State v. Jones, Docket No. 33372 (Idaho App. 9/9/2008)

• Decision Date: 09 September 2008
• Docket Number: Docket No. 33372.
• Parties: STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSIAH RAIN JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

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STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSIAH RAIN JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 33372.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Filed September 9, 2008.

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Latah County, Hon. John H. Bradbury, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for aggravated battery, affirmed.

Todd S. Richardson, Clarkston, Washington, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

PERRY, Judge.

Josiah Rain Jones appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated battery. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In July 2005, Jones was visiting his girlfriend Mandy—the victim's ex-wife¹—and her young daughter at Mandy's coffee shop. Mandy's coffee shop is connected to a bar. While Jones was present, Eric Cutlip, the victim and Mandy's ex-husband, entered the coffee shop and confronted Mandy about their custody arrangement. Jones punched Cutlip, knocking him down. Mandy retreated into the bar with her daughter, and Cutlip attempted to follow them. Jones punched Cutlip again, knocking him to the ground. It was later determined that Jones had fractured both of Cutlip's cheek bones.

Jones was charged with aggravated battery. A three-day jury trial was conducted. Jones testified and admitted to punching Cutlip twice but asserted that the amount of force he used was reasonable. Jones argued, and the jury was instructed on, the affirmative defense of the defense of others, asserting that he was justified in punching Cutlip in order to protect Mandy and her daughter. The jury found Jones guilty of aggravated battery. I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-907, 18-908. Jones appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Closing Argument and the Curative Instruction

Jones asserts the district court improperly refused to allow him to argue regarding the reasonable doubt standard during closing argument. Specifically, Jones alleges the district court erred in restricting him "from making arguments and discussing the law which was set forth in the jury instructions." See State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576, 181 P.3d 496, 502 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that "closing argument is an opportunity for the parties to . . . discuss the law set forth in the jury instructions as it applies to the trial evidence").

Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). Its purpose is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. Id.; State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587.

In 1979, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that, in a case where the evidence against the defendant was entirely circumstantial, the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction discussing circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt. See State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 132-33, 594 P.2d 639, 642-43 (1979). In that case, the defendant requested the following jury instruction:

You are not permitted to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged against him based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion and each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Also, if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to the defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt.

Id. at 132, 594 P.2d at 642. For approximately twenty years, the requested jury instruction in Holder was considered a proper statement of the law, and it was error for a district court to refuse to give the Holder instruction if the case against a defendant was based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

In 2000, the Supreme Court reexamined the Holder instruction to determine whether it had continued validity. See State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000). The Court relied on precedent from several sister states and a United States Supreme Court case discussing a growing consensus in the legal field that circumstantial evidence was not inherently less reliable than direct evidence. The Court concluded that it was no longer appropriate to give the Holder instruction and that "in all criminal cases there should be only one standard of proof, which is beyond a reasonable doubt." Humphreys, 134 Idaho at 661, 8 P.3d at 656.

In Humphreys, the Court relied, in part, on Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954). The defendant in Holland requested an instruction that provided that "where the Government's evidence is circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt." Id. at 139. The Holland Court recognized that there was support for this type of a circumstantial evidence instruction in lower court decisions, but it concluded that "the better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect." Id. at 139-40.

In this case, Jones began to argue the premise set forth in the Holder instruction. During closing argument, Jones asserted:

Remember we talked a little bit about how do you overcome that initial little bias, because as jurors you have a duty to presume him innocent until proven guilty beyond that mouse hole, that reasonable doubt.

Well, let me suggest one thing for you. Anytime there is evidence that can be thought of in more than one way, any time you look at this and say I think it went that way, if there is an explanation for that evidence that would lead you to a not guilty—

The state objected and the district court sustained the objection.

On appeal, Jones asserts that it was improper for the district court to preclude him from arguing the legal principle contained in the Holder instruction because there is a significant difference between an instruction and argument and because the Idaho appellate courts have never concluded the Holder principle to be an incorrect statement of law. The Holder instruction—and therefore the legal principle contained within that instruction—was only approved for use in cases where the evidence against a defendant was entirely circumstantial.

In this case, there was direct evidence provided through testimony by both Jones and Cutlip that Jones hit Cutlip at least twice. Furthermore, contrary to Jones's assertion on appeal, the closing argument he was presenting to the jury was not discussing the law set forth in the jury instructions because there was no Holder instruction given. We conclude the district court did not err in refusing to allow Jones to argue the Holder principle during closing argument.

Next, Jones asserts that the district court's error in precluding him from arguing the Holder principle was compounded by the court's curative instruction. Jones contends that the curative instruction informed the jury to completely disregard his counsel's argument and tacitly directed the jury to find him guilty. Jones relies on the proposition that "a judge's remark will be deemed prejudicial if it constitutes a comment on the weight of the evidence or indicates an opinion of the court as to the defendant's guilt or innocence." State v. Johnson, 138 Idaho 103, 106, 57 P.3d 814, 817 (Ct. App. 2002). The state responds that Jones's contention is unsupported by the record.

After determining that Jones would not be allowed to argue the Holder principle, the district court informed the jury as follows:

Be seated, please. Ladies and gentlemen, I really am sorry to interrupt the rhythm of it to decide but it's an important issue. And please don't judge either side by this because the Supreme Court has had a tough time—Idaho Supreme Court has had a tough time making up its mind on what the law should be in this particular area. So, it certainly was reasonable for either of them to argue as they have. And I've made my decision. I'm going to ask you to disregard [defense counsel's] statements that it could go one way or the other, that you had—that you should find not guilty. I'm not saying—so, I'm asking you just simply to disregard that portion of the argument and that will—I have concluded that that would apply only where there's a case where it's circumstantial evidence rather than where there's direct evidence.

(Emphasis added). Relying on the italicized portion of the district court's curative instruction, Jones argues that the instruction was an impermissible comment on the evidence, informed the jury to disregard his arguments entirely, and deprived him of the right to a fair trial.

Contrary to Jones's argument, we do not agree that the curative instruction informed the jury to disregard Jones's argument entirely. The curative instruction specifically informed the jury to disregard "that portion of the argument" in reference to Jones's attempt to argue the Holder principle. We also disagree that the instruction was an impermissible comment on the evidence. Nowhere in the instruction does the district court refer to the evidence. The instruction informs the jury to disregard Jones's statement that, if there is evidence going one way or the other, the jury...