State v. Johnston
| Decision Date | 25 November 1908 |
| Citation | 214 Mo. 656,113 S.W. 1083 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. SPILLERS, Collector of Revenue, v. JOHNSTON. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Cooper County; Samuel Davis, Judge.
Action by the state, on the relation of J. L. Spillers, collector of revenue, against Thomas A. Johnston. Judgment for defendant, and the state appeals. Affirmed.
W. G. & G. T. Pendleton, for appellant. John & J. W. Cosgrove, for respondent.
By its suit in the Cooper circuit court (the Honorable Samuel Davis sitting as special judge), the state sought to recover taxes for the years 1900, 1901, and 1903, on block 3, Houck's addition to Boonville, excepting 84 feet off the south side, aggregating all told, in principal, penalties, interest, and costs, $375.39. The evidence being in, the court gave a peremptory instruction for defendant. From a judgment following, the state appeals.
No question is made on the petition. It is in conventional form.
Defendant answered, confessing owning the land, but denied owing the taxes. For affirmative defense, he alleges that the land taxed consisted of one acre, was within the corporate limits of the city of Boonville, that it and the building thereon were used exclusively for school purposes by him during the years in suit, and, being so used, said acre was exempt from taxation under the Constitution and laws of the state of Missouri. The reply put in issue the plea of exemption.
The case made on the facts is this: Plaintiff put in a back-tax bill, covering the years and parcel of ground duly certified by Spillers, collector of the revenue for Cooper county, and rested. Thereupon, to sustain his plea of exemption, defendant put in uncontradicted proof to the effect following: He is the proprietor of Kemper Military School in Boonville. Block 3 in Houck's addition is more than an acre, and he owned it all. Deducting 84 feet off the south side, leaves the remainder one acre. He tendered and paid all taxes levied against the south 84 feet, upon which were located a barn and certain outbuildings of the school, and got acquittance therefor. The building known as "Kemper Military School" (a landmark in the history of Missouri) is on said acre. It was built years ago expressly for use as a private military boarding school for boys, and such school has been kept there right along for many years by defendant since the death of its worthy founder. It accommodates 110 cadets, 10 officers, about 15 servants, and defendant's family, made up of his wife, two daughters, and two sons. Some of these children were minors, but attained their majority in the period covered. The school term is a little over nine months per year. During the term the family, officers, and cadets resided in the school building, except at intervals one or another of the children was away at school, and one for a little while clerked for a merchant. During vacations the officers do not reside in the building, but defendant and his family do, and are engaged in getting ready for the next school term by advertising, correspondence, repairs, alterations, cleaning the building, and otherwise. Mrs. Johnston has charge of what is known as the "home department," i. e., the boarding of the cadets, teachers, and servants, attending to the health of the cadets, such duties as a good mother (an alma mater in name and fact) would perform for a family of boys. In the school building are eight or nine recitation rooms, a study hall, laboratory, and 15 or 20 rooms devoted to such general purposes as are necessary to the successful conduct of the school. While certain apartments of the building are set apart for the family, yet pupils and teachers have access to them, and these apartments at times are used in connection with the school, e. g., social attractions and giving the boys recreation. One of the defendant's said sons was an officer in the school, and did school work. One of said daughters was the general assistant to her mother in the home department. Another son and daughter were minors, and, when they were not elsewhere at school or in the employ of outside parties in outside pursuits, they were merely members of defendant's family, except that, as said, during vacation all the family performed duties connected with the school in renovating, refurnishing, house cleaning, etc., and, presumably, in correspondence, advertising, etc.
Resting on the foregoing facts, learned counsel insist on one side, and deny on the other, that the locus to the extent of one acre is exempt from taxation under the following constitutional and statutory provisions:
(1) Section 6, art. 10, of the Constitution (Ann. St. 1906, p. 280): "* * * Lots in incorporated cities or towns, or within one mile of the limits of any such city or town, to the extent of one acre, and lots one mile or more distant from such cities or towns, to the extent of five acres, with the buildings thereon, may be exempted from taxation when the same are used exclusively for religious worship, for schools, or for purposes purely charitable * * *."
(2) Section 9119, Rev. St. 1899 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 4199): "The following subjects are exempt from taxation: * * * Sixth, lots in incorporated cities or towns, or within one mile of the limits of any such city or town, to the extent of one acre, and lots one mile or more distant from such cities or towns, to the extent of five acres, with the buildings thereon, when the same are used exclusively for religious worship, for schools or for purposes purely charitable shall be exempted from taxation, for state, county or local purposes."
It is not contended by counsel for the state, as we see it, that the exemption does not cover private schools as distinguished from public schools, nor pay schools as distinguished from free schools, nor boarding schools as distinguished from schools having no home department, nor military schools as distinguished from those having no military features. The contention of the state hinges on the phrase, "used exclusively," found in the tax-exempting clause of the Constitution and statute; and the point for decision is narrowed down to a simple question, which may be stated bluntly and singly to be: If the proprietor of a private military boarding school in Missouri reside in the school building with his family, having no avocation but running the school, and in which avocation the family participate, does such residence destroy the exemption? It is our opinion that, viewed from the philosophy of the thing and measured by cardinal standards of legal interpretation, the right answer to that question is, No. This because:
(a) It must be conceded to the state that, whether a tax-exempting clause be viewed from the standpoint of the state down to the people or from the standpoint of the people up to the state, there be unbending and inviolate rules which as sure words of the law are always to be reckoned with; and those rules (from the standpoint of the state) are that an abandonment of the sovereign right to exercise the vital power of taxation can never be presumed. The intention to abandon must appear in the most clear and unequivocal terms (Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cass County et al., 53 Mo., loc. cit. 27); and from the standpoint of the people they are that equality is equity in taxation; that the yoke of taxation—a forced contribution for governmental needs—should rest evenly on the necks of all citizens; that to relieve one but increases the burden of the other; that tax exemptions are in derogation of equal right— are contrary to common right—hence are not to be favored by the courts, but should be construed strictly and confined to the subjects specified, including such as are necessarily within the contemplation of the legislation under review. Kansas City Exposition Driving Park Co. v. Kansas City, 174 Mo. 427, 74 S. W. 979; Fitterer v. Crawford, 157 Mo., loc. cit. 58, 57 S. W. 532, 50 L. R. A. 191 et seq.; City of Kansas v. Kansas City Medical College, 111 Mo., loc. cit. 146, 20 S. W. 35. Says Scott, J., in Wyman v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335: "Equality is equity, and when one claims exemption...
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