State v. Jones, Nos. 18161

CourtSupreme Court of South Dakota
Writing for the CourtAMUNDSON; MILLER; HENDERSON; KONENKAMP; HENDERSON
Citation521 N.W.2d 662
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Jason JONES, Defendant and Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of South Dakota in the INTERESTS of J.J., Minor Child, and Concerning D.C.
Docket NumberNos. 18161,18172
Decision Date14 September 1994

Page 662

521 N.W.2d 662
STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jason JONES, Defendant and Appellant.
The PEOPLE of the State of South Dakota in the INTERESTS of
J.J., Minor Child, and Concerning D.C.
Nos. 18161, 18172.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Argued March 21, 1994.
Decided Sept. 14, 1994.

Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Frank Geaghan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

Bruce V. Anderson, Wagner, for defendant and appellant.

AMUNDSON, Justice.

Jason Jones appeals his transfer from juvenile court to adult court and the subsequent

Page 665

judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict convicting him of second-degree rape. We affirm.
FACTS

On July 11, 12 and 13 of 1991, several juvenile girls rented a motel room in Lake Andes, South Dakota, for a party. These girls were between the ages of twelve and sixteen. Alcohol was being consumed by occupants and visitors of the motel room. The record does not indicate that these girls had any parental supervision.

During the afternoon of July 13, 1991, the girls met L.B., who was with her cousin, Jason Jones (Jones). The young girls invited L.B. and Jones to the motel room for a party. L.B. and Jones went to the motel room and started drinking the alcohol Jones' stepmother purchased for them.

As evening progressed, Jones and four girls, M.L. (the victim), I.G., L.B., and E.H. remained in the motel room. L.B. and I.G. left Jones, M.L., and E.H. in the motel room and walked to the local bar to look for I.G.'s boyfriend. After I.G. and L.B. left the motel room, M.L. shut off the TV and the room became dark. M.L. testified that she remained in the room because she "wanted to go to sleep." Jones stayed behind because he was about to "pass out."

M.L. testified that she was sleeping until the defendant woke her up by unbuttoning her pants. 1 Jones then began kissing her and she asked him to stop. Meanwhile, E.H. was trying to sleep on the floor. E.H. testified that M.L. did not object as the contact started but she heard M.L. say "no" to Jones one time while the two were kissing in the adjacent bed. As this progressed, E.H. left the room to get I.G. and L.B. at the bar. Upon reaching the bar, she told L.B. and I.G. that Jones was trying to "bone" M.L. The three girls then ran back to the motel to help M.L.

Jones inserted his penis into M.L.'s vagina. M.L. claims she pleaded with Jones to stop because "it hurt." She also claims Jones put his hand over her mouth in an attempt to stop her from screaming. I.G. and L.B. testified that they could hear M.L. screaming as they approached the motel room. After entering the room, L.B. pushed Jones off of M.L. and noticed blood "all over the bed and [M.L.'s] legs."

I.G. then phoned the police. After arriving at the motel, Lake Andes Police Officer Mervin Durham asked M.L. if she had been raped. M.L. answered "no." Officer Durham transferred the children to the Charles Mix County Law Enforcement Center (Center) to contact their parents.

While waiting at the Center, M.L. noticed she was bleeding from the vagina. When M.L.'s mother arrived she examined M.L. and decided to take her to the hospital in Wagner, South Dakota. The doctor who examined M.L. discovered a laceration in the wall of the vagina approximately 2.5 centimeters in length. The doctor testified at trial that the injury was indicative of a use of force and could have been caused by a penis in a very forceful act.

Jones was detained pursuant to a court order on July 15, 1991. State filed a motion for transfer to adult court on August 30, 1991. On March 26, 1992, the juvenile court ordered the matter transferred to adult court. While the matter was pending in juvenile court, social history, psychological, psychiatric, chemical dependency and sexual evaluations were prepared.

After the transfer to adult court, State presented Jones' case to a Charles Mix County Grand Jury which issued an indictment on May 22, 1992. On June 8, 1992, Jones filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of SDCL 23A-44-5.1 2 and for a

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violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied this motion. A jury trial was held on August 10 and 11, 1992. 3 The jury found Jones guilty of second-degree rape. Jones appeals.
ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in denying Jones' motion to dismiss due to State's failure to prosecute the matter in a timely fashion?

2. Did the trial court err by allowing State to use statements made by Jones to professional counselors during the transfer proceedings for impeachment at his trial in adult court?

3. Did the trial court err in failing to give Jones' proposed jury instructions?

4. Did the trial court err in denying Jones' motion for a judgment of acquittal?

5. Did the trial court err in transferring Jones to adult court pursuant to SDCL 26-11-4?

DISCUSSION

Issue 1

Did the trial court err in denying Jones' motion to dismiss due to State's failure to prosecute the matter in a timely fashion?

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article VI, Sec. 7, of the South Dakota Constitution, provide a criminal defendant with the right to a speedy public trial. First, Jones claims he has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial because he was not given a trial within the one hundred eighty day limitation set out in SDCL 23A-44-5.1. This statute requires all criminal cases be disposed within one hundred eighty days of the defendant's first appearance before a judicial officer. Jones argues that the speedy trial provisions of SDCL 23A-44-5.1 should apply to juvenile proceedings because South Dakota's Juvenile Court procedures do not provide a similar time requirement for commencing the formal adjudicatory proceeding. We disagree.

It is well recognized that a juvenile court proceeding is not a prosecution for crime but a special proceeding which serves

Page 667

as an alternative to a criminal prosecution. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). A juvenile will not be held criminally liable for an offense until the juvenile has been transferred to the adult court having jurisdiction over the offense. SDCL 26-11-1. Therefore, a minor is not subject to the requirements of the rules of criminal procedure until transferred. On June 8, 1992, Jones filed a motion to dismiss based upon a violation of SDCL 23A-44-5.1, and a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. This motion was filed almost a year after Jones had been detained as a juvenile and approximately seventy-one days from his transfer to adult court.

