State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 31 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2016 KA 0514,2016 KA 0514 |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. KENDRICK DEANDRE JOHNSON |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the 19th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
Case No. 06-11-0073
The Honorable Michael R. Erwin, Judge Presiding
Jane L. Beebe
New Orleans, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Kendrick Deandre Johnson
Hillar C. Moore, III
District Attorney
Dylan C. Alge
Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
BEFORE: HIGGINBOTHAM, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
The defendant, Kendrick Deandre Johnson, was charged by grand jury indictment with two counts of second degree murder, violations of La. R.S. 14:30.1, and pled not guilty as charged.1 After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged on both counts. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on both counts, to be served consecutively. The trial court denied the defendant's pro se motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's denial of challenges for cause on two prospective jurors, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the imposition of consecutive sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
On Monday, February 7, 2011, the Baton Rouge City Police Department (BRPD) received a tip through Crime Stoppers indicating that two dead bodies were in the trunk of a vehicle located near the Airline Highway and Plank Road intersection. The responding BRPD officers spotted a Saturn that fit the description of the vehicle provided by the tipster, who was later identified as Curtis Labode. While surveying the outside and interior of the vehicle, the officers saw a substance that appeared to be dried blood on the bumper and spent shell casings inside of the vehicle. The officers entered the vehicle through a door that was left open, released the trunk, and discovered the bodies of the two victims therein (subsequently identified as Latonya Wright and Jarrett Stanley). The officers secured the area and called crime scene technicians, supervisors, and additionaldetectives to process the scene. Detective Phillip Chapman obtained a search warrant for the vehicle and the vehicle was photographed and transported to police headquarters for further processing.
Wright had gunshot wounds to the head, back, and had a stab wound on her left chest. She had a total of eight gunshot entry and exit wounds. Stanley had multiple gunshot wounds, including shots to the head, abdomen, the lower back, and an exit wound on his thigh. Thus, in accordance with the autopsies, the cause of death for both victims was gunshot wounds to the head and body, and the manner of death as to both victims was homicide.2
While officers were at the scene of the vehicle, Crime Stoppers received another tip from the same source providing additional information. Labode specifically indicated that the homicides occurred in Alsen Heights Parkway (referred to by witnesses as the "Alsen" or "Alsen Heights" area) at 263 Gatebriar Street, located north of the City of Baton Rouge on U.S. Highway 61 in East Baton Rouge Parish. Labode said there was evidence in the house to show the shooting occurred there, noting that gunfire struck the kitchen stove in the residence. Labode also identified Patrick Ramirez, who resided at the Alsen house with his family, as the shooter.
The information provided in the second tip was used to obtain a search warrant for Ramirez's residence. The police photographed the home and collected evidentiary items, including the stove with an apparent bullet hole on the corner covered by white spray-painted duct tape, a can of white spray paint, a dustpan, and suspected blood swabs. Ramirez's children and wife, who were at the residence, were taken to the Violent Crimes Unit (VCU) to be interviewed. Thepolice learned that prior to the shootings, Ramirez, the victims, and the defendant were at the Ramirez residence watching the Super Bowl. On February 11, 2014, Labode gave a statement to the East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney's Office that while Ramirez was telling him of the murders, he also stated that the defendant was with him, and that he had pulled a gun in an attempt to rob the victims. Based on this new statement, a search warrant of the defendant's residence was obtained.
The defendant's girlfriend, Ebony Byrd, gave the police consent to search her apartment in Baton Rouge where the defendant was living. During the search, a backpack containing narcotics and drug paraphernalia (including several "baggies," small clear cellophane bags) was recovered.3 Both the defendant and Ramirez were arrested in connection with the homicides.
In assignment of error number two, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was involved in or present at the time of the shooting of the victims. The defendant notes that Curtis Labode only named Patrick Ramirez as the person who was involved in the murders. The defendant notes that while Ramirez purportedly confessed his crime to Labode, he never mentioned the defendant. The defendant further argues that Labode's testimony and motives were suspect because he was "pretty close to the event," specifically noting that Labode called the police a second time to report the bullet hole in the stove in Ramirez's house. The defendant notes that Labode, as he was being questioned about witness tampering after the defendant's arrest, waited three yearsto tell the police that the defendant was involved. The defendant claims that Labode only told the police what they wanted to hear.
The defendant further argues that several additional witnesses provided conflicting and/or suspect testimony, noting for example that Ramirez's step-son Terry Ferguson, a.k.a. "T.J.," in contradiction to Byrd, claimed that a large revolver was visible on the defendant's hip. The defendant notes that while Byrd testified that she drove the defendant to Ramirez's house, she admitted that she was smoking marijuana and drinking gin and bar juice which contained Xanax. The defendant argues that Byrd recanted her claim that the defendant was planning to commit a robbery. The defendant also specifically contends that Deroy Walden responded in a nonsensical manner when confronted with the testimony he presented at Ramirez's trial.
The defendant further contends that there was no physical evidence such as fingerprints or DNA to prove that he was in the vehicle or at Ramirez's house. Moreover, the defendant contends that the firearms examiner testified on cross-examination that there appeared to be one shooter and two firearms in this case based on the bullet trajectory through the backseat. The defendant concludes that the evidence was insufficient to support the requisite element of identity in this case.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. When issues are raised on appeal, both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43, 101 S.Ct. 970, 972, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accordance with the constitutional standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not find proof of the essential elements of the crime charged and defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La.C.C.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992); State v. Jones, 596 So.2d 1360, 1369 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 598 So.2d 373 (La. 1992). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La.C.Cr.P. art. 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144; State v. Wright, 98-0601 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 486, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157 & 2000-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1(A)(1) provides in pertinent part that second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant. State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126, 1127 (La. 1982). In accordance with La. R.S. 14:24, all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals. Thus, in order to support a conviction as a principal to second degree murder, the State must show that the defendant had thespecific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and that he assisted in the commission of the offenses. State v. Mathews, 2000-2115 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d...
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