State v. Jones

Citation73 S.E. 177,90 S.C. 280
PartiesSTATE. v. JONES.
Decision Date06 January 1912
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

1. Criminal Law (§§ 763, 764*)—Instructions—Comment on Testimony.

A charge: "You are prepared to hear the charge * * * and to retire after hearing that charge and go over the testimony and extricate from the testimony the truth of the case"—is not a charge on the facts, as stating that there was both truth and falsity in the testimony.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1731-1748; Dec. Dig. §§ 763, 764.*]

2. Criminal Law (§ 823*)—Manslaughter-Self-defense— Instructions.

A statement, in charging on the distinction between murder and manslaughter, that when a man strikes another a blow, and that man, acting under the influence provoked thereby, shoots and kills, he is guilty of manslaughter, is not objectionable as excluding self-defense, where that defense is presented by a charge immediately following.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1992-1995; Dec. Dig. § 823.*]

8. Criminal Law (I 822*)—Instructions-Requisites.

Where the instructions as a whole declare the law applicable to the case, the instructions are sufficient, and all the law of the case need not be stated in a single proposition.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1990-1995; Dec. Dig. § 822.*]

4. Homicide (§ 118*) — Self-Defense — Retreat.

Where one can with reasonable safety to himself retreat and thereby avoid the necessity to kill in self-defense, the necessity for killing does not exist, but one need not retreat where by so doing he will probably endanger his safety, and the necessity to kill must be either real or apparent to be determined by the jury, in view of the circumstances, and by applying the rule that accused must believe and act as a man or ordinary reason and firmness under such circumstances.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 168-171; Dec. Dig. § 118.*]

5. Criminal Law (§ 1144*)— Instructions— Requests—Compliance.

Where accused presented written requests to charge, and the court read them to the jury without objection or modification or refusal to charge any of the requests, the court on appeal must assume that the court intended to give the requests as read.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2736-2781; Dec. Dig. § 1144.*]

6. Criminal Law (§ 789*) — Self-defense-Instructions.

Where the court expressly charged that accused need only establish self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the guilt of accused must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, a charge that every element of the case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt was not objectionable as leading the jury to believe that self-defense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1846-1849. 1904-1922; Dec. Dig. $ 789.*]

7. Criminal Law (§ 923*)—New Trial—Disqualification of Jurors.

Accused, seeking a new trial on the ground of the disqualification of a juror, must show the disqualification, that it was unknown before the verdict, and that he was not negligent in failing to discover the disqualification before verdict.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2219-2237; Dec. Dig. § 923.*]

8. Criminal Law (§ 923*)—New Trial—Disqualification of Jurors.

Where the trial court, on motion for new trial on the ground of the disqualification of a juror because over 65 years old, found that the jurors had been drawn for 14 days, that their names had been published in the county papers a week or ten days before the court convened, that the juror was well known in the community, and that the slightest inquiry would have made known the fact that he was over age, a finding of failure to exercise diligence in discovering the disqualification before trial was justified.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2219-2237; Dec. Dig. $ 923.*]

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Orangeburg County; R. W. Memminger, Judge.

"To be officially reported." John J. Jones was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Wolfe & Berry, Glaze & Herbert, and C. P. Brunson, for appellant.

P. T. Hildebrand, Sol., for the State.

JONES, C. J. The appellant, John J. Jones, tried under an indictment charging him with the murder of Abe Pearlstine, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years and one month in the penitentiary.

The court instructed the jury: "You are prepared to hear the charge of the court and to retire after hearing that charge and go over the testimony and extricate from the testimony the truth of the case." By his first exception appellant contends that this was a charge on the facts, in that it in effect declared that there was both truth and falsity in the testimony.

The charge was general and did nothing more than require the jury to ascertain the truth of the case from the testimony. No testimony was singled out as true or false, and there was nothing to indicate the court's opinion of the testimony one way or the other.

The second and third exceptions were withdrawn.

The fourth exception complains of the following language in the charge: "So when a man strikes another a blow, and that man. acting under the influence provoked by the blow, shoots and kills, that is a clear case of manslaughter." The contention being that the charge excluded self-defense and was a statement of facts in the case. The context shows that the court was instructing the jury as to the distinction between murder and manslaughter, and that the factswere stated hypothetically, as appears by the following extract embracing the portion to which exception is taken: "Now the killing of a human being in sudden heat and passion is not always manslaughter. A man may kill another that way and it may be murder. The test is: Was the sudden heat and passion engendered by such provocation as the law recognizes? The law recognizes a blow as a provocation. If a man strikes another a blow, and he becomes provoked by the blow and acts under the influence of that provocation and shoots and kills, then the law reduces the killing from murder to manslaughter, unless sufficient time elapsed between the striking of the blow and the killing in which a man of ordinary reason, prudence, and caution should have cooled, and would have cooled, from the provocation. That is a matter for the jury. The law says that a man must cool in such time as a man of reasonable firmness and prudence and caution would have cooled in and should have cooled in; so when a man strikes another a Mow, and that man, acting under the influence provoked by the blow, shoots and kills, that is a clear case of manslaughter, but, if any time intervenes between the striking of the blow and the firing of the fatal shot, then it is for the jury to say whether that time that has elapsed was sufficient to constitute cooling time; that is, if a man of ordinary reason and firmness and prudence would have cooled. If such time has elapsed, then the provocation cannot be invoked as an excuse."

After this charge the court immediately proceeded to instruct as to the law of self-defense. It was not error, in stating the distinction between murder and manslaughter, to omit immediate reference to the law of self-defense. All the law of a case need not be stated in a single proposition. It is sufficient if the charge as a whole declares the law applicable to the case. State v. McKellar, 85 S. C. 240, 67 S. E. 314.

The fifth exception complains that the court erroneously charged the law regarding the rule or doctrine of retreat, in...

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