"The constitutional and statutory rights given to persons charged with crimes ordinarily are not applicable to juvenile court proceedings." 43 C.J.S. Infants Sec. 51 (1978). "Juvenile proceedings and sentences ... are conducted solely in the best interests of the child." SDCL 26-7-11; State v. Lohnes, 324 N.W.2d 409, 414 (S.D.1982).

South Dakota statutory law dictates that juvenile adjudicatory hearings are to be governed by the rules of civil procedure under SDCL ch. 15-6. SDCL 26-7A-34 and -56. The rigid requirements of the rules of criminal procedure do not lend themselves to thoroughly pursuing the purpose of juvenile court proceedings. The purpose of juvenile court proceedings is not to punish but rather to rehabilitate and correct a juvenile's behavior so as to avoid future confrontations with the law. In order to accomplish this goal, the juvenile court must weigh many different factors before deciding whether to transfer a matter for trial in adult court or dispose of the case in juvenile court. State v. Harris, 494 N.W.2d 619 (S.D.1993); In re L.V.A., 248 N.W.2d 864 (S.D.1977); SDCL 26-11-4. Oftentimes, as in this case, evaluations must be prepared after a petition is filed in order to determine whether the minor should be transferred to adult court. These evaluations obviously take time and can cause delay.

There is a split of authority as to whether the rules of criminal procedure should be applied to ensure a speedy trial in juvenile proceedings. The majority of jurisdictions which have ruled on this issue have refused to apply their rules of criminal procedure to juvenile proceedings. See R.D.S.M. v. Intake Officer, 565 P.2d 855 (Ak.1977); State v. Myers, 116 Ariz. 453, 569 P.2d 1351 (Ariz.1977); In Interest of C.T.F., 316 N.W.2d 865 (Ia.1982); Robinson v. State, 707 S.W.2d 47 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).

Naturally, Jones relies on the minority position by citing P.V. v. District Court, Etc., 199 Colo. 357, 609 P.2d 110 (Colo.1980). In that case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that trial courts were bound by the statutory and constitutional speedy trial requirements in juvenile as well as adult proceedings. Id. 609 P.2d at 111. We find the majority position much more persuasive and hold that the 180 day rule does not apply to juvenile proceedings. "We have long recognized that a juvenile court proceeding is not a prosecution for crime, but a special proceeding that serves as an ameliorative alternative to a criminal prosecution." C.T.F. 316 N.W.2d at 866-67 (citations omitted). "Delinquency proceedings are civil in nature and the provisions of the [ ] Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply." Robinson, 707 S.W.2d at 49.

The one hundred eighty day rule is statutory, but the right to a speedy trial is constitutional. Juvenile's are still entitled to constitutional protections.

Traditionally, juvenile delinquency proceedings were held to be special proceedings that were not subject to the provisions of either the state or federal constitutions; thus, juveniles did not enjoy the protection of constitutional rights applicable in criminal prosecutions of adults. In 1967, however, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). The court held that when delinquency proceedings may result in the detention of the child the due process clause...

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32 practice notes
  • In re Thomas J., No. 67
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • November 19, 2002
    ...test identified in Barker, supra, to find that the defendant's due process rights were not 811 A.2d 322 violated.5 See also In re J.J., 521 N.W.2d 662, 668 (S.D.1994) (applying the Barker factors after holding that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article VI, § 7, of t......
  • People in Interest of Z.B., No. 24619.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • November 5, 2008
    ...behavior so as to avoid future confrontations with the law.'" In re S.K., 1999 SD 7, ¶ 11, 587 N.W.2d 740, 742 (quoting State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 667 (S.D.1994)). The application of sex offender registry laws to juveniles thwarts the two fundamental underpinnings of the rehabilitation......
  • State v. Bunyard, No. 88,546.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • April 28, 2006
    ...(concluding that rape does not become a legal impossibility if the victim initially consents to penetration); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D.1994) (declining to adopt the Vela analysis); see also Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 720 5/12-17(c) (2004 Supp.) ("A person who initially consents to......
  • State v. Karlen, No. 20299
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • March 11, 1999
    ...Constitution and Article VI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution guarantee a defendant the right to a speedy trial. See State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 666 (S.D.1994). Karlen claims he was denied this right through the State's dismissal of the first indictment and subsequent reindictment o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
31 cases
  • In re Thomas J., No. 67
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • November 19, 2002
    ...test identified in Barker, supra, to find that the defendant's due process rights were not 811 A.2d 322 violated.5 See also In re J.J., 521 N.W.2d 662, 668 (S.D.1994) (applying the Barker factors after holding that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article VI, § 7, of t......
  • People in Interest of Z.B., No. 24619.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • November 5, 2008
    ...behavior so as to avoid future confrontations with the law.'" In re S.K., 1999 SD 7, ¶ 11, 587 N.W.2d 740, 742 (quoting State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 667 (S.D.1994)). The application of sex offender registry laws to juveniles thwarts the two fundamental underpinnings of the rehabilitation......
  • State v. Bunyard, No. 88,546.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • April 28, 2006
    ...(concluding that rape does not become a legal impossibility if the victim initially consents to penetration); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D.1994) (declining to adopt the Vela analysis); see also Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 720 5/12-17(c) (2004 Supp.) ("A person who initially consents to......
  • State v. Karlen, No. 20299
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • March 11, 1999
    ...Constitution and Article VI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution guarantee a defendant the right to a speedy trial. See State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 666 (S.D.1994). Karlen claims he was denied this right through the State's dismissal of the first indictment and subsequent reindictment o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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