State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 21 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-KA-0699,81-KA-0699 |
| Citation | 426 So.2d 1323 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Ronnie W. JONES. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Abbott Reeves, Art Lentini, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Robert Garrity, Jr., Harahan, for defendant-appellant.
On May 21, 1980 Ronnie W. Jones was charged by bill of information with the crime of simple burglary, a violation of R.S. 14:62; on October 31, 1980 a jury found him guilty of attempted simple burglary (R.S. 14:27). His motion for a new trial was denied, and he was sentenced to five years at hard labor. Defendant now appeals his conviction on one assignment of error and one argument.
At approximately 12:00 a.m. on May 21, 1980, Sarah Dillon was awakened by the sound of her daughter's bedroom door opening. Mrs. Dillon testified that she had fallen asleep next to her child while putting her to bed. Assuming that her husband was coming in to awaken her, she called out his name three times. No one answered and a person entered the bedroom. Mrs. Dillon then screamed for her husband who was asleep in front of the television in their bedroom next door. Getting no response she started banging on the wall, which finally roused him from his sleep. Mr. Dillon ran into the room, and apprehended the intruder, punching him several times. Mrs. Dillon then switched on the hall light and they recognized the prowler as their neighbor, the defendant, who lived two houses down the street.
In his assignment of error defendant contends that his conviction should be reversed because the state failed to produce sufficient evidence that his unauthorized entry into the dwelling of Mr. and Mrs. Dillon was with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein.
The state argues that defendant's unauthorized presence in the dwelling proved intent to commit a theft or felony in the victims' home. The defendant urges that his mere presence in the residence is not proof of his guilty intent.
The defendant must have had the specific intent to commit either a felony or a theft at the time of his unauthorized entry, both for the crimes of simple burglary and attempted simple burglary. State v. Marcello, 385 So.2d 244 (La.1980); State v. Anderson, 343 So.2d 135 (La.1977); State v. Walker, 328 So.2d 87 (La.1976).
In State v. Marcello, supra at 245, this court stated:
In determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, there must be sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Defendant testified that he was watching television at his home when suddenly something started to annoy him "universal wise." He elaborated that he became so tense and depressed that he decided to go to the hospital. He had previously been treated at the hospital for mental illness earlier in 1980 for about a week and a half. At that time he was admitted because he felt "kinda bad, kinda nauseated."
According to his testimony, his younger brother Stanley suggested that he "go ask McCharles [Dillon] he's got a car" to drive him to the hospital. Stanley worked for the Dillons on occasion and was acquainted with them. 1 Both cars of the Dillons were parked in the driveway, and the television was on. Defendant testified that he went
The victims' testimony is not inconsistent with defendant's account and, in fact, supports a finding that defendant was sick and in need of medical attention. Mrs. Dillon testified that when she asked defendant, "What are you doing in my house?" he responded, "I don't know." She described defendant as looking "like he was drunk or something," "stooped over like and swaying," and "like a person in a drunk stupor with his arms swinging and like stuttering, like he really couldn't say anything." In addition, in the minute and a half that elapsed after Mrs. Dillon began screaming for her husband and before her husband appeared, defendant remained in the same position and "didn't do anything."
Mr. Dillon described his encounter with the defendant: "Well, when I hit him and he hollered and put his hand behind his back well I know how guys look when they drunk or on drugs and he act like he was on drugs to me." Defendant asked Mr. Dillon, "Man, is this real?" Later, defendant explained his presence in the house by saying that his brother Stanley suggested he ask the Dillons for a ride to the hospital.
The arresting officer testified that at the time of the arrest defendant's "eyes appeared to be glossy," but otherwise he appeared to be "coordinated" to the officer.
In the case of State v. Marcello, supra, this court reversed a conviction for attempted simple burglary when the testimony showed that the defendant, who had entered the NOPSI building at 921 Union Street, did not have the requisite intent to commit a felony or theft in the building. Defendant had been sleeping on the roof of the office building and had entered a restroom in the building to wash. In reversing the conviction, this court reasoned that:
"... 385 So.2d at 245. (Emphasis added).
In the present case defendant did not remove any property from the premises nor did he commit a felony within the Dillons' home. No property was reported missing. 2 Defendant had no burglary tools in his possession, nor was there any other evidence of an intent to burglarize his neighbors' home, other than his mere presence in the house.
"When the evidence does not support a conviction of the crime charged, the Court has generally remanded with instructions to discharge the defendant." State v. Byrd, 385 So.2d 248, 251 (La.1980). However, the discharge of the defendant is neither necessary nor proper if the evidence supports a conviction on a lesser and included offense. State v. Byrd, supra.
In this case, all of the elements of the crime of criminal trespass have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact. A person who enters the residence of another without authorization is guilty of criminal trespass. R.S. 14:63.9 (repealed 1981). 3 See R.S. 14:63 for current version.
The evidentiary insufficiency related only to proof that defendant had "the intent to commit a felony or theft" in the building. The evidence more than sufficed to show that defendant intentionally entered the Dillons' residence without authorization. The Dillons were only casually acquainted with the defendant and had never previously invited him into their home. The victims testified that defendant must have entered their home through their back door, which inadvertently had been left unlocked. Defendant had to open a gate to the fenced-in backyard to reach the rear door of the house.
In State v. Byrd, supra, this court allowed entry of a judgment of guilty to a lesser and included offense which was a legislatively authorized responsive verdict to the greater offense found by the jury. Even though criminal trespass is not a responsive verdict to simple burglary (C.Cr.P. 814A(41)), it would be possible to extend the rationale of State v. Byrd, supra, to apply in this case because all of the elements of criminal trespass are included in the offense of simple burglary. However, the application of State v. Byrd ought not to be broadened, but ought to be limited to those responsive verdicts listed in C.Cr.P. 814.
The only legislatively authorized responsive verdicts for simple burglary are listed in C.Cr.P. 814A(41). These are "guilty," "guilty of attempted simple burglary," and "not guilty." Criminal trespass is not listed in C.Cr.P. 814A(41) as a responsive verdict.
State v. Byrd, supra, offers possibilities for preventing a miscarriage of justice when the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of a lesser offense whose elements are included in the greater offense that defendant was charged with. Nevertheless, there are substantial risks in this departure from the traditional disposition of cases on appeal when the state fails to prove an essential element of the offense charged. See State v. Byrd, supra at 253 (Watson, J., dissenting); State v. Goods, 403 So.2d 1205, 1210 (Blanche, J., dissenting); Note, Appellate Review and the Lesser Included...
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