State v. Jones, No. 57778
| Decision Date | 19 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 57778 |
| Citation | 806 S.W.2d 702 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sterling JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Scott E. Walter, Clayton, for defendant-appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Andrea K. Spillars, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Defendant Sterling Jones [hereinafter defendant] was charged with possession of a Schedule II controlled substance--cocaine in violation of § 195.020 RSMo (repealed 1989) and jury-tried. The jury found defendant guilty. He was sentenced to one year in the Missouri Department of Corrections according to § 195.200.1(1) RSMo (repealed 1989). The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial and this appeal follows.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state--meaning that we must accept as true all evidence whether direct or circumstantial, which tends to prove defendant guilty, together with all reasonable inferences supportive of the verdict. State v. Dulany, 781 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. banc 1989). We find the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict. The defendant does not dispute on appeal the facts pertaining to the arrest but claims error in allowing rebuttal evidence.
Defendant's first point on appeal is that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Eddie Givens [hereinafter Givens] to testify during rebuttal that he knew the defendant's witness, Tony Jones [hereinafter Jones], from an investigation of drug activity. He also claims the court erred in allowing Givens to further testify as to the circumstances of a custodial interrogation since that testimony pertained to impermissible "collateral" matters and such testimony was highly prejudicial.
Jones testified he was present at the time when defendant was arrested. When asked on direct examination if he had seen Officer Givens, one of the arresting officers, before this incident, Jones replied that he had. Defense counsel then asked Jones where he had previously seen Givens, to which he responded: "he [Givens] used to go up at National's [a supermarket] on Jefferson and me and a friend of mine's [sic] used to go up there a lot, talk to him, you know, because my friend knew him from somewhere." Later on direct examination, Jones, who was present at the time of the arrest of the defendant, testified that Givens asked Jones: "Don't I know you," to which Jones responded, "yeah, you know me from, you know, National."
On cross-examination of Jones, the prosecution asked Jones if he had seen Givens anywhere else other than at the National, to which Jones answered: "Yes." No further questions were asked by the prosecutor to explain this relationship. In rebuttal, the prosecutor recalled Givens and at that time defendant did not object.
An appellate court "will not entertain a claim of error in improperly admitting evidence unless the question was properly raised in the trial court." State v. Bibee, 496 S.W.2d 305, 317 (Mo.App.1973). Defendant did not object at trial or in his motion for new trial that Givens was an improper rebuttal witness.
The following is the rebuttal testimony of Detective Givens:
Q [By Mr. Leritz, Prosecutor] Now, do you know a man named Tony Jones?
A [By Eddie Givens] Yes, I do.
. . . . .
Q [by Mr. Leritz] Okay. Now, how was it you came to know Tony Jones?
A [by Eddie Givens] Tony Jones was brought to the District Station by Officer Mancell who is now a Detective in the Third Bureau and his partner at the time--I don't remember his partner's name--for suspected drug activity in the projects.
Q Okay, and did you and Finney talk to Tony Jones?
A Yes, I did.
Q Why was that? What was he arresting Tony Jones for?
Q (By Mr. Leritz) What was it about Tony Jones that led Mancell to bring him to you and Finney?
A During that time and since even before that time myself and Officer Finney was conducting an investigation in that area for suspected drug activity due to the numerous complaints that was received by the residents in that area due to the numerous shootings--well, the numerous drug-related shootings.
Q Okay, and that's what led to the arrest of Sterling Jones, also.
Q What sort of property did Tony Jones have on him?
MR. WALTER: Object, your Honor. What does Tony Jones' property have to do--
[Counsel approached the bench and the following proceedings were had outside the hearing of the jury.]
[The proceedings returned to open court.]
THE COURT: Before the Detective answers that question, ladies and gentlemen, this area that will be testified to, I am going to allow it only to explain Detective Givens, the contact Detective Givens has had with Tony Jones. Let's have the court reporter please read back the last question for the benefit of the jury.
[The last question was read by the reporter as follows: "What sort of property did Tony Jones have on him?"]
A Tony Jones had a large sum of money on him. It was a thousand plus dollars, and a beeper.
Q All right, and you say this was before the incident involving Sterling Jones?
A I believe so, yes.
Defense counsel's first "objection" occurred in response to the State's question of Givens, "What was he arresting Tony Jones for?" Defense counsel said:
"It is universally held in Missouri that specific objections are required to evidence, arguments, or statements of counsel, and the objection must call the attention of the Court to the ground or reason for the objection." State v. Lang, 515 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo.1974). An objection such as "I object" does not preserve any question for review. "The trial court must be given an opportunity to rule upon an objection giving stated reasons for exclusion." Id. See also State v. Hastings, 477 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Mo.1972) (). The trial court did not err in overruling this general objection.
Defense counsel's second "objection" occurred in response to the question: "What sort of property did Tony Jones have on him?" Counsel said: A bench conference was then held.
During the bench conference, defense counsel said "I object as irrelevant." The following exchange then occurred:
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