State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 16 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 30,766.,30 |
| Citation | 229 P.3d 474 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Curtis JONES, Defendant-Petitioner. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, JK Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.
Gary K. King, Attorney General, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.
Marsha Levick, Philadelphia, PA, for Amicus Curiae Juvenile Law Center.
{1} Defendant Curtis Jones, age 17 at the time, was originally charged as a serious youthful offender with first-degree murder of an infant child. The prosecution eventually dismissed the murder charge and substituted child abuse resulting in death—a youthful offender offense—to which Defendant eventually pled guilty, agreed to an adult disposition, and received an adult sentence of 18 years imprisonment. In sentencing Defendant as an adult, the court did not first determine whether Defendant was amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile.
{2} Defendant argues that once the State dismissed the first-degree murder charge, he became an alleged youthful offender, not a serious youthful offender, making him eligible for a juvenile sentence. As a youthful offender, Defendant asks us to hold that the children's court lacked the authority to sentence him as an adult without first determining his amenability to treatment or rehabilitation as a juvenile, even if he did not ask for such a hearing and appeared to waive it. He now asks permission from this Court to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial as an alleged youthful offender.
{3} In construing the relevant statutes and our legal precedent, we are persuaded that Defendant is correct that he should have received an amenability determination before being sentenced as an adult. Rather than allow Defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea, however, we hold that his plea is void. The Court of Appeals having decided otherwise, we reverse and remand to the children's court for further proceedings.
{4} On July 22, 2004, Defendant Curtis Jones and his mother took Amy May, a one-year-old child, to the emergency room at Carlsbad Medical Center. Upon her arrival, medical personnel determined that Amy was suffering from internal bleeding, a skull fracture, and a bite mark on her right cheek. Because of the extent of her injuries, Amy was transferred to the University Medical Center in Lubbock, Texas, where she died a short time later. The subsequent medical examination yielded symptoms consistent with Amy having been violently shaken by someone and possibly striking her head. The physician who performed the examination also found signs of severe rectal trauma, anal tearing, and a contusion around her anus.
{5} Defendant, who was 17 years old at the time, explained Amy's injuries to hospital personnel and later to a law enforcement officer. According to Defendant, on the morning in question, his mother placed Amy on the couch for a nap and left the house to make a phone call at a nearby club. Defendant, who was then alone in the house with Amy, heard Amy crying a few minutes later. Defendant went to check on her and found her lying on the livingroom floor. Defendant picked Amy up to soothe her, and she stopped crying and began talking to him. A few moments later, however, she tensed up and stopped breathing. Defendant attempted to perform CPR and managed to revive her. He took her to the club to find his mother, and the three of them got a ride to the hospital. After hearing Defendant's explanation, which was largely identical to his mother's, medical personnel concluded that Amy's injuries were inconsistent with his story and contacted law enforcement.
{6} Ten days later, Defendant was charged with first-degree murder and bound over for trial. The State later amended the criminal information to add two counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor. Because the alleged murder took place when Defendant was 17 years old, he was charged as a serious youthful offender and set to be tried and sentenced as an adult. Shortly thereafter, Defendant moved the court to treat him as a juvenile, claiming that certain provisions of the Children's Code are unconstitutional because they allow a juvenile to be sentenced as an adult without the benefit of a jury finding that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment as a child. The court denied the motion.
{7} As the State was building its case against Defendant, the prosecution dropped the first-degree murder charge and amended the information, charging Defendant instead with child abuse in the first degree. NMSA 1978, § 30-6-1(E) (1973). Shortly before trial, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he pled no contest to the child abuse charge and agreed to be sentenced as an adult. In return, the State dropped the two counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor. The plea agreement included a provision stating, "There is no agreement as to sentencing other than that Defendant agrees to be sentenced as an adult." (Emphasis omitted.) The trial court accepted the plea and ordered a psychological evaluation of Defendant prior to sentencing.
{8} During the course of the evaluation, Defendant claimed for the first time that he was innocent and that his mother was responsible for Amy's death. Defendant moved the court to allow him to withdraw his plea. After a lengthy hearing in which Defendant testified and introduced multiple reports, transcripts, and prior testimony, the trial court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to the maximum adult sentence allowable; an 18-year prison term plus two years of parole. The trial court also found that Defendant's crime was a serious violent offense, thereby limiting his chance for early release for good behavior under NMSA 1978, Section 33-2-34(A)(1) (1988). The court did not conduct a hearing to determine whether Defendant was amenable to treatment as a juvenile in lieu of an adult sentence in prison.
{9} Defendant appealed, arguing that (1) only the children's court, and not the district court, had jurisdiction over him once the State dropped its first-degree murder charge, and (2) the district court erred in refusing to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. In a memorandum opinion, our Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction. Defendant petitioned for review, and we granted certiorari.
{¶ 10} We explained in State v. Muniz, 2003-NMSC-021, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 152, 74 P.3d 86, that our Delinquency Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-2-1 to -32.1 (1993, as amended through 2009), establishes three classes of juvenile offenders: serious youthful offenders, youthful offenders, and delinquent offenders. See § 32A-2-3(C), (H) and (J). A child's placement in one of those three categories determines (1) which rules of procedure apply at trial, and (2) the potential post-adjudication consequences the child will face if the State proves its case.
{11} The procedural and post-adjudication requirements pertaining to serious youthful offenders and delinquent offenders are relatively straightforward. On the one hand, the serious-youthful-offender category is limited to juveniles between the ages of 15 and 18 who are charged with first-degree murder. Section 32A-2-3(H). Once charged with first-degree murder, a serious youthful offender is no longer a juvenile within the meaning of the Delinquency Act, and therefore is no longer entitled to its protections. Id. As a result, serious youthful offenders are subject to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts applicable to adults and are automatically sentenced as adults if convicted. See id.; Rule 10-101(A)(2)(a) NMRA.
{12} A delinquent offender, on the other hand, is a child under the age of 18 who is determined to have committed a delinquent act—an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a crime less serious than first-degree murder or one of the enumerated offenses of a youthful offender. Compare § 32A-2-3(A) () with § 32A-2-3(J) (). Delinquent offenders are subject to the Children's Court Rules and can only be sentenced as juveniles. See Rule 10-101(A)(1).
{13} The requirements for youthful offenders, by contrast, are more complicated. Youthful offenders are delinquent children who potentially face either juvenile or adult sanctions, depending on the outcome of a special proceeding after adjudication known as an amenability hearing. A youthful offender is a child between the ages of 14 and 18 who is either (1) adjudicated guilty of any of a series of listed offenses which have less serious consequences than first-degree murder, including child abuse resulting in great bodily harm or death, or (2) adjudicated of any felony offense after having been adjudicated of three separate felony offenses in the preceding three years. See § 32A-2-3(J). The youthful offender category also includes children who are 14 years old and adjudicated of first-degree murder. Id.
{14} Like serious youthful offenders, alleged youthful offenders may be subject to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts, see Rule 10-101(A)(2)(b), and may be sentenced as adults, see § 32A-2-20. However, unlike a serious youthful offender, an alleged youthful offender is not automatically treated as an adult. To treat a child as a youthful offender—subject the child to adult sanctions—the State must comply with certain procedural requirements of the Delinquency Act and the Children's Court Rules. See § 32A-2-20 (...
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