State v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 08 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 56703,56703 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Alex JOHNSON. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Stephen J. Katz, Kidd, Katz & Strickler, Monroe, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson, Dist. Atty., John R. Harrison, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Alex Johnson was indicted by the Ouachita Parish Grand Jury for second degree murder in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. After trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged. He was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. On appeal, he relies upon five assignments of error for reversal of his conviction and sentence. 1
Defendant first alleges error in the trial judge's denial of his motion to produce evidence favorable to defendant.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) held that the prosecution may not suppress evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or punishment. At the hearing on defendant's motion for production of favorable evidence, the prosecutor affirmatively stated that the state did not possess any evidence that was favorable to defendant. In the motion, defendant did not contend that the state was in possession of any specific evidence that would assist his case, nor does he now present any indication of what type of exculpatory evidence the prosecution might have had.
There is no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972). As we stated in State v. Williams, 310 So.2d 528 (La.1975), the state is not required to open its files to the accused and allow him to search them and decide what is exculpatory. Accordingly, there is no merit in this assignment of error.
Defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars that asked, Inter alia, whether or not any dangerous weapon was found on the victim's person or near his body at the scene of the crime. The state declined to answer this request on the ground that it was not required to reveal its evidence. Defendant assigns as error the trial judge's refusal to order the state to answer this request.
As a general rule, pretrial discovery is not available to a defendant in a criminal case. State v. Kado, 300 So.2d 461 (La.1974); State v. Rose, 271 So.2d 863 (La.1973); State v. Hunter, 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967). Brady v. Maryland, supra, requires the prosecution to disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused. In State v. Woodruff,281 So.2d 95 (La.1973), the accused, claiming self-defense as justification for his admitted homicide, moved for particulars as to whether a dangerous weapon or instrument was found on the victim's person or in close proximity to the scene of the killing. The trial judge refused to order the state to respond to this request. During the trial, the state disclosed the existence of a gun near the victim's body, which was admitted in evidence at trial. We held that the refusal of the state to disclose its knowledge of the weapon prior to trial denied the accused due process of law under Brady, supra, in that he was deprived of the opportunity to fortify his defense of self-defense, and thus constituted reversible error.
Although defendant relies on Woodruff in support of this assignment of error, the facts in Woodruff are distinguishable from those in the instant case. Unlike the accused in Woodruff, defendant did not rely on a claim of self-defense at trial. Rather, he asserted that a third party shot the victim and that he was the object of a 'frame-up' by the state's witnesses. In addition, this case is further distinguishable from Woodruff in that no weapon was in fact found at the scene of the homicide. See State v. Thomas, 306 So.2d 696 (La.1975). Defendant argues, however, that he needed to know before trial of the existence vel non of a dangerous weapon near the deceased's body so that he could plan his defense by deciding whether he would take the witness stand. This contention has no substance. The state alleges in its brief, and defendant makes no showing to the contrary, 2 that testimony given during the presentation of the state's case revealed that no weapon was located in the victim's vicinity. Defendant had ample time to make an informed decision as to whether he should take the stand. Therefore, the prosecution's failure to furnish the particular requested was not prejudicial. Accordingly, Woodruff is not applicable in this case; this assignment of error therefore lacks merit.
Defendant next alleges that the trial judge committed error when he denied his challenges for cause of two prospective jurors. Defendant exercised peremptory challenges against both, and exhausted his peremptory challenges prior to completion of the panel. La.Code Crim.P. art. 800 (1966).
Article 797 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pertinently provides:
The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that:
(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence;
(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court;
The determination of the qualifications of a juror is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Frazier, 283 So.2d 261 (La.1973). We have repeatedly held that only when his exercise of such discretion is arbitrary or unreasonable, to the prejudicial injury of the defendant in obtaining a fair and impartial trial, will this court be warranted in setting aside a verdict. State v. Johnson, 263 La. 462, 268 So.2d 620 (1972).
Mrs. George Fink, the first prospective juror, was challenged for cause because she replied, in response to questions by defense counsel, that it would be difficult for her to vote for defendant's acquittal unless he presented some evidence in his behalf. Defendant contends that the juror was incapable of recognizing the defendant's presumption of innocence since she testified that she would have to hear 'his side' of the case. Defense counsel, however, may have confused the prospective juror when he told her, at the outset of the examination, that 'there will be witnesses called by both the state and by the defense on behalf of Alex Johnson.' Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Mrs. Fink, when she stated that she would require 'a word from (defendant) or his witnesses' before making a judgment, was under the impression that it was incumbent upon defendant to present evidence in his favor.
After the trial judge explained to Mrs. Fink, however, that the accused was not required to present evidence and that it was the duty of the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, she unequivocally said that she could give defendant the presumption of innocence throughout the trial. Furthermore, in response to a question propounded by the prosecutor, she stated that she would return a verdict of not guilty if not satisfied that the state had proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, even if defendant presented no evidence. Viewing the totality of Mrs. Fink's testimony, we conclude that she was impartial and that she could accept the law as given her by the court.
The second prospective juror, James G. Shephard, was challenged for cause because he initially responded that he might give slightly more credence to the testimony of a deputy sheriff than to that of other witnesses. Defendant, relying on State v. Jones, 282 So.2d 422 (La.1973), contends that the witness was not impartial and that the challenge for cause should have been sustained.
State v. Jones is distinguishable from the instant...
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