State v. Jones, 52286

• Decision Date: 19 February 1973
• Docket Number: No. 52286,52286
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Abe JONES, Jr.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 422

282 So.2d 422

STATE of Louisiana v. Abe JONES, Jr.

No. 52286.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 19, 1973.

Dissenting Opinion Feb. 21, 1973.

On Rehearing Aug. 20, 1973.

Gravel, Roy & Burnes, James J. Brady, James M. Small, Alexandria, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin O. Ware, III, Dist. Atty., Robert P. Jackson, Alfred B. Shapiro, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.

SANDERS, Justice.

The Grand Jury of Rapides Parish indicted Abe Jones, Jr., for the murder of Roy L. Henderson. After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty without capital punishment. The trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment. The defendant has appealed, relying upon 24 bills of exceptions reserved in the trial court. The substantial questions pertain to the limitation of the voir dire examination of jurors, denial of a challenge for cause, and the procedure used for the summoning of tales jurors.

Bills of Exceptions 2 through 7 pertain to the rulings of the trial judge limiting defense counsel's voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Of these, Bills of Exceptions 6 and 7 relate to a juror who was later excused for cause. Since that juror did not serve, the rulings as to his examination were harmless. See LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 921. Hence, these bills will not be discussed in detail.

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS 2 and 3

As to prospective juror James H. Farmer, the line of questioning and ruling was as follows:

'QUESTION: I want you to suppose, Mr. Farmer, that Judge Gremillion advises you of the law and that part of the law is not to your liking. You have personal disagreement with it, could you nonetheless apply it?

'ANSWER: Yes.

'QUESTION: And you can say that without reservation, even not knowing what the law is at this point, is that correct?

'ANSWER: Yes.

'QUESTION: I take it then, if he gave you a completely obnoxious statement of the law, which you felt personally was wrong, notwithstanding that fact, you could apply it?

'ANSWER: Yes.

'QUESTION: I want to ask you again. Can you readily say yes to my question before you are advised of what the law is?

'BY MR. JACKSON: Objection.

'BY THE COURT: Sustained.'

The examination and ruling as to prospective juror Charles Bonneau, Jr., were similar.

A review of the examination shows that these jurors had testified that they would apply the law as charged by the trial judge, whether they agreed with it or not. This testimony had been repeated several times, in response to defense questions in various forms. The final question, to which objection was sustained, was both argumentative and repetitious.

Article 786 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the scope of voir dire examination shall be in the discretion of the Court. In the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion, this Court will not disturb the ruling on appeal. State v. Schoonover, 252 La. 311, 211 So.2d 273, cert. den. 394 U.S. 931, 89 S.Ct. 1199, 22 L.Ed.2d 460 (1969); State v. Williams, 230 La. 1059, 89 So.2d 898 (1956).

In our opinion, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion here.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 4

The defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 4 to the following ruling during the examination of prospective juror Rudolph White:

'QUESTION: Mr. White, at the conclusion of the State's and the defense's case, after all of the evidence is heard, Judge Gremillion is going to charge you with what the law is, and he is going to tell you to apply the law to the facts and to the evidence you heard. Now do you think you would be able to apply the law which the judge gives you, even assuming that you personally disagree with the law.

'ANSWER: I sure could.

'QUESTION: Even though you found it personally obnoxious, you could apply it as the Judge told you to apply it, sir?

'ANSWER: I believe in the law, whether I like it or not.

'QUESTION: Then I take it that you believe that Mr. Abe Jones at this point is innocent, is that correct?

'ANSWER: He is presumed innocent.

'QUESTION: Do you presume him to be innocent?

'ANSWER: Yes, sir.

'BY MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, we object to any further questions along this line.

'BY THE COURT: This is the type of question I spoke of earlier. You are in effect asking him to tell you what he knows about the law of innocence. That will not be permitted.'

Although the ruling of the trial judge here occurred when there was no pending question, the ruling may be construed as barring further examination relating to the juror's understanding of and reaction to the various rules of law deemed applicable to the case.

