State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 18 September 1884
• Citation: 64 Iowa 349,20 N.W. 470
• Parties: STATE v. JONES.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

64 Iowa 349

20 N.W. 470

STATE

v.JONES.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed September 18, 1884.

Appeal from Harrison district court.

Opinion upon rehearing. S. C. 17 N. W. REP. 911.

ROTHROCK, C. J., and SEEVERS, J., concur as to the first point, but dissent as to the second and third points.

BECK, J.

At a former term a rehearing was granted in this case, upon which it has been again argued and submitted.

1. Counsel for defendant moved to strike the petition for rehearing from the files upon the ground that this court has no authority to entertain a petition by the state for a rehearing in a criminal case. It is insisted that no such authority is conferred by statute, and cannot exist unless so conferred. There is no provision of the Code expressly declaring that rehearings may be had in criminal cases. The sections relating to the subject--3201, 3202, c. 2, tit. 19--are general in their language, and do not specify the classes of cases to which they are applicable. They are found in a chapter regulating appellate proceedings in the supreme court.

In the chapter (35, tit. 25) relating to appeals to the supreme court in criminal cases there is no provision upon the subject of rehearing. Counsel for defendant insists that the provisions first referred to relate exclusively to appeals in civil cases, and therefore there is no statute authorizing rehearing in criminal cases. We think differently. The chapter in which the sections first cited are found regulate the practice generally of this court. Many provisions are found in this chapter in regard to matters of practice, some of which affect the rights of the parties, and all are intended to promote justice, to which there are no corresponding provisions in the chapter relating to appeals in criminal cases. Of this character are sections 3200, 3203, 3204, 3205, 3206, 3208, and 3209. Unless these provisions are regarded as applicable to criminal cases, persons convicted would suffer inconvenience and hardship, and possibly injustice, upon the trial of their appeals in this court. This observationis especially true in reference to the matter of rehearings. Unless a rehearing is provided for by sections 3201, 3202, in a criminal case, there is no statute authorizing it. It could be granted neither to the state nor to the defendant. Surely, the courts would not adopt a construction of the statute which would be liable to result in defeating justice by preventing one accused of crime from having an opportunity to fully present his case to the appellate court upon rehearing. It cannot be possible that the legislature intended to deny such opportunity in criminal cases while securing it in civil cases.

While this question has not been decided by this court, never having been raised before, we have entertained petitions for rehearings filed by the state, and in one case, upon a reargument, reached a conclusion different from the decision first announced. See State v. White, 45 Iowa, 325;S. C. 41 Iowa, 316;State v. Brandt, Id. 593.

It is our opinion that the motion of defendant to strike the petition for rehearing from the files ought to be overruled.

2. Upon a careful re-examination of the case we reach the conclusion that the opinion of the majority of the court originally filed in this case is correct. We will proceed briefly to state some reasons in support of the opinion in addition to those presented in it.

The judgment of the district court was reversed upon conclusions reached in the fifth and sixth points of the opinion, holding that there is error in two instructions given to the jury. They need not be here repeated. The instruction discussed in the fifth point limits the consideration of the appearance, conduct, and language of the defendant to the time of the killing. It is admitted by the instruction that evidence of conduct, appearance, and language of the accused may be properly considered upon the issue of defendant's sanity, but it declares that such evidence must be confined to conduct, appearance, and language “during the time of the alleged killing.” This instruction is so obviously erroneous that little need be said about it. If defendant had been shown to be insane twenty-four hours or one hour before the killing, and no evidence upon the issue of his sanity related to his mental condition at the very time of killing, under this instruction he must be convicted. Yet the rule of the law is that where a condition is shown to exist it will be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown by evidence or presumptions arising upon the facts of the case. This is a rule of universal application, and it is not possible to except the case of insanity from it. A man charged with a homicide is proved to be insane by his conduct, language, and appearance at a stated time. He is seen no more for twenty-four hours or for one hour, and within that time he has, in the view of no witness, taken the life of another....