State v. Johnson
|199 A.2d 809,42 N.J. 146
|20 April 1964
|STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Florence B. JOHNSON, Defendant-Respondent.
|United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
Peter Murray, Asst. Essex County Pros., for plaintiff-appellant (Brendan T. Byrne, Essex County Pros., attorney, Peter Murray, Newark, of counsel and on the brief).
Herman D. Michels, Newark, for defendant-respondent (Toner, Crowley, Woelper & Vanderbilt, attorneys, Jay E. Bailey and Herman D. Michels, Newark, of counsel, Alan W. Kempler, Newark, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This appeal derives from defendant's conviction in the Livingston Municipal Court for operating a motor vehicle 'while under the influence of intoxicating liquor' in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4--50, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
She was again found guilty on review by the Essex County Court, which heard the case De novo upon the stengraphic transcript of the municipal court trial. N.J.S. 2A:3--6, N.J.S.A.; R.R. 3:10--1, 3:10--2 and 3:10--10. Both courts imposed the same sentence--imprisonment for three months, plus revocation of driver's license for a period of 10 years--which they conceived to be mandatory under the quoted section, since defendant had been convicted of the same offense some three or four years previously. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction on her further appeal. We granted the State's petition for certification. 39 N.J. 240, 188 A.2d 178 (1963).
The case is particularly important on the matter of the effect of N.J.S.A. 39:4--50.1 authorizing the chemical analysis of bodily substances to determine the amount of alcohol in a motor vehicle operator's blood and setting forth the efficacy of the results of such tests in relation to the offense. Although enacted in 1951, L.1951, c. 23, § 30, this is the first occasion for consideration of it by this court. It reads:
'In any prosecution for a violation of section 39:4--50 of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance shall give rise to the following presumptions:
1. If there was at that time 0.05 per centum or less by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 per centum but less than 0.15 per centum by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption that the defendant was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant;
3. If there was at that time 0.15 per centum or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed as requiring that evidence of the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood must be presented, nor shall they be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxication liquor. No chemical analysis, as provided in this section, or specimen necessary thereto, may be made or taken unless expressly consented to, or requested by, the defendant.'
The evidence presented by the prosecution fell into three categories: lay testimony of police officers, medical opinion by an examining physician, and a reading of 0.18 per centum by weight of alcohol in the blood as shown by chemical analysis of the breath through use of the Harger drunkometer utilizing the volumetric method. The defense sought to establish, principally by expert testimony, that the factual bases for the lay and medical opinions introduced by the State were insufficient to support the conclusion of operation while under the influence of intoxicants. It further urged that the drunkometer is inherently inaccurate in measurement of the percentage of alcohol in the blood and that, in any event, this test was improperly conducted. A particular thrust of the defense proofs was that such deviations from normal in defendant's physical condition as existed were to be attributed to hypertension and hyperthroidism, for which she was under treatment, rather than to the effect of liquor.
The automobile defendant was driving was stopped by the police about 5:15 P.M. on an August day. The proof as to any erratic driving was sparse, since the car had proceeded only about 500 feet from where it had been parked. The police had received information to the effect that a person who appeared to be intoxicated was operating a motor vehicle in the area. The officers at the scene observed the vehicle, a small foreign-make car, pull away from the curb and travel at a very slow rate of speed so as to cause other traffic to slow almost to a stop. The driver appeared to be having trouble shifting gears--the clutch operated electrically and the shift was manual--with resultant grinding noises. (The defense presented testimony of prior difficulty in shifting and necessary clutch repairs, which were said to be inherent in the model.)
One of the policemen whistled defendant to the side of the road and asked for her license, which was produced after some fumbling. Her face was slightly flushed and her eyes bloodshot. An odor of alcohol was detected, but she insisted, as she did several other times to the officers thereafter, that she had not had a thing to drink. She was then asked to get out of the car, which she did with considerable difficulty. When requested to walk in front of the car, she staggered, swayed and was not able to walk normally. She agreed to take a drunkometer test and was taken to headquarters in a police car. While not belligerent during the trip, she kept repeating that she had to get home to feed her husband, that the police were picking on her, and that she had harmed no one. Upon arrival, she was unable to walk up the steps by herself and had to be assisted. By this time, she was crying and obviously nervous and very excited. As she testified: 'I was * * * afraid * * * I'd lose my license and I can't get around home without one except by cab.'
The drunkometer test was administered promptly, to which defendant gave oral consent, producing the 0.18 per centum reading previously mentioned. According to the operator, she had considerable difficulty blowing air into the ballon associated with the apparatus.
The examination by the police physician followed. This was had in the presence of two of the apprehending patrolmen and began about an hour and a half after that event. The doctor found her neatly dressed, oriented and with normal speech and face color. She was crying and under some tension, but cooperative rather than argumentative. Apparently there was no evidence of euphoria. There was a strong odor of alcohol on her breath, her eyes were slightly bloodshot, and pulse rate rapid and blood pressure abnormally high. She stated that she had had only one drink that day--in the morning--but was confused as to the hour. She advised the doctor of being under medical care and medication for a thyroid condition and stated she felt 'fine.' He then had her perform the conventional neurological tests for balance and coordination. About half were performed successfully. The others, particularly involving balance, resulted in marked abnormality with wide degrees of swaying to the extent that she had to be supported. Based on his examination, the doctor concluded that Mrs. Johnson had consumed sufficient alcohol to affect her faculties and 'was sufficiently under the influence of liquor to be a non-safe driver on the road.' He stated that, in reaching this opinion, he had made lenient allowance for the effect of a hyperthyroid and hypertensive condition. The two police officers who participated in the arrest and observed the medical examination also testified that, in their opinion, without regard to the drunkometer reading, defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The defense revolved primarily around three expert witnesses. The defendant herself first testified, in course of which she admitted to having imbibed to the extent of two two-ounce jiggers of rum, with water, during the afternoon. The first drink was about 3:30 P.M. and the second approximately an hour later, shortly after which she left her home in Short Hills to go to Livingston to purchase a bottle of liquor. It was after the purchase had been made and she was starting the return trip that the police apprehended her at, as has been said, about 5:15 P.M. In view of her denials to the police of any drinking and the statement to the examining doctor that she had had only one drink, and that in the morning, the trier of the facts could well doubt the complete truthfulness of her testimony.
The first expert was a physician, not previously acquainted...
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