State v. Jones

Decision Date30 January 2019
Docket NumberNo. W2015-02210-SC-DDT-DD,W2015-02210-SC-DDT-DD
Citation568 S.W.3d 101
Parties STATE of Tennessee v. Henry Lee JONES
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

James E. Thomas (on appeal)3 and James M. Gulley (on appeal/resource counsel at trial), Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Henry Lee Jones.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; Leslie E. Price, Senior Counsel; Amy Weirich, District Attorney General; Tom Henderson and Jennifer Nichols, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Cornelia A. Clark, Holly Kirby, and Roger A. Page, JJ., joined. Sharon G. Lee, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J.

In this capital case, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Henry Lee Jones, of alternative counts of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of Clarence James and alternative counts of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of Lillian James. The jury sentenced the Defendant to death on all four counts. As for the two counts related to Mr. James, the jury found the evidence sufficient to support six aggravating circumstances. As for the two counts related to Mrs. James, the jury found the evidence sufficient to support five aggravating circumstances. The trial court merged each of the felony murder convictions into the corresponding premeditated murder convictions and imposed two sentences of death. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. On automatic review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 39-13-206(a)(1), we now address the following issues: (1) Whether the Defendant was unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the former testimony of Tevarus Young; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the appointment of a mitigation expert. We also conduct our mandatory review of the Defendant’s death sentences. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and death sentences. As to the remaining issues raised by the Defendant, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusions and attach as an appendix to this opinion the relevant portions of that court’s decision.

Factual and Procedural History

This case arises out of the murders of Clarence and Lillian James in their Bartlett, Tennessee, home on August 22, 2003. The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Henry Lee Jones, on October 7, 2003, for the first degree premeditated murder of Clarence James, the first degree premeditated murder of Lillian James, the first degree felony murder of Clarence James in perpetration of a robbery, and the first degree felony murder of Lillian James in perpetration of a robbery. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty on February 17, 2004.

This is the second trial for the Defendant, who was first tried in 2009. Although the first trial resulted in convictions on all counts and sentences of death, this Court reversed the convictions because of a prejudicial evidentiary error and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tenn. 2014). The second trial was held on May 11–16, 2015.

I. Pretrial Hearings

Prior to trial, the attorney who represented the Defendant in the first trial was permitted to withdraw. On October 31, 2014, the trial court appointed two private attorneys to represent the Defendant. These attorneys filed ex parte motions seeking funding for a "fact investigator," which was granted, and for a mitigation investigator, which was denied. In denying the motion for a mitigation investigator, the trial court expressed its opinion that, in view of the appointment of two lawyers and approval of funding for a fact investigator, "one of the lawyers appointed to represent Mr. Jones should be able to perform the mitigation investigation." Thereafter, the Defendant became dissatisfied with his new attorneys and, in December 2014, filed a series of pro se motions with the trial court. Included in those motions was a motion to waive his right to an attorney and asking that he be permitted to represent himself.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion. At that hearing, the trial judge engaged the Defendant in an extensive colloquy concerning his right to representation by an attorney, the pitfalls of proceeding without an attorney, and the fact that he would be bound by the Tennessee Rules of Evidence and the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Defendant told the court that he had represented himself in a prior capital case in Florida and wished to represent himself in this case as well. He affirmed that he understood he was facing the death penalty, asserted that he understood the elements of the offenses with which he was charged, and represented that he had read and was familiar with the rules of evidence and procedure. The trial judge repeatedly and strongly discouraged the Defendant from representing himself. In the end, however, the court found that the Defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

On no fewer than nine occasions during the pretrial proceedings, the trial court questioned the Defendant about his decision to represent himself and offered to re-appoint counsel. The Defendant repeatedly declined the offer. On February 11, 2015, the Defendant agreed to "resource counsel" to assist him in obtaining discovery, in issuing subpoenas, and otherwise assisting in matters that the Defendant could not do from the jail. As a result, the trial court appointed private attorney James Gulley to assist the Defendant.

When trial began on May 11, 2015, the court once again advised the Defendant of his right to an attorney and offered to appoint counsel for him. The trial judge stated, "I am begging you to let an attorney represent you." The Defendant responded, "It won't happen." When the Defendant affirmed that he was waiving his right to counsel, the court had Mr. Gulley review with him the written waiver of right to counsel, and the Defendant reviewed and signed it.

The first two days of trial encompassed jury selection, reading of the indictments, the Defendant’s entry of a "not guilty" plea, preliminary instructions to the jury, and opening statements. When trial resumed on May 13, 2015, the trial court yet again asked the Defendant to reconsider his decision to represent himself. Although the Defendant persisted in his decision to proceed pro se , the court advised him that if at any point he would like Mr. Gulley to step in and represent him, he was available.4

At the first trial, the State’s key witness was the Defendant’s co-defendant, Tevarus Young. Following the Defendant’s convictions in that trial, Mr. Young pled guilty as a mitigated offender to two counts of facilitation of first degree murder in return for two concurrent thirteen-and-one-half-year sentences. By the time of this second trial, Mr. Young had fully served those sentences, been released, and returned to his home state of Florida.

On April 13, 2015, one month before trial, the State filed a petition to secure Mr. Young’s appearance as a material witness for trial and for the advance payment of witness travel expenses pursuant to the Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-201 through -212 (2012) ("the Law to Secure Witnesses"). That same day, the trial court granted the State’s petition and issued a certificate to secure Mr. Young’s attendance to testify at trial.

On May 4, 2015, the State filed another petition to secure Mr. Young’s appearance including an averment that the Assistant District Attorney trying the case had spoken with Mr. Young and that Mr. Young had advised him that he would not agree to appear and testify. Mr. Young also had stopped answering his phone and appeared to be evading service by Dade County, Florida, investigators trying to locate him.

The State requested that Mr. Young be taken into custody and delivered to an officer of Shelby County, Tennessee, to secure his presence for the trial scheduled to begin on May 11, 2015. The trial court issued a certificate and an order to transport Mr. Young to Tennessee pursuant to the Law to Secure Witnesses on May 7, 2015. In that order, the court noted that the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Miami-Dade County, Florida, had received the earlier certificate issued by the trial court and had issued a summons for Mr. Young. The trial court noted that, on May 6, 2015, the Florida court found that Mr. Young was actively evading service of the summons to appear in that court, that service on Mr. Young’s mother did not procure his appearance in court pursuant to that summons, and that the court had ordered the immediate arrest of Mr. Young.

Nevertheless, as of May 11, 2015, Mr. Young was still eluding service. Accordingly, the State filed a motion to have Mr. Young declared an unavailable witness and sought permission to use a transcript of Mr. Young’s testimony from the 2009 trial. This motion documented the State’s efforts to find Mr. Young:

In attempting to prepare for the pending trial, the State of Tennessee has made every effort to obtain the presence of Tevarus Young to testify at the pending trial. Law enforcement officers in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, where witness Young was living when these events began, were contacted. Using paperwork from the misdemeanor probation, law enforcement officers in Miami-Dade County, Florida, were able to locate his mother’s residence in Miami-Dade County. Officers were told by his mother that Young was
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