State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 04 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-37558,A-1-CA-37558 |
| Citation | 464 P.3d 1079 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sarita JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
{1} At issue in this appeal is the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on Sarita Jones's (Defendant's) theory that she acted in defense of another against use of excessive force by a police officer. We hold for the first time in New Mexico that defense of another against use of excessive force by a police officer is a viable defense, and we apply the standard announced in State v. Ellis , 2008-NMSC-032, 144 N.M. 253, 186 P.3d 245, involving self-defense claims against police officers. We conclude that Defendant was entitled to a defense of another instruction against the use of excessive force by police officers directed at her son. We thus reverse Defendant's convictions for battery upon a peace officer ( NMSA 1978, § 30-22-24 (1971) ), and resisting or abusing a peace officer ( NMSA 1978, § 30-22-1(D) (1981) ) and remand this case to the district court for a new trial.
{2} The following facts are derived from testimony and video evidence presented at trial. Officers John Hong and Raphael Aguilar were dispatched to Defendant's home in reference to a domestic dispute. Officer Hong arrived first, and as he approached the house, he saw the front door slam shut and heard yelling from inside the home. After knocking loudly and announcing his presence, Officer Hong asked Defendant and her two sons to step outside of the house for safety reasons. Although they were resistant at first, all three eventually came outside and stood on the porch. While Officer Hong was attempting to ascertain their identities and investigate the situation, Defendant's son, Corey, stepped inside the house and closed the door. Almost immediately, Corey opened the door, yelled at his brother and Sergeant Aguilar, who had just arrived and was walking across the front lawn. Sergeant Aguilar immediately pulled his taser and ordered Corey to the ground, advancing into the house as Corey retreated with his hands raised. Sergeant Aguilar knew that Corey had a warrant for his arrest and intended to arrest Corey because of the warrant, but he did not convey this information to Corey or Defendant at the time of the arrest. However, Sergeant Aguilar testified that another officer had informed Corey and Defendant a "couple weeks" prior that Corey had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. As Sergeant Aguilar advanced towards Corey, Officer Hong drew his taser as well and pointed it at Corey. Defendant testified that when she saw the officers with tasers drawn and pointed at her son, she believed the weapons were guns and attempted to place herself between the officers and her son. Defendant grabbed Sergeant Aguilar's wrist. Sergeant Aguilar fired the taser at Corey but struck Defendant instead. Officer Hong's lapel video captured the incident, all of which occurred within a few minutes.
{3} At trial the district court denied Defendant's request for a defense of another jury instruction. Defendant was found guilty of battery upon a peace officer and resisting or abusing an officer. Defendant appeals her convictions.
{4} At the outset, we note that the district court denied Defendant's request for a defense of another jury instruction finding it was not a viable defense because the "law does not allow" for defending another against excessive force by a police officer. We disagree and hold that defense of another against use of excessive force by a police officer is a viable defense as set forth below.
{5} Defendant argues that under the facts and circumstances of this case she was entitled to a defense of another instruction to the same extent that Corey would have been entitled to a self-defense instruction. The State agrees on the law, specifying that the controlling case on use of self-defense against a police officer, Ellis , 2008-NMSC-032, 144 N.M. 253, 186 P.3d 245, should apply when a defense of another instruction is requested in the context of alleged excessive police force.1
{6} We agree with the parties that controlling case law on use of self-defense against a police officer applies with full force in this case, involving defense of another. New Mexico "[c]ase law and commentary treat ‘defense of another’ and ‘self-defense’ as virtually identical for purposes of analysis." State v. Sandoval , 2011-NMSC-022, ¶ 16, 150 N.M. 224, 258 P.3d 1016 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Gallegos , 2001-NMCA-021, ¶ 7, 130 N.M. 221, 22 P.3d 689 (); State v. Duarte , 1996-NMCA-038, ¶ 3, 121 N.M. 553, 915 P.2d 309 (); see also UJI 14-5182 NMRA comm. cmt. (referring specifically to UJI 14-5181 NMRA (self-defense) in the defense of another instruction); cf. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-7 (1963) (). Because we analyze self-defense and defense of another claims similarly, we see no reason, and the parties have provided us none, why the defense of another defense would be unavailable to a defendant when an officer uses excessive force. See State v. Orosco , 1982-NMCA-181, ¶ 10, 99 N.M. 180, 655 P.2d 1024 (). We thus look to New Mexico law on self-defense against the use of excessive force by a police officer to determine the availability of the defense of another defense in this context.
{7} In New Mexico, a person has a limited right of self-defense against a police officer using excessive force. See State v. Kraul , 1977-NMCA-032, ¶ 29, 90 N.M. 314, 563 P.2d 108 (). In Ellis , our Supreme Court outlined the standard to apply in cases involving self-defense claims against police officers. See generally 2008-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 14-42, 144 N.M. 253, 186 P.3d 245. The Court concluded that the right to self-defense against a police officer is not absolute; it does not exist if the officer is "using necessary force to effect an arrest." Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, if "some evidence of excessive force" is presented, an "instruction on self-defense is required." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Given the similar treatment of self-defense and defense of another by our courts, we apply the Ellis standard, as the parties have done, to determine whether a jury should be instructed that a defendant was defending another against the use of excessive force by a police officer.2
{8} Having concluded that the Ellis standard applies in determining whether a jury should be instructed on defense of another, we apply it to the facts of this case. The propriety of jury instructions is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. State v. Salazar , 1997-NMSC-044, ¶ 49, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996. "When evidence at trial supports the giving of an instruction on a defendant's theory of the case, failure to so instruct is reversible error." See State v. Brown , 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 34, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69. "We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the giving of the requested instruction." State v. Hill , 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139. If a defendant presents any evidence, even slight, to support a jury instruction, he is entitled to the instruction. Id. ¶ 8.
{9} A defendant is only entitled to a defense of another jury instruction if an officer used force against another that was unreasonable and unnecessary. See Ellis , 2008-NMSC-032, ¶ 17, 144 N.M. 253, 186 P.3d 245. "Generally, the question of the reasonableness of the actions of the officer is a question of fact for the jury." Id. (). However, a court may determine as a matter of law that reasonable minds of the jurors could not differ as to whether the officer used excessive force. Id. To make this determination, the court must evaluate whether an objectively reasonable officer on the scene would have acted similarly in light of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses a threat to the safety of others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. ¶ 26. The objective standard, based on a "reasonable officer's opinion about the use of force," takes into consideration the "fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. ¶¶ 26, 28 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The [s]tate must prove to the jury that the officer met an objectively reasonable standard in employing force against the defendant." Id. ¶ 31.
{10} Applying the Ellis standard to the facts here, we conclude that reasonable minds...
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