State v. Johnson, C8-92-1404

• Decision Date: 25 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. C8-92-1404,C8-92-1404
• Citation: 514 N.W.2d 551
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Steven Bruce JOHNSON, Petitioner, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 551

514 N.W.2d 551

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v.Steven Bruce JOHNSON, Petitioner, Appellant.

No. C8-92-1404.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 25, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

The certification process by which a misdemeanor is treated as a petty misdemeanor is a matter of procedural law governed by Rule 23.04,Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Samuel A. McCloud, Dean S. Grau, Barry L. Hogen, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Thomas J. Simmons, Renville County Atty., Nancy L. Jones Norman, Asst. Renville County Atty., Olivia, for respondent.

George Kuprian, Asst. Wash. County Atty., Stillwater, for amicus curiae, MN County Atty's.Assoc.

John M. Stuart, MN State Public Defender, Charlann Winkin, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae, MN State Public Defender.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Robert Stanich, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for amicus curiae, Atty. Gen.

Heard, considered and decided by the Court en banc.

OPINION

WAHL, Justice.

The question raised by this appeal is whether the certification process by which a misdemeanor offense is treated as a petty misdemeanor is a matter of procedural law governed by Rule 23.04,Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the defendant's consent, or a matter of substantive law governed by Minnesota Statutes, Sec. 609.131, subd. 1(1992), which requires the approval of the court but not the consent of the defendant.The trial court and the court of appeals held the certification of a misdemeanor as a petty misdemeanor to be a matter of substantive law governed by statute.We reverse.

On January 12, 1992, appellantSteven Bruce Johnson was stopped for driving 73 mph in a 55 mph zone and cited for speeding and for failing to wear a seat belt.¹Because this was appellant's third moving violation in a year, he was charged with a misdemeanor pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.89, subd. 1.²

Appellant appeared in court, pleaded not guilty, and requested a jury trial.Some time later, but before trial, the prosecutor moved to certify the misdemeanor charge as a petty misdemeanor pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.131, subd. 1andState v. Batzer, 448 N.W.2d 565(Minn.App.1989).Appellant objected to the state's motion because he would lose his right to a jury trial if the misdemeanor charge was certified as a petty misdemeanor.Minn.R.Crim.P. 23.05, subd. 1;Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.89, subd. 2.He argued that Minn.R.Crim.P. 23.04, which requires the state to obtain a defendant's consent before treating a misdemeanor violation as a petty misdemeanor, supersedes the conflicting statutory provision.

The trial court ruled that the statute governed the certification process, permitted the reduction over appellant's objection, and then denied appellant's demand for a jury trial on the ground that a petty misdemeanor is not a crime.After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the trial court found appellant guilty.The court of appeals held first that the certification process is a matter of substantive rather than procedural law, and then concluded that Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.131, subd. 1 prevails over conflicting provisions in Minn.R.Crim.P. 23.04, affirming the trial court.495 N.W.2d 454.This court granted review.The Minnesota Attorney General, the State Public Defender, and the Minnesota County Attorneys Association have filed briefs as amici curiae in response to this court's invitation.

Whether the certification process is a matter of substantive law governed by Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.131, subd. 1, or a matter of procedural law governed by Rule 23.04, Minn.R.Crim.P., is a question of law which this court will review de novo.Meister v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 372, 376(Minn.1992).

The question presents a conflict between a rule of criminal procedure, adopted by this court in 1975, and a statute enacted by the legislature in 1987, both regulating the manner in which a statutory misdemeanor may be certified as a petty misdemeanor.

Rule 23.04, provides:

If at or before the time of arraignment or trial on an alleged misdemeanor violation, the prosecuting attorney certifies to the court that in the prosecuting attorney's opinion it is in the interests of justice that the defendant not be incarcerated if convicted, the alleged offense shall be treated as a petty misdemeanor if the defendant consents and the court approves.(emphasis added)

Minn.Stat. Sec. 609.131, subd. 1, provides:

Except as provided in subdivision 2, an alleged misdemeanor violation must be treated as a petty misdemeanor if the prosecuting attorney believes that it is in the interest of justice that the defendant not be imprisoned if convicted and certifies that belief to the court at or before the time of arraignment or pretrial hearing, and the court approves of the certification motion.The defendant's consent to the certification is not required.When an offense is certified as a petty misdemeanor under this section, the defendant's eligibility for court-appointed counsel must be evaluated as though the offense were a misdemeanor.(emphasis added)

