State v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 02 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 756SC849,756SC849
• Citation: State v. Johnson, 225 S.E.2d 113, 29 N.C.App. 534 (N.C. App. 1976)
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Jerome Allen JOHNSON et al.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 113

225 S.E.2d 113

29 N.C.App. 534

STATE of North Carolina v.Jerome Allen JOHNSON et al.

No. 756SC849.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 2, 1976.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Zoro J. Guice, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

W. Lunsford Crew, Roanoke Rapids, for defendant Goods.

Arba S. Godwin, Jr., Roanoke Rapids, for defendant Johnson.

Nicholas Long, Roanoke Rapids, for defendant Frederick.

MARTIN, Judge.

Preliminary to consideration of the specific questions presented by the three appellants, we note the following: that some of the evidence at trial and in the record before us relates to a co-defendant who is not a party to this appeal; that the defendants were also charged with conspiring to commit common law robbery which was dismissed at the close of the State's evidence; and that no objection was made by Johnson or on his behalf at trial to the consolidation of the cases for trial.

Defendants Frederick and Goods contend the court erred by consolidating for trial the charges in the several indictments.

Ordinarily, unless it is shown that irreparable prejudice will result therefrom, consolidation for trial rather than multiple individual trials is appropriate when two or more persons are indicted for the same criminal offense(s).The judge in his discretion is authorized to order cases consolidated for trial when the offenses charged are of the same class, relate to the same crime, and are so connected in time and place that most of the evidence at the trial upon one of the indictments would be competent and admissible at the trial on the other.State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186 S.E.2d 384(1972).

Whether the evidence presented at trial prejudiced defendants to such an extent that the failure to order separate trials constituted a denial of due process of law will be discussed together with the assignment of error made each defendant in which they contend the admission of evidence of statements of one defendant tended to incriminate other defendants and thereby violated their rights to confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.

Under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, it is a clear violation of a defendant's constitutional rights in a joint trial to offer the confession of a co-defendant who does not testify where the confession incriminates and implicates the defendant not making the statement.In this instance, the defendant who is incriminated and implicated by the statement has been denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the co-defendant making the statement.

Bruton was interpreted and applied in North Carolina by our Supreme Court in State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E.2d 492(1968).In Fox, Sharp, J.(now C.J.) said:

'The result is that in joint trials of defendants it is necessary to exclude extrajudicial confessions unless all portions which implicate defendants other than the declarant can be deleted without prejudice either to the State or the declarant.If such deletion is not possible, the State must choose between relinquishing the confession or trying the defendants separately.The foregoing pronouncement presupposes (1) that the confession is inadmissible as to the codefendant (seeState v. Bryant, supra(250 N.C. 113, 108 S.E.2d 128(1959))), and (2) that the declarant will not take the stand.If the declarant can be cross-examined, a codefendant has been accorded his right to confrontation.'

Applying that rule to the facts here, we hold that it was error to admit those portions of Johnson's statements which might have implicated the defendants Goods and Frederick, and those portions of defendant Harper's statements which might have implicated defendants Goods, Johnson, and Frederick, and those portions of defendant Frederick's statements which might have implicated defendants Goods and Johnson.However, not all federal constitutional errors are prejudicial.

In State v. Brinson, 277 N.C. 286, 177 S.E.2d 398(1970), Justice Huskins states the test for harmless error as follows:

'Some constitutional errors in the setting of a particular case 'are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. . . .(B)efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'(Citation omitted).In deciding what constituted harmless error in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, (1963), the Court said: 'The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."

Applying the foregoing standard to the facts in this case, we hold that the admission of those portions of Frederick's, Johnson's, and Harper's statements which implicated each other as well as defendant Goods was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.Any incrimination of any of the defendants attributed to the statements of their co-defendants was of insignificant probative value in relation to the competent and admitted evidence against all of them.This is so although...