We note that the juror had already testified that he would apply the law given to him by the trial judge, whether he agreed with it or not. Under these circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in curtailing detailed examination concerning the various legal rules applicable to the case. See State v. Sheppard, 263 La. 379, 268 So.2d 590 (1972) and the authorities therein cited.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 5

The defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 5 to the exclusion of the following defense question addressed to a juror:

'Mr. Juneau, do you believe that if a Grand Jury indicts someone, this man is guilty?'

For the reasons assigned in Bill of Exceptions No. 4, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion here.

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS NOS. 9 and 10

The defendant reserved Bills of Exceptions Nos. 9 and 10 to the denial of a challenge for cause of Louis O. Edwards, a prospective juror. After the denial of the challenge for cause, the defendant excused the prospective juror with a peremptory challenge.

The rulings were as follows:

'Defense Counsel:

'Q. Mr. Edwards, getting back just for one minute, because of one thing or another, perhaps happened to you during your life, do you feel that if it came down to a policeman saying one thing and an ordinary citizen saying another. The two being in direct conflict, you would be inclined to accept and believe the testimony of the policeman, is that correct.?

'A. I would.

'Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I submit the juror for cause.

'Q. My question to you is this, Mr. Edwards, would you weight the credibility of each party and rule accordingly, or would you be inclined to accept the testimony of the policeman in the event of a direct conflict?

'A. I would be inclined to go along with the policeman because that in his job he is trained--I would think, to where if they did see a crime he would be more susceptible to get the facts right off hand because he's trained to do that. That's the way I believe, I would be inclined to go along with the policeman because he would seem like to me, just see the facts better than your or I would.

'Q. And by that you mean any fact which he would happen to witness?

'A. Well any fact he would witness, I mean he would be more susceptible to see it just like it was than I would.

In his Per Curiam, the trial judge states:

'During the examination of prospective juryman, Louis O. Edwards, there was developed by defense counsel what appeared on the face of Edward's testimony that he would believe the policeman in preference to an ordinary citizen. The entire dialogue must be read at which time the only conclusion that logically can be reached is that Mr. Edwards told of the circumstances he would appraise the testimony of such police officer and such a citizen. The ultimate conclusion that can be drawn from his testimony is that he would weigh the testimony of both and with the knowledge that a police officer is trained to observe, be inclined to accord more weight because of that fact.'

Only a few cases have dealt with this type of question on Voir dire examination. These cases have differed as to the propriety of such questions. The United States Circuit Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia has held that it is reversible error to bar such a question where police testimony represents virtually the entire case for the prosecution. See Brown v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 203, 338 F.2d 543 (1964); Sellers v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 271 F.2d 475 (1959). The First and Fifth Circuits have held that the trial courts did not abuse their discretion in disallowing such questions. See Gorin v. United States, 1st Cir., 313 F.2d 641 (1963), cert. den. 374 U.S. 829, 83 S.Ct. 1870, 10 L.Ed.2d 1052; United States v. Gassaway, 5th Cir., 456 F.2d 624 (1972); United States v. Jackson, 5th Cir., 448 F.2d 539 (1971).

The issue here is whether or not it was reversible error for the trial judge to deny the challenge for cause, after having allowed the questions and received the answers of the prospective juror.

On questions related to the impartiality of jurors, great weight must be given to the ruling of the trial judge, who sees and hears the prospective juror.

The juror further testified:

'Q Also, Mr. Edwards, during the course of this trial very likely the testimony is going to be, some testimony is going to be given by various members of the Police Department, do you think you would be inclined to give more weight or more credence to the testimony from a policeman merely by virtue of the fact that he is a policeman than you would say to the testimony of an ordinary citizen?

'A Well, I would go along with either one of them, you know, policeman or ordinary citizen, I'd listen to it, you know and get the facts, that's all you can do.

'Q Would you be more inclined to believe the policeman because of the fact that he is a policeman?

'A I would be inclined to believe policemen, his testimony.

'Q And that's because merely you believe that policemen are more inclined to tell the truth than ordinary citizens?

'A Well, I think either one of them would tell the truth, as far as that goes, but a policeman it's more his job you know to get the truth and lots of times in cases well the policeman was there, you know and I believe in the law, I'll put it like that. I will just say...