State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 18 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-KA-2379,80-KA-2379 |
| Citation | 398 So.2d 1049 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Ray JONES. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., James L. Davis, Dist. Atty., Herman L. Lawson, Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Robert L. Salim, of Kelly & Salim, Natchitoches, for defendant-appellant.
*
For the second time, defendant appeals from the severity of the sentence after a plea of guilty.
He was originally charged with distribution of marijuana, a violation of R.S. 40:966(A). After a plea bargain was negotiated, the state reduced the charge to attempted distribution of marijuana (R.S. 40:966(A); R.S. 14:27) and the defendant pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labor and fined $7000.
In his appeal, defendant alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because it was induced in part by the state's promise that he would receive no jail sentence, and he claimed that the sentence was excessive. We found that we had no criteria by which to assess the appropriateness of the sentence because the trial judge failed to state for the record the factual bases for the sentence imposed, noting only that there was an undue risk that the defendant would commit another crime if given probation or a suspended sentence, and that a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. Holding that this was inadequate compliance with C.Cr.P. 894.1, we vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. State v. Jones, 386 So.2d 85 (La.1980).
Pursuant to our instructions, a re-sentencing hearing was held, and defendant was provided with a copy of the presentence report relied upon by the judge so that he could refute any erroneous information contained therein.
After hearing testimony, the trial judge imposed the same sentence on the defendant. He acknowledged that the defendant appeared to be working regularly and contributing to his family's support, but he thought that his prior employment history was spotty. He remained convinced that the defendant was likely to commit another crime if placed on probation. He emphasized the dangers of drug use and concluded that the seriousness of the crime required a severe sentence, even if it caused hardship to the defendant's family.
Defendant again contends that the sentence is excessive. He notes the absence of prior criminal convictions and the small amount of marijuana involved. 1 The sentence given the defendant is virtually the maximum sentence for attempted distribution of marijuana five years imprisonment and a $7500 fine. The state could have charged the defendant with two counts of distribution of marijuana, and exposed him to a potential punishment of twenty years imprisonment, 2 but he was in fact charged with only one count of attempted distribution. Considering that defendant had no previous record of dealing in contraband, and that the amount of marijuana involved was small, this is not an egregious case which calls for the imposition of the maximum penalty allowed by law.
Trial judges are granted great discretion in imposing sentences, but even sentences within statutory limits may be excessive under certain circumstances. State v. Spencer, 374 So.2d 1195 (La.1979). Sentences must be individualized to be compatible with the offenders as well as the offenses. In deciding whether to confine a defendant or to grant him probation, the judge must consider certain factors enumerated in C.Cr.P. 894.1(A) and (B). His consideration should be based upon factual determinations. For example, he should review the defendant's personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, his potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. State v. Jackson, 360 So.2d 842 (La.1978); State v. Frank, 344 So.2d 1039 (La.1977). He must then state for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor. C.Cr.P. 894.1(C). In this case, the trial judge considered the factors mentioned in C.Cr.P. 894.1, but it is difficult to discern the factual basis for his conclusion that the defendant was an unlikely prospect for probation. The defendant's conduct in the past year would indicate that he can be rehabilitated by other means than imprisonment.
In both appeals to this court, defendant has alleged that his guilty plea was induced in part by the state's promise that he would receive no jail sentence. He argues that the trial court should honor this agreement, or should allow him to withdraw his guilty plea and have a trial on the merits.
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes called "plea bargaining," has been characterized as "an essential component of the administration of justice." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 432 (1971). Courts have encouraged the practice while cautioning that it must be properly administered. The guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made, since it waives important constitutional rights. If the guilty plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, the essence of the promise must be made known and the promise must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, supra. Where a defendant shows that a prosecutor has reneged on a sentencing agreement made in connection with a plea bargain, federal courts have held that he is entitled to relief, either enforcement of the agreement, or withdrawal of the plea.
This court has also held that due process is denied when the state fails to comply with the material representation or promise which induced the defendant's guilty plea. State v. Neitte, 363 So.2d 425 (La.1978). In Neitte we remanded with instructions to vacate the guilty plea because the record indicated that the district attorney broke his promise to recommend probation in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea and promise to testify at the trial of another defendant. In that case, the record contained a letter from the defendant's attorney to the defendant apprising him of the terms of a proposed plea bargain. Both the defendant and his attorney testified that the district attorney promised to recommend probation.
In this case, the...
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