State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 08 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 2021AP1442-CR |
| Citation | 984 N.W.2d 746 (Table),2023 WI App 1 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Caley M. JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
¶1 Caley M. Jones appeals his judgment of conviction for second-degree sexual assault of a child, as well as an order denying his postconviction motion. Jones argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statement he made to a police detective on the grounds that his constitutional rights against self-incrimination were not properly waived, and that his statement was coerced. He also reasserts the request in his postconviction motion for sentence modification based on the existence of an alleged new factor.
¶2 Upon review, we reject Jones's arguments and affirm.
¶3 The charge against Jones stemmed from an incident in October 2018, when Jones was babysitting for his six-year-old relative, O.M.T., at O.M.T.’s residence in Milwaukee. O.M.T. disclosed to police during a forensic interview conducted in February 2019 that Jones had made O.M.T. put his mouth on Jones's penis two different times while Jones was babysitting him.
¶4 Jones was arrested and charged with two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child. Two custodial interviews were conducted after his arrest. The first interview took place around midnight on February 25, 2019, a few hours after Jones was arrested. During that interview, Jones was advised of his Miranda1 rights, which he indicated that he understood. Jones then waived those rights and made a statement in which he denied doing "anything sexual" with O.M.T.
¶5 After that interview, Jones was taken to the hospital where he received prescription medication for ADHD. Jones was subsequently interviewed again at approximately 10:00 a.m. on February 26, 2019. Jones was again advised of his Miranda rights. During that interview, Jones admitted that his penis was exposed while he was babysitting O.M.T., and that O.M.T. "lick[ed]" his penis "one time."
¶6 Jones filed a motion to suppress the statement he made in the second interview. He asserted that his waiver of his rights was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, because the detective read through the Miranda warnings very quickly, and because his ADHD and his medication for that condition had diminished his ability to understand his rights. Jones also argued that his statement was coerced by the detective conducting the interview due to the manner in which the detective questioned Jones, and the "intense psychological pressures" that he put on Jones.
¶7 A hearing on the motion was held in September 2019. The trial court2 noted that it had reviewed recordings of the interviews, and acknowledged that the Miranda warnings were read "fast" during the second interview. However, the court observed that the detective had made reference to Jones being advised of his rights during the first interview; specifically, the detective stated, The trial court further stated that Jones had ultimately indicated that he understood his rights and was willing to make a statement.
¶8 The trial court further found that the tactics used during the questioning of Jones, such as minimizing the seriousness of the offense to encourage a confession, are "common tool[s]" utilized by the police during interrogations, and that the interview was not unduly lengthy or overly confrontational. Additionally, the court found that Jones did not show signs of being under physical or mental duress, nor did he demonstrate any cognitive or intellectual limitations. The court also determined that a report by a psychologist relating to Jones's ADHD medication was speculative and did not establish that it had affected Jones's ability to understand the questions posed by the detective.
¶9 Therefore, the trial court found that there was no Miranda violation and denied Jones's motion to suppress. Jones then entered into a plea agreement, in February 2020, under which he pled no contest to one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child. He was sentenced in September 2020 to five years of initial confinement to be followed by five years of extended supervision. The conviction also required Jones to register as a sex offender.
¶10 Jones subsequently filed a postconviction motion seeking sentence modification. He argued that there was a new factor that warranted modification; that is, a postconviction psychological evaluation relating to Jones's likelihood of sexual recidivism and treatment needs. Jones asserted that the sentencing court had expressed concern at sentencing over Jones's failure to take responsibility, and contended that the psychological evaluation explained that this failure is not indicative of an increased likelihood of recidivism.
¶11 The postconviction court rejected Jones's arguments. It found that the conclusion in the postconviction psychological evaluation regarding Jones's low risk of recidivism was not highly relevant to the sentence imposed by the sentencing court because Jones's "overall good character and his low risk of recidivism were not in question" at sentencing. Thus, postconviction court found that Jones had not established that the evaluation was a new factor.
¶12 Furthermore, the postconviction court stated that even if the evaluation was a new factor, sentence modification was not warranted. The postconviction court observed that Jones had obtained an "enormous benefit" through the plea negotiations in terms of limiting his prison exposure. The postconviction court also noted that the sentencing court had made it "exceedingly clear" that the sentence it imposed "was primarily motivated by the gravity of the offense." Therefore, the postconviction court denied Jones's motion. This appeal follows.
¶13 We first discuss Jones's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police. The review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Eason , 2001 WI 98, ¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. We will not reverse the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; however, we review de novo the application of constitutional principles to those facts. Id.
¶14 "In order to be valid, a Miranda waiver must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent." State v. Ward , 2009 WI 60, ¶30, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236. Such a waiver is deemed to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent if it is " ‘the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,’ and has ‘been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’ " Id. (citation omitted). The burden is on the State to establish a prima facie case that these requirements were met. State v. Lee , 175 Wis. 2d 348, 359, 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993). If that burden is met, the statements are admissible unless the defendant presents "countervailing evidence" demonstrating that the waiver was not valid or that the statement was not voluntary. Id.
¶15 Jones argues that neither of these requirements were met during his second custodial interview. Jones first asserts that the Miranda rights provided in the second interview were read by the detective very quickly and without regard to whether Jones understood them, and further, that the trial court's reliance on the Miranda rights given in the first interview as providing adequate notice was in error.
¶16 In support of his argument, Jones suggests that the trial court's characterization of the first interview as "very nonconfrontational" distinguishes it from the second interview, and thus he asserts that the Miranda rights given during the first interview should not be considered in the analysis regarding the validity of the rights given in the second interview. Jones cites to State v. Hambly , 2008 WI 10, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48, for the premise that "[t]he procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda ’s protection of Fifth Amendment rights ‘are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.’ " Id. , ¶22 (citation omitted).
¶17 However, regardless of the manner in which the first interview was conducted, Jones had been arrested and was in custody at that time, and there were questions presented to him that related to "his association with the alleged victim and the alleged victim's family and what was going on on the premises where he's accused of having committed this crime on the day in question." The first interview was therefore a custodial interrogation, and was recognized as such by the trial court in its decision.
¶18 Moreover, although the trial court recognized that the Miranda rights were read through very quickly in the second interview, the court also observed that there had been a "lengthy discussion" with Jones during the first interview regarding his rights, and that the detective in the second interview referenced that discussion. Jones asserts that the approximate ten-hour time span between the first and second interviews makes the Miranda rights given in the first interview too far removed to bolster any deficiencies of the rights provided in the second interview. Jones again cites to Hambly for support; however, the issue in Hambly was whether the defendant, in requesting counsel before his Miranda rights were given and questioning had begun, had effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. Hambly , 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶¶16-17. We thus do not find Hambly particularly instructive in this context. Rather, we observe that the record clearly demonstrates that the detective read through th...
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