State v. Johnson

Decision Date15 March 1972
Docket NumberNo. 83,83
Citation280 N.C. 700,187 S.E.2d 98
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Will JOHNSON, Jr.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., T. Buie Costen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Rafford E. Jones, Associate Atty. Gen., for the State of North Carolina.

HUSKINS, Justice:

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in consolidating the two armed robbery cases for trial. Defendant contends that although he is charged with crimes of the same class, the crimes charged are not 'so connected in time or place as that evidence at the trial of one of the indictments will be competent and admissible at the trial of the other,' citing State v. Combs, 200 N.C. 671, 158 S.E. 252 (1931) and G.S. § 15--152.

In North Carolina the consolidation of criminal charges is a discretionary matter, but the court must exercise its discretion within the framework of G.S. § 15--152 which reads in pertinent part as follows: 'When there are several charges against any person for the same act or transaction or for two or more acts or transactions connected together, or for two or more transactions of the same class of crimes or offenses, which may be properly joined, instead of several indictments, the whole may be joined in one indictment in separate counts; and if two or more indictments are found in such cases, the court will order them to be consolidated. . . .' An elementary phrase-by-phrase analysis of the statute reveals a variety of circumstances under which consolidation of charges against a single defendant may be ordered: (1) where several charges against the accused arise from the same act or transaction; (2) where several charges against the accused for two or more acts or transactions are connected together (such charges need not be of the same class of crimes and offenses); and (3) where several charges for two or more transactions are of the same class of crimes or offenses which may be properly joined (such transactions need not be connected together).

It would seem that defendant has simply misread the statute. He confuses categories (2) and (3), maintaining that when there are several charges against any person for two or more transactions of the same class the transactions must also be, in some way, 'connected together' in order to be properly consolidated. Defendant's conclusion in that respect is not supported by the express language of the statute.

Here the indictments are for crimes of the same class--in fact, for identical offenses of armed robbery. Their consolidation is permissible in the discretion of the court unless the circumstances are such that they may not be 'properly joined,' Viz: unless the offenses are so separate in time or place and so distinct in circumstances as to render a consolidation unjust and prejudicial.

In State v. White, 256 N.C. 244, 123 S.E.2d 483 (1962), defendant was charged in four separate indictments with receiving stolen goods valued at more than $100, knowing them to have been stolen. Two of the offenses occurred on 1 December 1959, one on 17 October 1960, and one on 7 December 1960. The goods received belonged to four different persons. The four cases were consolidated for trial over objection. Held: 'Where a defendant is indicted in separate bills 'for two or more transactions of the same class of crimes or offenses' the court may in its discretion consolidate the indictments for trial. In exercising discretion the presiding judge should consider whether the offenses alleged are so separate in time or place and so distinct in circumstances as to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
25 cases
  • State v. Taylor
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • November 3, 1981
    ...and place and so distinct in circumstances as to render the consolidation unjust and prejudicial to defendant." State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 700, 704, 187 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1972). We find here a sufficient "transactional connection" between the crimes committed by defendant against Mildred Murc......
  • State v. Chandler
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • March 2, 1989
    ...home over a five-month period. In Street, the Court of Appeals relied on the test for severance as stated in State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 700, 704, 187 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1972), which is "whether the offenses are so separate in time or place and so distinct in circumstances as to render a consol......
  • State v. Parton, 81
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • May 5, 1981
    ...and place and so distinct in circumstances as to render the consolidation unjust and prejudicial to defendant." State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 700, 704, 187 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1972). Thus, there must be some type of "transactional connection" between the offenses consolidated for trial. State v. P......
  • State v. McAllister
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • May 6, 1975
    ...is authorized in the discretion of the court by G.S. 15--152, State v. White, 256 N.C. 244, 123 S.E.2d 483 (1962); State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 700, 187 S.E.2d 98 (1972).' State v. Anderson, 281 N.C. 261, 264--65, 188 S.E.2d 336, 339 (1972). (G.S. § 15--152 was repealed effective 1 July 1975 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT