appeal for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In so doing, we expressly overrule our decision in Mims.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, Michael Anthony Johnson, was charged by bill of information with the armed robbery of a clerk at a Circle K convenience store, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:64. He pleaded not guilty. After waiving his right to a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged following a bench trial. The State then filed a bill of information seeking to establish habitual offender status. The State asserted that defendant was a fourth felony offender based upon the following:

1) a June 8, 1982 arrest for armed robbery resulting in a conviction on November 15, 1982, for which defendant received a sentence of twenty years at hard labor;

2) a January 4, 1993 arrest for felony theft auto occurring on December 23, 1992, to which defendant pleaded guilty as charged on August 16, 1993, receiving a sentence of two years at hard labor;

3) a January 4, 1993 arrest for attempted first degree robbery occurring on December 27, 1992, to which defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of simple robbery on August 16, 1993, receiving a sentence of five years at hard labor to run concurrently with the felony theft conviction; and

4) the April 24, 2002 armed robbery conviction for which sentence enhancement was being sought.

At the hearing conducted to determine defendant's habitual offender status, the State presented the testimony of a criminal identification specialist who matched defendant's fingerprints to the arrest cards for his three prior convictions. The State also introduced bills of information and court minutes documenting defendant's three prior convictions. Finally, the State asked the district court to take judicial notice of the defendant's current conviction for armed robbery.

For his part, the defendant did not contest the 1982 armed robbery conviction, the 1993 felony theft conviction, or the current armed robbery conviction. Rather, the defendant argued that the district court could not use the 1993 simple robbery conviction to enhance his sentence because (1) it was entered on the same day as the felony theft conviction and (2) it was not the defendant's conviction and sentence but that of another Michael Anthony Johnson.

After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the district court rejected the defendant's arguments and adjudged him a fourth felony offender. As such, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant appealed his conviction and habitual offender adjudication.

The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, but vacated the habitual offender sentence, finding that the State's proof did not suffice to demonstrate defendant's status as a fourth offender because two of his predicate convictions had been entered on the same date. State v. Johnson, 855 So.2d 437, 03-0127 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/26/03), unpublished. More particularly, the court noted that defendant pleaded guilty on August 16, 1993, to both a felony theft charge based on an incident which occurred on December 23, 1992, and to simple robbery based on an incident which occurred a few days later, on December 27, 1992. Relying on this court's decision in Mims,¹ the court of appeal held that the two convictions entered on the same date lack the proper sequencing (commission of a crime, followed by conviction, then commission of another crime, followed by conviction and so forth) to constitute more than one offense for purposes of LSA-R.S. 15:529.1. The court vacated the defendant's habitual offender adjudication and sentence and remanded the case to the district court with instructions for the State, should it elect to file a new, third felony habitual offender bill, to select which predicate felony (felony theft or simple robbery) it wishes to use, as both cannot be utilized to enhance the defendant's sentence.

Given our dicta in Everett, we granted the State's application for writs to revisit our holding in Mims that multiple convictions entered on the same day must be treated as a single predicate under the habitual offender law, even when the convictions stem from separate and distinct criminal episodes. State v. Johnson, 03-2993 (La.5/21/04), 874 So.2d 159.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Habitual Offender Law, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, provides, in relevant part:

A. (1) Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony ... or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows:

(a) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction;

(b) If the third felony is such that....

(c) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that....

B. It is hereby declared to be the intent of this Section that an offender need not have been adjudged to be a second offender in a previous prosecution in order to be charged as and adjudged to be a third offender, or that an offender has been adjudged in a prior prosecution to be a third offender in order to be convicted as a fourth offender in a prosecution for a subsequent crime.

Prior to 1956, the statute did not include section B. It did, however, include the contents of section A. In State v. Clague, 224 La. 27, 68 So.2d 746 (1953) and State v. Williams, 226 La. 862, 77 So.2d 515 (1955), we were called upon to determine whether the statute, as written, imposed a sequential requirement such that there must be the commission of a crime, followed by conviction, then commission of another crime, followed by conviction and so forth in order for a prior conviction to qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of sentence enhancement under the habitual offender statute. In other words, we were asked to determine whether multiple convictions entered on the same day must be treated as a single predicate for purposes of the habitual offender law. In both decisions, the court held that the statute is clear and unambiguous and susceptible of only one construction: it does not impose a sequential requirement on the prior convictions. More precisely, we observed:

We do not think that it is necessary for the

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