Under the rule, if the defendant does not consent to the reduction in the charge, the court cannot grant the state's motion and the charge proceeds to jury trial as a misdemeanor, State v. Gwara, 311 Minn. 106, 107-08 n. 2, 247 N.W.2d 417, 418 n. 2(1976).Under the statute, however, certification takes place without defendant's consent and, in decriminalizing the offense, denies the defendant a jury trial.Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.89, subd. 2.

This court has the authority to "regulate the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in criminal actions in all courts of this state, by rules promulgated by it from time to time."Minn.Stat. Sec. 480.059, subd. 1(1992).This authority, acknowledged by the legislature, arises from the court's inherent judicial powers.State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184(Minn.1983).³Notwithstanding this inherent power, the enabling legislation for the Rules of Criminal Procedure purports to reserve to the legislature the right to "enact, modify, or repeal any statute or modify or repeal any rule of the supreme court adopted pursuant thereto."Minn.Stat. Sec. 480.059, subd. 8.Commentators have recognized, however, as do we, that since the 1956amendment to the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution removed the constitutional requirement that pleadings and proceedings be under the direction of the legislative body, under the separation of powers doctrine the legislature"has no constitutional authority in their enabling acts or otherwise to reserve a right to modify or enact statutes that will govern over court rules[of procedure] already in place."⁴Maynard E. Pirsig & Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 Wm.MitchellL.Rev. 141, 182(1989).⁵But, as we noted in Willis, 332 N.W.2d at 184, due respect for coequal branches of government requires this court to exercise great restraint in considering the constitutionality of statutes particularly when the consideration involves what is a legislative function and what is a judicial function.

Determination of procedural matters is a judicial function.The legislature, for its part, determines matters of substantive law and has carefully protected that prerogative by providing that the Rules of Criminal Procedure"shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any person."Minn.Stat. Sec. 480.059, subd. 1.As a matter of substantive law, the legislature has "[t]he power to define the conduct which constitutes a criminal offense and to fix the punishment for such conduct * * *."State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 17-18(Minn.1982).Both branches agree that "[i]n matters of procedure rather than substance, the Rules of Criminal Procedure take precedence over statutes to the extent that there is any inconsistency."State v. Cermak, 350 N.W.2d 328, 331(Minn.1984);State v. Keith, 325 N.W.2d 641, 642(Minn.1982).Minn.Stat. Sec. 480.059, subd. 7 provides:

If a rule is promulgated pursuant to this section which is in conflict with a statute, the statute shall thereafter be of no force and effect.Notwithstanding any rule, however, the following statutes remain in full force and effect:

(a)Statutes which relate to substantive criminal law, found in chapters 609, 617, and 624, except for sections 609.115and609.145.(emphasis added)

Thus, the question becomes whether the certification process is a matter of substantive or procedural law.This court has distinguished substantive and procedural law as follows:

[B]y substantive rights the legislature was referring to statutes which declare what acts are crimes and prescribe punishment for their violation, rather than statutes which regulate the steps by which the guilt or innocence of one who is accused of a criminal statute is determined.

State v. Wingo, 266 N.W.2d 508, 513(Minn.1978).

In Stern v. Dill, 442 N.W.2d 322, 324(Minn.1978), we defined substantive law as "that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, as opposed to * * * 'remedial law', which prescribes [the] method of enforcing the rights or obtaining redress for their invasion."⁶The California Court of Appeal provides another helpful definition, "[a]statute is procedural when it neither creates a new cause of action nor deprives defendant of any defense on the merits."Strauch v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App.3d 45, 49, 165 Cal.Rptr. 552(1980).

Many statutes and rules have both procedural and substantive aspects.Statutes of limitation, for example, are procedural in that they regulate when a party may file a lawsuit and are substantive in that they are outcome determinative.⁷Like statutes of limitation, the certification process at issue also partakes of both procedural and substantive elements.

Appellant and amicus State Public Defender assert that the certification process is procedural because the...