State v. Jones

• Citation: 404 So.2d 1192
• Decision Date: 10 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. 67400,67400
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. John L. JONES.
• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana

Page 1192

404 So.2d 1192

STATE of Louisiana v. John L. JONES.

No. 67400.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 10, 1981.

Concurring Opinion Sept. 15, 1981.

Dissenting Opinion Sept. 17, 1981.

Concurring Opinion Nov. 4, 1981.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin O. Ware, Dist. Atty., Edward E. Roberts, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for defendant-appellant.

James S. Gravel, of Gravel, Schley & Van Dyke, Alexandria, for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

On March 17, 1980, the defendant, represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty to operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense in violation of La.R.S. 14:98(d) (DWI-3). The defendant, with the approval of the state and trial judge, expressly conditioned his guilty plea by reserving his right to appeal to this Court under State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976), on the issue of whether the court minutes showing his two prior guilty pleas to charges of violation of La.R.S. 14:98 could serve as a valid predicate for the present charge. Defendant was sentenced to one year in jail and a $500 fine, and on default, six months in jail. Defendant appealed, urging the Crosby reservation.

Following a bench conference with the judge on March 7, 1980, counsel for the defendant and the state made a joint offer of copies of court minutes showing defendant's plea of guilty to DWI-1 entered on May 28, 1976 ¹ and a subsequent guilty plea to DWI-2 on June 15, 1978. ² The prosecutor commented that the minutes speak for themselves. Defense counsel objected "not to the actual offerings themself (sic), but to the content of the offering(s) because they do not lay a proper predicate" for the offense charged. The trial judge noted the objection to the offerings, but accepted the conditional guilty plea despite his doubts "whether this was procedurally proper under Crosby."

The defendant filed no pretrial motions. His only argument on appeal is that he cannot be properly charged as a third offender on the basis of the minutes showing his two prior convictions. ³ The defendant contends that his earlier pleas cannot be used to enhance his status and sentencing liability under La.R.S. 14:98 because the pleas were not taken in compliance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Specifically, the defendant argues that the state must produce a contemporaneous record affirmatively showing a knowing and voluntary waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, right to a trial, and a right to confrontation of accusers.

This case raises the following questions:

(1) Is a Crosby reservation an appropriate procedural vehicle to allow this Court to reach the merits of the defendant's argument?

(2) If we reach the merits, does the three-right articulation rule we established in State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 260 La. 90, 255 So.2d 85 (1971), apply to misdemeanor guilty pleas which will be used as a basis for actual imprisonment, enhancement of actual imprisonment or conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony?

CROSBY RESERVATION

A defendant who enters a guilty plea may appeal his conviction and sentence just as the defendant convicted following trial. La.C.Cr.P. art. 912. However, the issues appealable are more limited. It has been traditionally held that a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings prior to the plea. State v. Torres, 281 So.2d 451 (La.1973); State v. Coats, 260 La. 64, 255 So.2d 75 (1971); Joseph, The Work of the Appellate Courts for the 1975-76 Term Postconviction Procedure, 37 La.L.Rev. 568 (1977). In State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976), we departed from this rigid position and joined a growing number of jurisdictions ⁴ and commentators ⁵ favoring acceptance of conditional guilty pleas in some contexts. The principal nonjurisdictional issue the defendant reserved in Crosby was the denial of his motion to suppress certain physical evidence which he alleged was illegally seized. Crosby has routinely been followed in subsequent cases involving reservations of similar Fourth Amendment claims. E. g., State v. Lewis, 385 So.2d 226 (La.1980); State v. Neyrey, 383 So.2d 1222 (La.1980); State v. Hutchinson, 349 So.2d 1252 (La.1977); State v. Lain, 347 So.2d 167 (La.1977). This is the most common context in which conditional guilty pleas have been found appropriate. See 93 Harv.L.Rev. 564 and 26 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 360, supra.

We must determine whether it is appropriate to allow the defendant to reserve his due process claim that his Boykin rights were violated by application of the principles established in Crosby, supra, 338 So.2d 590-92. Without lengthy discussion, we conclude that these principles weigh in favor of reaching the merits rather than simply setting aside the plea and remanding.

The defendant raises a purely legal question of whether our Boykin-Jackson rule provides him with a legal defense to the instant charge. Thus, unless we allow this reservation, a trial will be necessary, not for the resolution of any factual dispute, but as a means of preserving the defendant's constitutional claim for appeal. As we stated in Crosby, it would be wasteful to force a sham trial in order to avoid a forfeiture of appellate review. 338 So.2d at 389. Accepting a conditional plea also spares the defendant from making the somewhat inequitable choice of either foregoing the potential benefits of plea bargaining or sacrificing his constitutional claims. In addition, the record of this case allows adequate review of the assignment presented us. Lastly, we note that the trial judge accepted the conditional plea, but has great discretion to reject such pleas if the situation demands.

APPLICATION OF BOYKIN-JACKSON TO CERTAIN MISDEMEANOR GUILTY PLEAS

The United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) noted that several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial, viz., the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), the right to trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), and the right to confront one's accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), and held that it "cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record." 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.

This court in State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 260 La. 90, 255 So.2d 85 (1971), expounding Boykin, held that "in taking a plea of guilty, an express and knowing waiver of at least these three federal constitutional rights must be made, which waiver cannot be presumed." 260 La. at 103, 255 So.2d 85.

Boykin and Jackson involved guilty pleas to felony offenses. Two of the same federal constitutional rights involved in those cases, and sometimes all three, are involved in a waiver that takes place when a guilty plea is entered in a state misdemeanor trial. However, the opinions in Boykin and Jackson do not explicitly state whether an appellate court can presume a waiver of these federal rights from a silent record in a misdemeanor case.

A majority of this court is of the opinion that the three right articulation rule is applicable to a misdemeanor guilty plea used as a basis for actual imprisonment, enhancement of actual imprisonment, or conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony. Some members of the court draw the line at these points by analogy to the holdings in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 101 S.Ct. 1585, 65 L.Ed.2d 1125 (1980); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). Others are of the view that, since guilty pleas to misdemeanors involve waivers of federal constitutional rights which cannot be presumed from a silent record, the three right articulation rule should be applicable to all misdemeanors except for minor traffic offenses.

Accordingly, whenever a misdemeanor guilty plea will be used as a basis for actual imprisonment, enhancement of actual imprisonment or conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to inform the defendant that by pleading guilty he waives (a) his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; (b) his right to trial and jury trial where it is applicable; (c) his right to confront his accusers, and to make sure that the accused has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. See State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, supra, 260 La. at 101, 103.

In the present case, the minute entry showing defendant's guilty plea to his first DWI offense does not show that he had waived any constitutional right other than his right to counsel. This misdemeanor guilty plea was used as a basis for conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor, DWI 1, into a felony, DWI 3d. See La.R.S. 14:98. Also, because defendant received a one year jail sentence, the misdemeanor guilty plea was used to enhance his actual imprisonment beyond the maximum six months jail sentence he could have received for DWI 2d. See La.R.S. 14:98. Accordingly, we are required to declare the misdemeanor guilty plea to defendant's first DWI offense invalid for these purposes. Consequently, defendant's DWI third offense conviction and sentence must be set aside because his invalid first offense DWI guilty plea conviction was an essential element thereof.

Our decision will be fully applicable to this case and any other case filed and presently pending in this court involving the issue presented herein. In all other cases, however, we will apply our holding to guilty pleas entered after this decision becomes final.

Decree

Accordingly,...