State v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 14 July 1966
• Docket Number: No. 18532,18532
• Citation: 248 S.C. 153,149 S.E.2d 348
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Appellant, v. Joseph L. JOHNSON, Jr., John Mayo Jones and John F. Maybank, Respondents.

Page 348

149 S.E.2d 348

248 S.C. 153

The STATE, Appellant, v. Joseph L. JOHNSON, Jr., John Mayo Jones and John F. Maybank Respondents.

No. 18532.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 14, 1966.

Arthur G. Howe, Sol., Charleston, for appellant.

Pritchard, Myers & Morrison, Ernest F. Hollings, Falcon B. Hawkins, Charleston, for respondents.

MOSS, Chief Justice.

The respondents were indicted on September 14, 1964, by the Charleston County Grand Jury for (1) rape; (2) assault with intent to ravish; (3) assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature; and (4) conspiracy. The case came on for trial before the Honorable James B. Pruitt, Presiding Judge, and a jury, at the March 1965 term of the Court of General Sessions, and resulted in a verdict of acquittal on March 5, 1965.

Thereafter, on March 8, 1965, the entire jury panel was summoned to appear in court and each juror was examined by the court and the solicitor with reference to whether they had been contacted or communicated with by friends, relatives and acquaintances of the respondents prior to the trial. As a result of the aforesaid hearing, on March 12, 1965, twelve persons were cited by the Court to appear on March 18, 1965, and show cause, if any they could, as to why they should not be held in contempt for unlawfully attempting to influence some twenty-one prospective jurors on behalf of certain of the respondents.

Immediately following the conclusion of the testimony in the contempt proceedings, and before the Court had pronounced any judgment thereabout, the State made an oral motion for 'a mistrial of the entire cause' on the ground that in law and in fact there was no jury because of what had happened to the jurors Owens and Traynor which could not have been known at the time they were presented any only subsequently known after the verdict was rendered. Thereafter, on March 22, 1965, the State, by written notice, confirmed the oral notice and motion, to which reference has heretofore been made, and asked the Court 'to declare the purported trial heretofore had in said cause to be null and void and of no legal force or effect inasmuch as the jury impaneled therefor did not in law constitute a jury.' It was the position of the State that the two members of the jury heretofore named, through fraud and collusion received evidence other than that received at the trial, thereby improperly influencing said jurors in their verdict.

The aforesaid motion of the State was denied by the trial judge. He held that both the State and the respondents received a fair and impartial trial by a fair and impartial jury, and we quote from his order the following:

'I find that the jury that heard this case and rendered its verdict was a lawful jury, properly drawn and impanelled and sworn in accordance with the statutes and decisions of the State of South Carolina. At the commencement of the trial I believed each of the juror's statements under oath that they would give a fair and impartial trial. Nothing occurred at the trial or since to change this belief. The hearings in contempt proceedings subsequent to the trial do not indicate any fraud or collusion on the part of the two jurors cited, but rather these jurors exhibited a commendable resistance to such contacts. I observed these two jurors and others closely during the trial of the case. They were attentive and showed serious concern. A full presentment was allowed the State and the Defendants; and, while some may agree and others disagree with the verdict, it can be said that both the State and the Defendants have had their day in court before a fair and impartial jury--and a lawful one. * * *'

The State has appealed from the aforesaid order upon the following ground:

'In that the Court erred in not ordering another trial because the verdict of acquittal was a nullity and in law no trial was had, when it was discovered for the first time after trial that prior thereto two members of the jury sitting received evidence, other than that received at the trial itself, particularly, when said evidence so received was through the fraud and collusion of persons acting on behalf of the Respondents, and, also, when said jurors and two additional jurors sitting had unlawful and undue influence brought to bear upon them by persons acting on behalf of the Respondents.'

The motion of the appellant for a mistrial was based solely upon the alleged undue influence brought to bear upon the jurors Owens and Traynor and the receiving of evidence by them through the fraud and collusion of persons acting on behalf of the respondents. Undue influence with regard to the two additional jurors mentioned in the exception cannot be considered by this Court since that question was not presented to nor passed upon by the trial judge. State v. McCrary, 242 S.C. 506, 131 S.E.2d 687. Therefore, we will confine our discussion to the jurors named in the motion.

Prior to the argument of the appeal in this case, the respondents duly moved before this Court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the State has no right of appeal from a verdict of acquittal. We have held in numerous cases that the State does not have the right of appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. State v. Rogers, 198 S.C. 273, 17 S.E.2d 563; and State v. McWaters, 246 S.C. 534, 144 S.E.2d 718. However, in State v. Howell, 220 S.C. 178, 66 S.E.2d 701, we held that '(a) verdict of acquittal procured by accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in jeopardy; and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.' Since the State takes the position that the verdict of acquittal here was the result of fraud and collusion and, in view of our decision in the Howell case, we consider the appeal on its merits.

After the verdict of acquittal in this case, the State moved for a 'mistrial' on the ground hereinabove stated. The question arises as to whether the motion so made was proper. The term 'mistrial' is aptly applied to a case in which a jury is discharged without a verdict. Clark v. State, 170 Tenn. 494, 97 S.W.2d 644. A mistrial results where, before a trial is completed and judgment rendered, the trial court concludes that there is some error or irregularity that prevents a proper judgment being rendered, in which event a mistrial may be declared. A motion for a new trial recognizes a completed trial in which a judgment is rendered. It thus appears that a mistrial and a new trial are not the same thing in name or effect. 66 C.J.S. New Trial § 1c, page 65. Ordinarily, a motion for a mistrial is ineffective where there is a completed trial and the jury has been discharged. We think the motion of the State for a mistrial was inappropriate and we could affirm the order of the lower court on that basis. However, construing the motion of the State for a mistrial as one for a new trial, the result would be the same.

In this case, upon motion of the State, the trial judge, under a Voir dire examination of the jurors asked all of them the statutory questions required by Section 38--202 of the Code.

The juror, Charles A. Traynor, on his Voir dire examination, testified that he was contacted by telephone by a 'Mrs. Grace' who lived across the street from him. He was asked to state the conversation he had with Mrs. Grace. He said:

'Yes, sir, about the time I got home from work and she told me I was to be on this case and she didn't get to say much else. I told her I didn't think it was right to talk about it and hung up.'

Thereafter, in response to a further question from the court, he testified that despite the conversation that had taken place between him and Mrs. Grace that he could give the State and the defendant a fair and impartial trial and a true verdict render according to the law and the evidence received in the trial. This juror was then presented by the court and accepted by the solicitor and the respondents.

The juror, William F. Owens, Sr., when placed on his Voir dire, was asked by the court if anyone, including the defendants, their representatives, friends, or a law enforcement officer, or any other person had communicated by any means with him concerning his service as a juror. He answered in the affirmative. In response to further questioning by the trial judge, the juror testified that he was contacted by telephone at his home by a person whose name was 'Grace'. When asked what such person said to him, his reply was:

'She asked me if I was going to serve on the jury. I told her that I had no idea if I would or would not and I didn't know how she got my name and then I hung up the telephone. She called back and I told my wife to tell her that I was not at home and that's the end of it.'

This juror was then asked if despite the telephone call he was conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against the accused or any of them and whether he could give the State and the respondents a...