State v. Johnson
| Citation | 26 A.3d 59,301 Conn. 630 |
| Decision Date | 19 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 18703.,18703. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticutv.Keir JOHNSON. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, and Mary Jean Kanabis, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.ROGERS, C.J.
The primary issues raised in this appeal are: (1) whether the language of General Statutes § 54–56d (m)(5),1 which provides that the court shall dismiss the charges “when the time within which the defendant may be prosecuted for the crime with which the defendant is charged, as provided in section 54–193 or 54–193a, has expired” applies to crimes that did not result in the death or serious physical injury of another person; and (2) if so, whether, for purposes of § 54–56d (m)(5), the applicable statute of limitations starts to run from the date of the offense or from the date that the defendant is found incompetent and not restorable to competency pursuant to § 54–56d (g).2
After the defendant, Keir Johnson, was charged in three criminal cases, two cases involving misdemeanor charges and one case involving a felony charge, and, in a separate fourth case, with violating his probation, he was found incompetent to stand trial and not restorable to competency. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the charges in all four cases, claiming that he was entitled to dismissal of the two cases involving misdemeanor charges and the violation of probation case pursuant to § 54–56d (m)(5) because the statute of limitations as set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 54–193 had expired, and that he was entitled to dismissal of the case involving the felony charge, for which the statute of limitations had not expired, pursuant to Practice Book § 41–8(5).3
The trial court concluded that § 54–56d (m)(5), which provides for dismissal upon expiration of the statute of limitations, did not apply to the defendant because his crimes had not resulted in the death or serious injury of another person; see General Statutes § 54–56d (m)(3); but granted the motion to dismiss with respect to all four of the pending cases on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant after he had been found incompetent and not restorable to competency. The state then filed this appeal 4 claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly concluded that § 54–56d (m) did not apply to the defendant and that the trial court therefore retained jurisdiction over the defendant until the statute of limitations expired. We agree with this claim, but affirm the judgments of the trial court dismissing the two cases involving misdemeanor charges on the alternate ground that the charges were subject to dismissal pursuant to § 54–56d (m)(5) because the applicable statute of limitations runs from the date of the offense for purposes of that statute, and it has expired. With respect to the case involving a felony charge, for which the statute of limitations has not expired, we reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand that case to the trial court for a determination as to whether the case should be dismissed pursuant to Practice Book § 41–8(5). Finally, we conclude that the state was not aggrieved by the dismissal of the violation of probation case and, accordingly, we dismiss that portion of the appeal.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On January 27, 2007, the defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while his operator's license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14–215 and improper illumination of a registration plate in violation of General Statutes § 14–96c (Docket No. MV07–0672905–S). The defendant pleaded not guilty to these misdemeanor charges on March 26, 2007.
On September 5, 2007, the defendant was arrested and charged with breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–181 (Docket No. CR07–0293539–S). The state subsequently changed the charge to assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–61, a misdemeanor. In addition, the state charged the defendant with violating his probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a–32 (Docket No. CR06–0286981–S).5 Also as the result of the September 5, 2007 incident, the trial court, Abrams, J., issued a protective order against the defendant. On October 5, 2007, the defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge of assault in the third degree and denied the violation of probation charge.
On February 15, 2008, the trial court, Abrams, J., ordered a competency hearing pursuant to § 54–56d to determine whether the defendant understood the proceedings and was able to assist in his own defense. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court, Strackbein, J., determined that the defendant was not competent, but could be restored to competency. The court ordered that the defendant be placed in a ninety day outpatient program with the department of developmental services (department).
On May 20, 2008, the state arrested the defendant and charged him with violating the protective order that Judge Abrams had issued as the result of the September 5, 2007 incident, in violation of General Statutes § 53a–223 (Docket No. CR08–0297344–S). The defendant pleaded not guilty to this felony charge on June 6, 2008.
The trial court, Frechette, J., conducted a second competency hearing on November 25, 2008. The court concluded that the defendant was not competent and that there was no substantial probability that the defendant would regain competency within the maximum period allowed by law. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant to be placed in the custody of the department and continued the underlying matters until May 29, 2009.
On June 4, 2009, the defendant made an oral motion to dismiss the criminal charges and the violation of probation charge. The defendant contended that the two misdemeanor cases, Docket Nos. MV07–0672905–S and CR07–0293539–S, and the violation of probation case, Docket No. CR06–0286981–S, should be dismissed pursuant to § 54–56d (m) because the one year statute of limitations for misdemeanors, as set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 54–193(b),6 had expired.7 See General Statutes § 54–56d (m)(5) (). With respect to the felony charge of violating the protective order in Docket No. CR08–0297344–S, the defendant contended that dismissal was warranted pursuant to Practice Book § 41–8(5), because there was no longer sufficient cause to justify the continuation of the information. The state argued that the court should not dismiss the misdemeanor charges because the one year statute of limitations had not begun to run on those charges until November 25, 2008, the date that the defendant had been found incompetent and not restorable to competency. In the alternative, the state argued that, if the statute of limitations began running when the defendant committed the offenses,8 then any delays caused by the continuances required for the competency hearings should be excluded from the calculation of the limitations period.
As we have indicated, the trial court, McMahon, J., granted the defendant's motion to dismiss all four cases without prejudice on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant after he had been found incompetent and not restorable to competency.9 On appeal, the state claims that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) the portion of § 54–56d (m)(5) providing that “[t]he court shall dismiss, with or without prejudice, any charges for which a nolle prosequi is not entered when the time within which the defendant may be prosecuted for the crime with which the defendant is charged, as provided in section 54–193 or 54–193a, has expired” did not apply to the defendant; and (2) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant after he had been found incompetent and not restorable to competency. The state further claims that, if this court agrees that § 54–56d (m)(5) applies to the defendant, the judgments of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges may not be affirmed on the alternate ground that the statute of limitations has expired because, for purposes of that statute, the statute of limitations begins to run when the defendant is found incompetent and not restorable to competency or, in the alternative, the statute of limitations resumes running at that time. 10 Finally, the state claims that the dismissal of the violation of probation case may not be affirmed on the alternate ground that the statute of limitations has expired because that case was not subject to the statute of limitations. The defendant disputes all of the state's claims and also claims that this court lacks jurisdiction over the state's appeal because it was untimely, the state was not aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, the dismissal of the charges without prejudice was not an appealable final judgment, and the state's claims are moot.
We reject the defendant's jurisdictional claims with respect to the cases involving the misdemeanor charges and the felony charge, but we agree that the state was not aggrieved by the trial court's dismissal of the violation of probation case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as to the judgment in that case. We agree with the state's claims that § 54–56d (m)(5) applies to the misdemeanor and felony charges and that the trial court therefore...
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