State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 28 November 2000
• Citation: 60 Conn. App. 866,761 A.2d 789
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: (Conn.App. 2000) STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. CHARLES JONES STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. JASPER DUDLEY AC 18786 AC 19057

761 A.2d 789 (Conn.App. 2000)

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

V.

CHARLES JONES

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

V.

JASPER DUDLEY

AC 18786

AC 19057

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued May 3, 2000

November 28, 2000

Cameron Dorman, special public defender, for the appellants (defendants).

Frederick W. Fawcett, assistant state's attorney, with whom on the briefs were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and Joseph T. Corradino, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Landau, Mihalakos and Pellegrino, Js.

Pellegrino, J.

OPINION

The defendants, Jasper Dudley and Charles Jones, each appeal from judgments of conviction, rendered following a joint jury trial, of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) (4) and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48.¹ Both defendants claim that (1) the trial court improperly restricted their cross-examination of a prosecution witness, (2) the court improperly failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into allegations of juror misconduct and improperly ruled that there was no jury misconduct (3) the state improperly failed to disclose the arrest record of a prosecution witness and (4) the court improperly admitted statements of coconspirators. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On December 23, 1996, at approximately 1 p.m., the defendants, along with two other individuals, Michael Capozziello and Darius Miller, participated in the armed robbery of a Bridgeport automotive store. Capozziello subsequently confessed to the crime, implicated the defendants and testified against them at trial. Additional facts will be discussed where relevant to the issues on appeal.

I.

The defendants claim first that the court improperly restricted their cross-examination of Capozziello, a key prosecution witness. They claim that the restrictions violated their rights to confront the witnesses against them under article first, §§ 8,² of the constitution of Connecticut, and the sixth³ and fourteenth⁴ amendments to the United States constitution.⁵ In addition, they claim that the court abused its discretion in imposing those restrictions.

The following additional facts are relevant to these claims. Prior to the robbery at issue, Capozziello and members of his family were acquainted with Miller. At some point prior to the robbery, Miller was arrested in connection with the alleged sexual assault of one of Capozziello's cousins, and Miller also had disagreements with members of the Capozziello family.

Following Capozziello's direct testimony, the defendants sought to question Capozziello regarding the influence and possible involvement of his mother in implicating the defendants in the robbery. The defendants argued that the questioning was relevant as to the witness' credibility and to establish bias.⁶ The court, however, sustained the state's objections to that line of inquiry.

"The general rule is that restrictions on the scope of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of the trial court... but this discretion comes into play only after the defendant has been permitted cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the sixth amendment." (Citations omitted.) State v. Gaynor, 182 Conn. 501, 508, 438 A.2d 749 (1980); see also State v. Thompson, 191 Conn. 146, 148, 463 A.2d 611 (1983).

"The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination... and an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying.... In order to comport with the constitutional standards embodied in the confrontation clause, the trial court must allow a defendant to expose to the jury facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 331, 618 A.2d 32 (1992); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974); State v. Lubesky, 195 Conn. 475, 481-82, 488 A.2d 1239 (1985). "In determining whether a defendant's right of cross-examination has been unduly restricted, we consider the nature of the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.... [T]he denial of all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate area of inquiry fails to comport with constitutional standards under the confrontation clause." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Santiago, supra, 331; see also State v. Roma, 199 Conn. 110, 116, 505 A.2d 717 (1986).

Once it has been established that constitutional standards have been met, the "trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. The determination of the relevancy and remoteness of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court.... The trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court's discretion.... Sound discretion... means a discretion that is not exercised arbitrarily or wilfully.... And [it] requires a knowledge and understanding of the material circumstances surrounding the matter.... In our review of these discretionary determinations, we make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling.... In considering the relevancy of evidence, we ask whether it tends to establish the existence of a material fact or to corroborate other direct evidence in a case.... If the evidentiary ruling is not of constitutional dimension, an appellant has the burden of establishing that there has been an erroneous ruling which was probably harmful to him." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McNeff v. Vinco, Inc., 59 Conn. App. 698, 701-702, 757 A.2d 685 (2000). Although "[c]ross-examination to elicit facts tending to show motive, interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may not be unduly restricted... [t]he confrontation clause does not... suspend the rules of evidence...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reeves, 57 Conn. App. 337, 344, 748 A.2d 357 (2000).

With these standards in mind, we conclude that the defendants' cross-examination of Capozziello satisfied constitutional requirements and, further, that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the questioning as it did. A review of the record discloses that the defendants had a more than ample opportunity to cross-examine Capozziello regarding his bias against Miller and motives in testifying. In response to the defendants' questioning, Capozziello spoke of the incidents leading to a strained relationship between his family and Miller, of his mother's role in the robbery investigation, and of his personal dislike for Miller and the other two defendants. The jury was also aware that he had received a favorable plea agreement in exchange for his testimony against the defendants. Overall, it cannot be said that the jury had inadequate information with which to judge Capozziello's credibility as a witness. It also is not the case that there was no meaningful opportunity to inquire into Capozziello's potential bias. Although "the constitutional right of cross-examination guarantees the opportunity for effective cross-examination... that does not mean cross-examination `that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' Delaware v. Fensterer, [474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985)]. That right does not include, in a word, `unrestricted' cross-examination." State v. Reeves, supra, 57 Conn. App. 353. The court limited the defendants' questioning about Capozziello's mother primarily on the ground of relevancy. On the basis of our review of the record and briefs, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in ruling as it did.

II.

Each defendant also claims that the court improperly failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into allegations of juror misconduct and improperly ruled that there was no juror misconduct. The defendants claim that there was evidence of juror misconduct that the court did not find and properly address, and that provided grounds for granting their motions for a new trial. We do not agree.

The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim. After the conclusion of the trial, and after the verdict was accepted by the court, the court clerk met with the jurors to distribute to them the customary juror questionnaires. At that time, one of the jurors mentioned something to the clerk that gave her cause to believe that the juror may have had information about Jones' criminal history that was not part of the evidence in the present case. The clerk reported this to the court, which promptly questioned the juror regarding the statements made to the clerk. The court's inquiry centered on whether the juror had information that Jones had been involved in a robbery of a Subway Sandwich Shop. After the court conducted the inquiry, it determined that the juror had no such information and that there was no impropriety. The court, therefore, denied the defendants' motions for new trials.

"Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution.... [An] accused [is entitled to] a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.... The modern jury... determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments.... [These] rules... assure that the jury will decide the case free from external influences....

"The question is...